Junta Rule in the Sahel: Decolonization and Destabilization

Junta Rule in the Sahel: Decolonization and Destabilization

. 8 min read

On September 16, 2023, three West African states—Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso—formed a mutual defense pact called the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The founding of the alliance followed a string of coups in the countries between 2020 and 2023, wherein military juntas ousted former leaders and seized power.

Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are part of Françafrique, a pejorative term for France’s sphere of influence in sub-Saharan Africa following decolonization. They face arduous challenges in terms of development: Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso rank 188, 189, and 185, respectively, out of 193 countries on the Human Development Index. The coupling of these two facts mean that the juntas have largely blamed the region’s instability on French (and, more broadly, Western) domination. A rejection of Western influence and the international system thus characterizes these coups.

The Sahel’s governmental changes and new policies can be seen as decolonization, an interpretation championed by the juntas. Nevertheless, persistent terrorism, rising pro-Russian sentiment, and absent attempts to reinstitute democracy paint a different picture. The contentious nature of junta rule in the Sahel demonstrates the challenges of strengthening self-determination in the Global South in the absence of steady development. The situation begs the question: how should fragile states balance sovereignty and stability? What risks come with diverging from the Western international order, and how can international institutions respond to the grievances of dissident states?

Western Withdrawal and Military Coups

The Sahel has long been a focal point of global security concerns, primarily due to the influx of Islamist insurgency groups into the region following the collapse of the Libyan state in 2011. In 2013, international involvement began when French forces entered Mali upon request from its government at the time (termed “Operation Serval,” then later “Operation Barkhane”). The United States followed suit in deploying forces in the region.

In August 2020, however, Mali experienced a military-led coup that led to the resignation of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, who was seen as a symbol of corruption and inefficiency. On July 13, 2021, following increasing pressure by the juntas, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that Operation Barkhane would end in the first quarter of 2022. In May 2022, the Malian government terminated its Defense Cooperation Treaty with France and the Status of Force Agreement that facilitated French and EU operations in the country.

Burkina Faso soon followed suit. On September 30, 2022, Army Captain Ibrahim Traoré led the second coup in Burkina Faso that year. Dissolving the transitional government of military leader President Paul-Henri Damiba, who came into power after the first coup, Traoré’s junta cited Damiba’s inability to address the challenges with terrorism as a reason for the overthrow. In January 2023, the Burkinabé junta gave France one month to withdraw its troops, ending a military accord between the two countries.

Pro-junta Demonstration in Bamako, Mali in 2021. Moctar Barry / Wikimedia Commons.

The last of the military-led coups occurred in Niger on July 26, 2023. With Niger seen as the last bulwark of France’s counterinsurgency efforts in the Sahel, the coup marked a critical end to Western influence in the region. The junta publicly accused France of trying to destabilize the country. The last French troops deployed to Niger subsequently left in December 2023. Niger was also a key strategic partner for the United States in the region and the largest recipient of US Department of State military assistance in West Africa. Nevertheless, in early August 2024, the United States handed over its last military base in Niger. Soon after, Germany withdrew its last soldiers as well.

Cutting Colonial Ties and Rejecting the West

In the Sahel, resentment against Western states is not haphazard but instead rooted deeply in the region’s fraught colonial history. Anti-French—and, more broadly, anti-Western—sentiment is not simply the ideology of the juntas but is also widely embraced by the general public. These sentiments have manifested in popular, often violent, protests.

In Burkina Faso, shortly following the coup in October 2022, junta leader Traoré claimed that the toppled military leader Damiba was planning a counteroffensive from a “French base.” Subsequently, hundreds of angry demonstrators gathered and set fire to the French embassy.

Similarly, the spokesman for Niger’s junta warned the public of an impending “plan of aggression” by France shortly after its own successful coup in July 2023. Like in Burkina Faso, thousands of Nigerians marched toward the French embassy, chanting “Down with France” before they smashed windows and set a door on fire.

The juntas’ grievances are not unfounded: France exercises an outsized amount of influence over its former colonies. Fourteen former French colonies in Africa still use the CFA franc, a currency that has its value pegged to French currencies (first to the franc and then the euro). Until 2020, these states also had to keep 50 percent of their reserves in the French Treasury in return for a convertibility guarantee. France also operates various extractive industries in the Sahel, with 20 percent of the uranium it uses for energy production coming from Niger alone.

Discontent with France, however, has alarmingly translated into the rejection of all institutions with significant ties to the West. The three AES junta governments have not only retreated from Western military forces but also withdrawn from one of the major security agreements in the region: the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel), established in 2014 in the name of combating terrorism. Mali was the first to leave in 2017 while Burkina Faso and Niger announced their withdrawals on December 2, 2023.  In December 2023, the UN Multidimensions Integrated Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) also ceased its operations in the region after ten years of deployment.

Envoys of the G5 Sahel at the Congress Palace of Niamey in 2018. Abdoul-Razak Idrissa / Wikimedia Commons

This exit also has resounding effects on neighbors of the AES. In January 2024, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso announced their departure from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)—an economic bloc that had become a critical bulwark of Western influence in the region. An important facilitator of diplomacy, the bloc was also instrumental in creating a Schengen-esque area of free movement among its member countries and supplying peacekeeping forces. The departure of AES states rings the death knell for the bloc, whose founding convention stated that it can be dissolved upon the request of at least three member states.

Pivoting Alliances: The Role of Russia

Assimi Goïta (President of Mali) meets Vladimir Putin in 2023. President of Russia, Kremlin / Wikimedia Commons

In addition to rejection of Western military intervention and exit from institutions with Western ties, the AES states are also becoming increasingly reliant on Russian forces, especially the Wagner group, a state-funded private mercenary group often used as a proxy for the Kremlin. The group’s activities in the region began in the early days of the juntas, with its initial arrival in Mali in December 2021.

Russia’s military alliance spans multiple dimensions: its stakes in the region are both historical and geopolitical. Like France, Russia’s influence in the Sahel predates its contemporary involvement. In the 20th century, African nations initiated diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union along with the rise in socialism’s popularity. Mali established ties with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, followed by Niger in the 1970s.

Russia also holds stakes in the region’s various resources, and these stakes are closely tied to its military endeavors. Russia has traditionally thrived in countries where governance is limited, securing access to resources like gold, diamond, cobalt, and oil throughout Africa. In late 2016, the Wagner group deployed forces in Sudan in exchange for gold-mining concessions. The Sahel is similarly rich in natural resources—such as oil, uranium, natural gas, and lithium—which are ripe for Russian control as France’s control dwindles.

These advantages of presence in the Sahel have motivated Russia to occupy the newly created power vacuum. It has used the media as a channel for disinformation, which has been widely accepted due to the existing anti-Western sentiment in the region. Since the wave of military coups, pro-Russian sentiment has increased in the Sahel; Russia’s provision of arms and troops paired with its support for the junta governments represents an alternative to the Western condemnation of military rule.

However, Russian involvement has not proven to be much more effective in bringing peace than Western military intervention, and terrorism continues to plague the region. On September 17, 2024, Bamako, the capital of Mali, suffered its first major attack since 2015. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) militants attacked a military barracks, highlighting persisting security challenges.

The Sahel’s pivot from the West to Russia also has implications for global conflicts, especially the Russia-Ukraine War: in early August 2024, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso jointly issued an open letter to the UN Security Council condemning Ukraine, claiming that Kyiv had supported terrorist groups in northern Mali.

The Russian rise to power in the Sahel—facilitated by the power vacuum left by the West’s withdrawal—has both regional and global implications. While a return to the days of extensive Western intervention seems unlikely, global institutions like the United Nations continue to seek solutions for the violence proliferating in the region; these range from improving state capacity through increasing resources to developing political cohesion and participation.

Democracy Delayed

Even though they promote populist rhetoric such as anti-Western sentiments and discontent at the former bureaucracy, the juntas have failed to reinstate mechanisms that, in practice, grant power to the greater public. Although the states have all pledged to suspend military rule and return to civilian rule, these plans have been repeatedly delayed, and there has been no transition into effective democracy.

Mali’s election, which was set for February 4, 2024 (nearly three years after the August 2020 coup) was postponed indefinitely in September 2023 due to “technical reasons.” This postponement marks the second extension from the initial proposed date of February 2022, which was agreed upon following pressure from ECOWAS. After further negotiations, however, the junta government proposed a longer five-year transition plan to full democracy, drawing the condemnation of opposition parties.

Burkina Faso has similarly extended its military rule. When Traoré seized power, he pledged to restore civilian government by July 1, 2024. In May 2024, however, Burkina Faso joined Mali in extending its transition period by an additional five years. Under the amended charter, quotas will no longer be used to assign seats in the assembly to members of traditional parties.

These delays, coupled with diminished political representation, reflect the broader challenges facing the Sahel in its struggle to balance sovereignty, stability, and the democratic aspirations of both their people and the international community.

A Complicated Situation

The rise of junta rule in the Sahel represents a complex interplay between decolonization and destabilization. While these regimes have successfully distanced themselves from Western influence, particularly France, they have struggled to provide security—sometimes worsening the terrorist threat—or pave a clear path to democracy. The pivot toward Russia has yet to offer a viable solution to persistent terrorism, and prolonged military rule further delays the prospect of democratic governance. Geopolitical realignment with Russia instead of global democracies further undermines this prospect. As the AES states navigate this precarious shift, the Sahel’s future remains uncertain, with both regional stability and global implications hanging in the balance.