Unsurprisingly, international relations are based on established inter-state relationships. In the modern world, one of the most tenuous relationships is that between the United States and Iran. This relationship was once a bond that Washington took for granted under the Shah, Iran’s prior de-facto king. Since 1979, however, Iran views its global position as fundamentally revisionist, firmly opposing the US-led liberal world order.
However, a development in the relationship may occur with Masoud Pezeshkian's victory in the July 2024 Iranian presidential election. As a moderate, more “Western-friendly” candidate, Pezeshkian sought to differentiate himself from his hardliner opponents. Pezeshkian's unique tone and political stance position him well to shift Iran's place on the world stage. Nevertheless, Pezeshkian's success in this endeavor may depend on the receptiveness of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his pocket parliament.
Revisionist Legitimacy
Since the Iranian Revolution and the rise of the Ayatollah in 1979, Tehran has positioned itself as a revisionist power in the Middle East. Establishing itself primarily as a wedge against the Western-allied Gulf States, Iran continues to fulfill this role by supporting militant groups across the Middle East, primarily through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It has increasingly attempted to court favor with authoritarian regimes, such as China and Russia, to solidify an axis of power against Washington and its Western allies.
This current strategy represents a culmination of various institutional, legal, and functional changes that emphasize an aggressive approach to international relations, rather than a diplomatic, peacemaking posture. President Hassan Rouhani’s administration (2013-2021) negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015—in which Iran agreed to limit its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief—and sought to engage with its allies and adversaries diplomatically. However, under President Ebrahim Raisi (2021-2024), the Iranian government experienced centralization, militarization, and autocratization. Power and authority shifted from diplomatic to aggressive actors; the IRGC and Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) have slowly become the main authorities dictating Iran's foreign policy. The passage of Iran's new "development plan," ratified by the Iranian parliament in January 2024, crystallized this shift. The plan exempted various state institutions, including the armed forces and the Ministry of Intelligence, from coordinating with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before engaging in international relations. This legal shift—combined with the increasingly important role of the SNSC under Khamenei—means that Iran’s foreign policy is decreasingly driven by diplomats.
Former President Ebrahim Raisi's approach integrated this increasing centralization and militarization of Iran's foreign policy with two other vital components: anti-Westernism and authoritarianism. Increasingly, Tehran views Western nations as declining. In this vein, the Raisi administration sought to embrace Russia and China, who were more aligned with Tehran's vision of governance than Washington. This realignment was likely influenced by US pullout from the JCPOA in 2018 and the subsequent "maximum pressure" campaign, which imposed severe economic sanctions on Iran. While former President Rouhani and former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif continuously pursued the revival of the JCPOA, subsequent President Raisi did not consider the revival of the JCPOA a priority. One of the significant reasons why Raisi believed that Russia and China were more suitable international partners was the opportunity to share best practices on maintaining effective control over their respective populations. Both Russia and China support Tehran's efforts to control its cyberspace and shield itself from both internal and external threats.
As diplomatic institutions became eclipsed by the armed forces and the IRGC, it became increasingly evident to Washington and its allies that containment, not cooperation, is the optimal strategy with Iran.
Raisi: A Well-Trodden Path to Power
Initially appointed as prosecutor of Karaj, a city northwest of Tehran, in 1981, Ebrahim Raisi began climbing up the judicial hierarchy. He became the deputy prosecutor of Tehran in 1985 and participated in the infamous 1988 death commission, during which the government executed between 2,800 and 5,000 political dissidents. With his participation in the commission and apparent lack of remorse, Raisi earned the nickname the "Butcher of Tehran." After the death of former Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini and the subsequent succession of his son, Ali Khamenei, to office in 1989, Raisi increasingly engaged with his political ambitions. In 1989, Raisi was promoted to Tehran Revolutionary Prosecutor, which he held for five years before former Chief Justice Mohammed Yazdi appointed him as head of the General Inspector's Office in 1994.
While serving as chairman of the Astan Quds Razavi—a wealthy charity that manages the Imam Reza shrine—Raisi was selected by the Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Force (JAMNA) as a presidential candidate in 2017. Although Rouhani was re-elected in 2017, Raisi won the 2021 presidential election with 63 percent of the vote, amid low turnout and accusations of electoral rigging. His election to the presidency solidified the rule of the Principlist faction of the Iranian parliament, a far-right, conservative coalition that aligns with the hardline positions of Khamenei and supports the original ideological tenets of the 1979 revolution.
But what did the "Butcher of Tehran" represent? Would he moderate after being elected to higher office, or would he default to his prior instincts for brutality? The death of Mahsa Amini—a 22-year-old Kurdish woman who was arrested and beaten to death by the Iranian "morality police" for allegedly failing to comply with hijab rules—answered this question. The event spurred a massive movement for women's rights and against the hardline actions that characterized Raisi's career. Raisi equally expressed this iron-fisted method of leadership in his approach to foreign policy, supporting the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan and the expansion of the IRGC. He also courted diplomatic favor with China and Russia. This made Raisi highly favorable to Khamenei. In 2019, Al Jazeera described Raisi as "the most likely successor of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei," reflecting his prominent status in Iranian domestic and foreign politics.
Given his deeply conservative and autocratic approach to governance, the rise of Raisi made the prospect of US-Iran cooperation seem unlikely. However, on May 19, 2024, Raisi and several of his ministers abruptly perished when their helicopter crashed over a village in East Azerbaijan. Iranian media declared them "martyrs," and Khamenei announced five days of national mourning. In the wake of this national tragedy, the prospect of Iran altering its geopolitical position became increasingly likely.
Enter, Pezeshkian
Pezeshkian did not follow the same well-trodden path to political power as Raisi. Pezeshkian started his career in medicine, and after earning a subspecialty from the Iran University of Medical Sciences, he became a cardiac surgeon. In 1994, he was appointed president of Tabriz University of Medical Sciences, a position he held for five years. On paper, Pezeshkian had no connection to politics, but this changed dramatically in 1997.
Former President Mohammed Khatami appointed Pezeshkian as deputy health minister in 1997, and he later rose to health minister, serving from 2001 to 2005. During this time, Pezeshkian was exposed to Khatami's reformist style of governance, which influenced both his political leanings and aspirations. However, he distinctly avoided explicitly declaring sides, describing himself as a "reformist principlist" and stating: "I am a principlist, and it is for these principles that we seek reform." After his service in the health ministry, Pezeshkian ran for parliament; he has represented the city of Tabriz since 2008, and he served as Deputy Speaker from 2016 to 2020. Notably, Pezeshkian criticized Tehran’s intense crackdown on protests after the 2009 presidential election dispute, which drew backlash from right-wing, conservative politicians.
However, following Raisi's untimely helicopter crash in May 2024, Pezeshkian found an opportunity to achieve political success. After protests raged on behalf of the Women, Life, Freedom movement following Amini's death, the country yearned for an alternative to hardline rule. In a surprise decision, after denying his application to run in 2021, the Council of Guardians approved Pezeshkian’s candidacy for president.
Pezeshkian represented an alternative to the conservative rule Iran experienced under Raisi. He also supported protest movements, famously chastising the government's response to the anti-corruption protests following the controversial 2009 presidential election. After Amini's death, Pezeshkian released the following statement: "In the Islamic Republic it is unacceptable to arrest a girl for how she wears her hijab and then to hand her body to her family... May God have mercy on us, our children, and the future of our land." However, in an effort to balance this rhetoric, he has expressed loyalty to Khamenei.
The initial results of the 2024 election were inconclusive, forcing Pezeshkian and his principlist rival Saeed Jalil into a run-off. On July 6, Pezeshkian won the run-off with 53.7 percent of the vote, and he was officially endorsed by Khamenei for the presidency on July 28. While many, both domestically and internationally, view this victory as an orchestrated strategy to pacify protests against Khamenei, Pezeshkian's rise to power and his political shrewdness renewed the opportunity for the West to engage Tehran in negotiations.
Threading the Needle: The "Reformist Principlist"
Pezeshkian's foreign policy agenda conflicts with Tehran's geopolitical strategy under his predecessor. So far, Pezeshkian’s presidency has carefully forged a middle ground between reformist and principlist factions. In August, all of his Cabinet members were approved by hardline members of parliament, reflecting Pezeshkian’s willingness to compromise with theocratic forces. However, he also appointed the first-ever female government spokesperson, Fatemeh Mohajerani, and vehemently opposed the new “chastity and hijab” law passed by the hardline parliament in September.
Pezeshkian’s gift lies in balancing the hardline conservative bent of Iranian politics and the desire to improve relations with the West. Albeit encumbered by principlist restrictions, Pezeshkian could bridge the divide between Washington and Tehran if the West is willing to engage diplomatically. Pezeshkian stated in September that Tehran is ready for “constructive” dialogue and is “ready to engage” with the West about nuclear power. He has also indicated willingness to improve relations with the United States to reduce economic sanctions. If the United States is willing to negotiate with his administration on a revised version of the JCPOA, guaranteeing its survival beyond a handshake, Pezeshkian could bring Iran back to the diplomatic table. Pezeshkian has also declared he wants to engage with Tehran's "European partners" on renegotiating the nuclear deal. Supported by Zarif in his presidential campaign, Pezeshkian seemingly wishes to take a page out of his book: cautiously engaging with Washington and its allies, while continuing to look east for new partnerships.
However, barriers to friendly US-Iran relations remain. Importantly, Pezeshkian zeroes in on the JCPOA as an example of Washington’s and the West's mistreatment of Iran. The reelection of Donald Trump—who pulled the United States out of the JCPOA originally—also poses challenges for the revival of the deal. Pezeshkian has highlighted ongoing tensions with the United States, stating: “The U.S. deliberately chose to escalate hostilities by waging not only an economic war against Iran but also engaging in state terrorism by assassinating General Qasem Soleimani.” Pezeshkian also advocates for improved relations with Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, citing economic reasons. Notably, he urges Western states to stop sending military support to Israel, an “apartheid regime” committing acts of “genocide.”
Furthermore, the IRGC will continue to enjoy support from Tehran and expand its power in the Middle East. It is equally likely that Russia and China will persist as Iran's partners of favor, solidifying the "axis of resistance" against the West and the "liberal world order." During a meeting with China's vice premier Zhang Guoqing on December 4, Pezeshkian stated: "The United States pursues authoritarianism and unilateralism on the international stage…We are determined to expand our cooperation with China and Russia to counter unilateralism."
While his election to the presidency could alter Iran's foreign policy, it stands firmly against the Majles and the interests of the SNSC and IRGC. Khamenei and the IRGC's increasingly unilateral control over the direction of Iran's geopolitics will restrict Pezeshkian’s ability to affect change. The full political consequences of Pezeshkian’s presidency could therefore be determined after the death of Khamenei and the appointment of his replacement. Whether this new ayatollah will be receptive to this "reformist principlist" approach to leadership is yet to be seen. Dialogue between the West and Pezeshkian could chart a new course for Iranian foreign policy and relations.
