Central Asia in the Global Calculus: An Interview with Ambassador George Krol (Part 1)

Ambassador George Krol is a senior U.S. foreign officer, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Belarus, from 2003 to 2006, to Uzbekistan, from 2011 to 2014, and to Kazakhstan, from 2015 to 2018. He completed his undergraduate studies at Harvard, as a resident of Quincy House, in 1978 and began his career in the U.S. Foreign Service in 1982 and was posted to Poland, India, USSR, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. He served as Special Assistant to the Ambassador-at-Large for the New Independent States and as Director of the Office of Russian Affairs. Prior to his nomination as Ambassador to Uzbekistan, he also served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. He retired from the Foreign Service in 2018 after completing 36 years of service. Today, he teaches as an Adjunct Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and is a Local Affiliate of Harvard’s Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies.

Based on your experience serving in Central Asia, how has the region’s strategic importance evolved since the post-Soviet 1990s, and what do you see as the most significant drivers of that evolution today?

I first came to Central Asia in the 1990s, shortly after it became independent, when I was the Special Assistant to our then Ambassador-at-Large for the newly independent states formed after the breakup of the Soviet Union. That was the first time I traveled with Ambassador James Collins. We traveled throughout Central Asia between 1995 and 1996. Thus, I did have some insight into that early period where, from the perspective of the United States government and much of the outside world, Central Asia was really a terra incognita. It was not a place that was visited by diplomats, and there was not much international engagement with those Soviet Socialist Republics. They were basically closed zones and would be opened up only on rare occasions for cultural exchanges in Tashkent. At the time, Uzbekistan was the window to Soviet Central Asia that the Soviets wanted to demonstrate to the rest of the world, as it would show how the Soviet Union had developed the region in the Soviet style as opposed to imperialistic colonialism in other parts of the world.

When these republics gained independence, they were still largely unknown. So, there was a great deal of curiosity in much of the world as to what the region has to offer. American energy companies were particularly interested in oil, gas, and minerals because they understood that Central Asia was a rich and unexplored area. Other countries, such as China, also took an interest in the region’s resources. Turkey took an interest in bringing the states into the orbit of the Turkic world. The Islamic states—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and others—saw this as an opportunity to bring what they considered to be historic Muslim countries into the Islamic world.

One of the reasons why Russia decided to break away from the Soviet Union was the feeling that the Central Asian republics drained resources from the rest of the Soviet Union and that they were practically subsidizing them. There was a feeling in the Western Soviet republics that they were rich and powerful, and that the Central Asians were a drag on their economy. They felt that the Central Asians needed them more than they needed them. Other Soviet Republics perceived Central Asia as the most backward part of the USSR. In the 90s, it seemed as though independence came to Central Asia out of nowhere since it was not something that any of the republics were advocating for. They had to immediately become responsible for their economics, their security, their social welfare, and the like. After an utter economic collapse caused by the breakdown of the ties that bound the different units of the Soviet centralized economy together, a period of rebuilding followed.

Central Asia was an area of interest to the outside world, but it was also an area of concern because it was thought of as an ethnic powder keg, especially places like the Fergana Valley, where borders had been drawn by the Soviet authorities. It was believed that this area could become a center for inter-ethnic violence. The Chinese were concerned that Uyghur minorities in Central Asia could become a crucible for Uyghur separatism. So, there was some apprehension from the outside world as it was looking at Central Asia’s development. At the same time, Central Asians were developing their own sense of identity and their own politics, and they became very distinct, leading to them splitting apart. The integrated schemes of the Soviet era shaped the electricity grid and the transportation networks that connected the people across the region. Borders becoming actual borders, the civil war in Tajikistan, and the isolationist policies in Turkmenistan led to the division of populations.

The big change came after 9/11, when American and NATO coalition forces entered Afghanistan. Central Asia became important for US security because it could serve as a secondary transit area for bringing troops and material into Afghanistan. The two developed a security relationship with transit routes; there were military bases in Uzbekistan and later in Kyrgyzstan. Thus, Central Asia grew in importance for the United States and also became the focal point of policies aimed at developing the north-south trade route in order to integrate Afghanistan with Central Asia and South Asia. In the State Department, Central Asia was therefore moved from the European to the South Asia Bureau. Preventing Russian domination of this region, as well as allowing the states to develop ties with the external world and the global economy, was also a policy pursued both by the United States and the European powers.

China, meanwhile, was developing its economic and political relationships with these countries quietly. It viewed the region as rich in resources and as a viable alternative transit route. That became an important element for the evolution of Central Asia’s importance after the United States left Afghanistan.

The region became particularly important after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. For Russia, Central Asia was crucial for access to goods and technologies after sanctions had cut many of the direct ties with Europe. China continued its development of the transit routes, and the United States pulled away from Central Asia after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, but it is still trying to push for it to become more resilient. There was no substantial effort underway, despite the discussion of the Middle Corridor that the United States supported at the time. The southern route fell out of favor not only because of Afghanistan, which is now in the hands of the Taliban, but also Iran, which has always been a problem for the United States.

With the new US administration, there seems to be a renewed interest in Central Asia as a source of critical minerals, rare earths, and hydrocarbons—resources that would be necessary for US military spending. The region has moved into a phase of heightened interest from the United States and continued interest from Russia and China. Central Asians have pushed away the embrace of the Islamic world, but they do still want the economic investments from these countries, so long as they do not lead to the spread of religious influence on the population.

In 2013, you received the Order of Friendship from President Islam Karimov, and in 2018, you were awarded the Order of Dostyk by President Nursultan Nazarbayev for your contribution to the development of bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and the U.S. Given your experience engaging with Central Asian governments, what internal challenges pose the greatest risk to stability in Central Asia?

Stability in Central Asia largely depends on how well the governments can control the population and meet their needs. One of the challenges facing the entire region is the increase in population. The majority of the population is very young and has not experienced the Soviet period of the existence of these republics—this is a different generation that may have different needs and desires. There is also the economic challenge: the leaders of these countries want to satisfy the economic needs of the growing population, which they need to do by developing their economic base, but that is difficult because it requires opening up their economies. Furthermore, because public goods, such as education and health care, tend to be very expensive, the countries have to find ways of financing them while also avoiding the emergence of political competition.

There has traditionally been fear that political competition will only bring about insecurity and instability as various groups and peoples mobilize to express their needs, often citing Kyrgyzstan as an example. What happens if you have a system that, on the face of it, appears democratic but is then challenged in such a dramatic way? Changes of government would largely follow demonstrations and overthrows rather than proper elections. Furthermore, popular dissatisfaction could be manipulated by other parties that have the resources to remove their competition from the government. We have seen this happen in Kyrgyzstan and almost in Kazakhstan as well. Questions of how to manipulate the populations are therefore very much on the minds of regional leaders.

Furthermore, it is understood that the development of nationalism and national identities in these countries can bring about ethnic turmoil, as it did in Kyrgyzstan with the deadly clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyzs that took place in the southern part of the country in 2010. There is also the issue of the Fergana Valley, the most populous part of Central Asia that contains a variety of ethnic groups wedged together in a relatively small area. The borders created under the Soviet Union created many enclaves within states in the Valley, and have divided up important resources. Thus, the larger cities in Uzbekistan depend upon the water coming from Kyrgyzstan. This is another area of potential instability. Although it is important to note that the countries themselves seem to be finding ways of resolving their problems without seeking external intervention.

There is also the concern of religion—as the population becomes more influenced by religion, in particular Islam, the chances of a confrontation with the secular government authorities, which often seek to control or eliminate certain forms of Islam that they feel are threatening to the domestic peace and tranquility of society. Overall, there appears to be a confrontation between an evolving society and the controlling regime, which has to respond to the challenge one way or another. The way these governments handle the situation could lead to violence and to greater instability, which may invite foreign intervention in one form or another and can lead to unforeseen consequences.

Central Asia is rich in natural resources, which have long been a key reason for its geopolitical relevance. However, the region remains particularly vulnerable to global warming, grappling with increasingly severe droughts. To what extent do you believe global energy transitions—renewables, diversification, and decarbonization—will impact the region’s leverage?

With regard to the droughts, the melting of glaciers in the Kyrgyz and Tajik mountains in particular will lead to greater uncertainty in the future. The water that flows down the mountains provides hydroelectric power for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which they can then sell to other states. This is also one of the reasons why Central Asia is important for South Asia, because it could export the additional electricity through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India. Though this could be quite problematic since the necessary infrastructure is not there. The topic of energy transition is also concerning for Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, since the three were known before for their large hydrocarbon resources. Turkmenistan possesses the fifth-largest reserve of gas in the world. Uzbekistan used to have a lot of gas, but this has diminished over time.

As for Kazakhstan, most of its oil reserves are located in the western part of the country, and a large part of the oil has been shipped abroad for refinement through the northern Russian pipeline. Though these exports have been suspended due to a Ukrainian strike on the Novorossiysk oil-exporting infrastructure. One of the main challenges facing Central Asians is therefore also the so-called land law. Exporting all of these ores, minerals, gas, and oil overseas requires the construction of pipelines that go through other countries to reach ports. Ports in the Persian Gulf, particularly the Bandar Abbas port, which can be reached through Iran, make the most sense. But seaport access routes that go through other countries create political problems. Take, for example, the Novorossiysk port. The ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia has made the Black Sea a contested and unstable route. As such, another issue that the Central Asian region faces is the surrounding conflicts, which hinder its trade relations.

To be sure, the region’s energy resources are diminishing over time, and the countries do not have the capacity or the industry to fully replace them with other renewable forms. Kazakhstan, which has a lot of uranium, is planning to build nuclear power plants with help from the Russians. The nuclear energy industry and the refining of uranium in Kazakhstan still greatly depend on Russia. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, is looking at solar power. When I was in Uzbekistan, I could see that, even in isolated villages, practically every house had solar panels—Chinese solar panels—and generators, which would provide them with energy for their household appliances. I think that this was a reaction to the fact that they were cut off from the main electricity grids. It is likely that Uzbekistan has since embraced the use of solar energy even more strongly.

Wind power is also gaining prominence, though it is particularly popular in poorer countries, like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Other than hydro power, these two countries have large reserves of coal, which is very dirty and largely unfavored, and if they are unable to find alternatives, they would have to return to using it as an additional source of energy. In the eastern region of Kazakhstan, near Astana and Almaty, there are still huge reserves of coal, though the Kazakhs do not want to use them because of the pollution effects they have on their cities. If you have ever been to Almaty, you will know that when there is an inversion, it is hard to see through the smog. I imagine they do not want to continue with this. So they have to overcome the challenges of finding renewables and exploiting them for their domestic use.

The Central Asians also face problems when it comes to exporting their resources. There is as of yet no pipeline that would stretch across the Caspian Sea to bring the vast reserve of Turkmen gas westward to European markets. The question is, where would all of the infrastructure go? After all, the Caspian Sea was once a barrier, but it could join the countries together. It is true, however, that the Caspian Sea has been an area of contention, because it is not only Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan that have access to it—Iran, Russia, and Azerbaijan also share the coast. So, from the standpoint of their resource base, these are all matters one has to keep in mind. If the United States wishes to invest, then a big challenge will be how to get the ores out of the region. The most efficient means have been through railway networks that go through Russia—extraction through other means, even across the Caspian, is difficult.

Kazakhstan is trying to ship its oil across the Caspian through barges, but it is not as efficient as a pipeline. However, building a pipeline is very expensive. At the same time, the water level in the Caspian Sea is decreasing, which is making shipping, particularly in the northern area, where all the installations are, a major problem. A solution, then, is using small ships to bring the oil to the market. Though the falling level of the Caspian Sea may nevertheless impede the ships’ trajectories. So climate change is having a pronounced effect, in many respects, on the water resources, but particularly the Caspian region.

Initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road, the Middle Corridor, and new trans-continental rail links have revived the idea of Central Asia as a global trade hub. From your perspective, what challenges must the region overcome to realize its economic potential?

Even more than a trade hub, Central Asia’s strategic importance mainly derives from its role as a global transit hub. I doubt that any of the cities or the like will become large trade hubs. As much as Tashkent would like to be a trade hub, Astana a financial and trade center, and Baku to assume a similar position, the region continues to be used largely as a railway transit zone. The Chinese have been instrumental in building these routes through Central Asia. The question has thus always been: is it cost-effective? The Chinese ship most of their exports by sea, which they dominate, also through their Merchant Marine. But they've often seen this transit through Central Asia as an alternative route, which would facilitate the development of the Xinjiang province in China and then use it as an entrepot for sending goods out westward through Central Asia.

Another issue to consider is that the global economy and the economies of the countries that end up consuming these products are beset by problems. First, there is the war in Ukraine, which creates challenges in the Black Sea area. Then there is an overall economic decline, which is also present in China and Russia. This diminishing global economic activity will affect Central Asia and its use as a transit route—the required infrastructure, particularly in the Caspian region, would need to be justified economically. If there is a glut of gas, then it makes little sense to invest in a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Baku, as it would be unlikely to be cost-effective for any company that would want to build it. This pipeline would likely also be contested by the Russians and the Iranians. The Russians, in particular, would much rather see the gas and oil going through Russia, unless they get benefits from the resources crossing the Caspian Sea instead.

There is also the aspect of the north-south direction, which could be very important for Central Asia. But this route depends on connecting the region’s resources to the demands of the economies of Pakistan and India, though even these two countries are experiencing a period of political crisis. Afghanistan is trying to revive itself, and it is interesting to see that Central Asian and Afghan authorities have been meeting together to discuss projects of bringing electricity and development from Central Asia to Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, which views Afghanistan as a key component in developing and extending infrastructure southward, is particularly involved in this plan.

Thus, the Central Asian countries are faced with the surrounding international climate, their domestic economic situation, and also the geopolitics of the neighboring countries on which their role as a transit and trade hub depends. As a result, there are some uncertainties about future developments, though to be sure, the potential certainly has always been present, especially under the conditions of peace and security. Iran coming out of isolation could benefit the region. However, since they cannot control the surrounding situation, the Central Asians will have to remain patient.

Krol spoke with Benedejcic on December 19, 2025.

This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity. The views expressed in this piece are the interviewee’s own and are not reflective of the views of the HIR.