For many, the fall of the Soviet Union was cause for celebration; from the end of the nuclear arms race to the emergence of the United States as the superior economic power, an era of prosperity emerged. However, as nations evolve, so do the threats they face. Without a strong, central government to exert control over the Soviet stockpile of nuclear weapons, the emerging peaceful world order faced a new existential problem: “loose nukes.”
In the 1990s, over one million Russians worked in nuclear facilities that possessed over 1.5 million kilograms of plutonium and uranium. Those one million Russians also lived in a nation facing compounding economic, political, and social crises. Thus, a new worry began to plague Russian and US nuclear experts: desperate Russians being persuaded to share classified nuclear material with the highest bidder.
The US and Russian governments immediately sprang into action. Containment efforts were created and funded, such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Act. Barriers to scientific collaboration were dismantled, leading to collaborative efforts between US and Russian scientists. Because both sides recognized the catastrophic risks posed by loose nukes, a commitment to solve emerging nuclear threats emerged. Thus, nuclear threats were never realized during the 20th century.
Although several decades have passed since the impetus for worry surrounding illicit nuclear markets, the threat remains. From Ukraine to Taiwan to North Korea to Pakistan, the stability of the nuclear order is continuously being called into question by leaders who seem willing to plunge the world into full-scale nuclear war. As the world enters this period of nuclear instability, the geopolitical risk of unpredictable nuclear developments cannot be overstated.
Experts agree that the highest risk of nuclear catastrophe stems from new nuclear states. These nations lack the sophisticated and time-tested capabilities to ensure stability and are unpredictable, having never before possessed the power of a nuclear arsenal. Illicit markets also allow for terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials. These actors are not constrained by the logic of mutually assured destruction nor international agreements of restraint. Their operation at a sub-state level compounds risks of miscalculation and inadvertent escalation, demonstrating the high costs of allowing these markets to operate.
The world may have evaded the formation of an illicit nuclear market in the 20th century, but more recently, we have not been as lucky.
In 2001, a single man threatened to upend the continued tradition of nuclear non-use: Abdul Qadeer Khan. Considered a hero in the East and a terrorist in the West, Khan was the father of the Pakistani nuclear program. He used his extensive knowledge of nuclear materials and processing to successfully acquire Pakistan’s first nuclear weapon. However, Khan did not stop there. He then sold his knowledge on the black market, resulting in the export of nuclear materials to states including Libya, Iran, and North Korea.
These developments suggest that—despite the scare of the 1990s—the international community did not subsequently eradicate illicit nuclear markets.
The Man Who Almost Broke the World
In 1974, India performed its first test of nuclear weapons. Immediately, the Pakistani government felt threatened. Tensions have been strained between the two nations since the creation of the Pakistani state by the British in 1947. Territorial disputes between the Muslim-majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India continue even to this day.
Thus, after word of Indian nuclear weapons spread, Khan was quickly overcome with nationalist sentiment. He wrote to Pakistani leadership to offer his services in the quest for a domestic Pakistani nuclear deterrent.
Khan had been working in the Netherlands at Urenco, the world’s largest uranium enrichment company. Now, Dutch officials were certain Khan was not just wanting to improve his work—he was observed asking “suspicious questions” to experts on the enrichment process. Thus, in early 1975, Khan was moved off of projects related to enrichment. In response, Khan returned to Pakistan, bringing copies of classified blueprints that would later become his own nuclear bible. His work on the Pakistani weapons began almost immediately, and by 1978, Pakistan enriched uranium for the first time.
Unbeknownst to international agencies at the time, other non-nuclear nations began to approach Khan to aid their own domestic nuclear programs. In 1987, Khan closed a deal with Iran, agreeing to sell the necessary knowledge for the construction of a uranium enrichment facility. His business dealings did not end in the Middle East—throughout the 1990s, Khan traveled throughout Africa, visiting countries including Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Sudan, and Tunisia.
In 2000, Khan took his black market operation above ground and decided to advertise his nuclear weapons at the Karachi arms fair in a mushroom cloud-shaped brochure. This decision led to an immediate investigation into Khan’s business dealings, and in the early 2000s, Khan finally confessed publicly to supplying illicit nuclear weapons. Despite being charged with a multitude of crimes, Khan was ultimately pardoned by the Pakistani leadership. Unable to be captured by Western authorities, he lived the rest of his days under house arrest until he finally passed away in 2021.
However, threats to global stability did not fade away with Khan.
Future of the Illicit Trade
In 2021, there were 146 incidents globally involving the transfer of items related to illicit nuclear weapons development. This number is only projected to increase as global tensions rise and technology removes barriers that previously blocked entry into the nuclear domain.
Specifically, reports warn of the growing accessibility of illicit nuclear goods to growing terrorist networks. Groups like Al-Qaeda are expected to continue their attempts to acquire the bomb, and with new momentum, pose a unique threat to the nuclear order.
When one pictures a facility that houses nuclear weapons, one likely thinks of military bases overflowing with security personnel and advanced anti-theft systems. Unfortunately, however, many nuclear facilities remain vulnerable to theft. Experts agree that lack of access to nuclear materials is the largest roadblock to terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons; therefore, insecure nuclear sites currently pose an incredibly large risk.
Turkey
At present, the United States and NATO store 20 B-61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, which has been the center of continued controversy in the past few years. In 2010, activists easily entered the compound and walked freely through the nuclear vaults for over an hour before security arrived. This incident raises critical questions. If an unarmed group can get inside a military compound, what will happen if a small army of dangerous actors knocks on the door?
What is more worrying is that Turkey is entering a period of political instability. A crumbling economy and questions of electoral legitimacy are plaguing the nation. In past years, this turbulence has led to power being cut off to certain regions of the nation, including Incirlik. In 2016, a blackout occurred right as anti-US protestors arrived at the base’s perimeter. Later, the base’s commander was arrested after authorities realized he had helped the protestors organize an attempted coup.
Clearly, 20 unguarded nuclear weapons in an unstable region pose significant security risks. These bombs also provide little military utility—the United States possesses a litany of other similar weapons in other bases that are more secure.
Libya
Problems of nuclear material security do not start nor end with the United States. In early 2023, the United Nations reported that 2.3 tons of uranium had gone missing in Libya. That amount can be converted into 12 pounds of weapons-grade material if one possesses the requisite capability—a capability made easier to acquire with Khan’s exporting of nuclear knowledge.
While there are reports that the materials have since been found, any uncertainty about their security for any amount of time is dangerous. Even if a group lacked the ability to enrich the materials, natural uranium could be packed into conventional weapons, resulting in catastrophe. According to Libyan government officials, the barrels were found by groups from neighboring Chad that abandoned the barrels after realizing they were not full of weapons. It was sheer luck the barrels were not found by groups with more insidious motives.
The Age of Nuclear Insecurity
As we enter an age of unknowns, we cannot risk adding loose nuclear weapons to the growing list of pressing global issues. Although the United States has increased radiation detection equipment, monitored exports and imports, and provided assistance to developing nations in order to curtail illicit access to nuclear materials, ongoing security issues suggest that these efforts are falling short.
After the USSR fell, regulating loose nuclear weapons catalyzed cooperation between two superpowers otherwise extremely divided. Currently, those tensions are escalating due to the failure of arms control agreements as well as the ongoing war in Ukraine. Hopefully, leaders in charge will recognize that the illicit trade of nuclear materials poses a threat to everyone and be willing to cooperate.
Domestic regulations are insufficient because the nuclear trade is a global issue. International agencies—such as the International Atomic Energy Agency—need to be granted much greater authority to ensure the safety of nuclear material. In addition, more research needs to be done to create a mechanism capable of effectively deconstructing nuclear weapons after their disarmament.
Now is the time to prevent the greatest threat to the nuclear order. Preventing the illegitimate proliferation of nuclear weapons is the only way to preserve the nuclear taboo.
