America in the Western Hemisphere: An Interview with Eric Jacobstein

Eric Jacobstein is a nonresident senior fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue and founder of Puentes Global Advisory, bringing nearly two decades of U.S. government experience as a senior adviser on Latin America and the Caribbean. In the Biden-Harris administration, he served as deputy assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere Affairs, special adviser for the Western Hemisphere to Vice President Harris, NSC director for Central America and Cuba, and founding staff director of USAID’s Northern Triangle Task Force. Prior to the executive branch, he spent fifteen years in Congress as a senior adviser on Latin America, authoring landmark legislation including the U.S.–Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act.

Having worked in Congress for 15 years, mostly on Latin America and the Caribbean, what would people find surprising about your role there? What were some of your biggest accomplishments, and what might people not realize about the scope of what you did?

The exciting thing about working on Latin America and working on foreign policy in Congress is that many people don't recognize the fundamental role that Congress can play on these issues. For example, Congress has the power of the purse, meaning appropriations go through Congress. Yes, the President makes foreign policy; yes, the State Department carries out diplomacy and foreign policy, but Congress appropriates foreign assistance and defense funding. Although we've seen the President try to take steps beyond his authority recently, Congress sets tariffs. Hundreds of ambassadorial nominees, confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Treaties go through the Senate. But beyond that, you also have legislation that can do a number of things. People think about things like mandating reports, but beyond that, Congress puts in place legislation that can create new sanctions regimes.

I'll give you a couple examples of work that I did in Congress that I think had a real impact in Latin America and the Caribbean. First, in 2019, when I worked for Congressman Engel, who was the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, we visited El Salvador with a bipartisan congressional delegation in March of 2019. As we were there, the first Trump administration announced that it was cutting off foreign assistance to Central America. We came back in a bipartisan way and put together legislation both to authorize spending for assistance to address the root causes of irregular migration from Central America, and also to put in place a new sanctions regime, something that ended up being called the Engel List, that essentially gave the President the authority to revoke visas of corrupt and undemocratic actors from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and eventually Nicaragua as well.

There are a number of things you can do in Congress. Although the executive branch makes foreign policy on a day-to-day basis, Congress has the ability to really adjust foreign policy on the margins in a way that can be critical and can have real impact.

After working on Capitol Hill, you moved to the executive branch. What surprised you most about how policy works across different branches? How did each of those vantage points shape the way you think about U.S. policy in Latin America?

What impressed me most during my time working in the executive branch was just the depth of smarts and experience that the nonpartisan core of civil servants has. It was incredible to be able to work across the various U.S. departments and agencies and learn from the experience of different individuals. Especially when I was at the White House and the National Security Council, you really are able to have a view from the center of it all.

Yes, sometimes you see disorganization, sometimes you see individuals not working together, but you also see a lot of really positive things in terms of the experience people have and the skill sets individuals bring, whether on humanitarian aid, sanctions, or foreign policy writ large. It is really impressive to work with folks across the board, both in the U.S. and in our embassies across the world.

You worked on the Northern Triangle Task Force established during the Biden administration. What are your reflections on what you were able to accomplish? The administration faced a lot of pushback on immigration. Do you think it rose to the challenge, and what do you think people misunderstood about the immigration situation at the time?

First, when you look across the board at the Northern Triangle Task Force and also the initial focus on the root causes of migration from Central America, it is clear this was important work. If you look over time, there were concerns about migration, but the number of migrants coming from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras significantly dropped from the beginning of the time that Vice President Harris was doing this work until the end of the administration. You saw real progress in terms of the number of migrants and a real impact from this work addressing the root causes: investing in violence prevention, investing in the rule of law and good governance, investing in the economies of these countries.

What I would have done differently, looking back now, is [to have] pursued more of a regional focus. The focus on those three countries was important, but migration numbers rose from across the board — from Venezuela, from Colombia, and at a certain time there were significant numbers coming from Mexico. Eventually there was a region-wide approach to migration. In 2022, President Biden rolled out the Los Angeles Declaration at the Summit of the Americas, which allowed countries to really step up and work together on a regional approach covering both enforcement, lawful pathways, and foreign and humanitarian assistance. But this initial focus on just the Northern Triangle left out some other countries that are important. Looking forward, any return to a regional approach that addresses root causes really needs to target all countries in the region, as opposed to just looking at the hot spots of the moment.

That said, the work itself on the Northern Triangle Task Force under Samantha Power's leadership had a significant impact. For example, we ran an initiative built around the idea that far too often foreign assistance went to big contractors when the goal was to get assistance into the hands of local nonprofits and local leaders who really knew the situation on the ground better than anyone. On another hand, we focused on labor pathways  whether it was temporary labor pathways like H-2A programs for farmworkers doing temporary labor work in the United States, and H-2B programs for other temporary workers, such as workers in hotels and restaurants coming for seasonal employment.

The task force also provided funding to labor ministries in Central America to help them play the role of matchmaker between U.S. companies looking for labor and workers in Central America. This was a win-win-win: a win for individuals from Central America who were able to come to the United States, gain resources for themselves and their families, and invest those resources in their communities; a win for the United States in that we were able to fill labor gaps in the U.S. economy; and a third win in that it allowed for regular channels of migration, as opposed to irregular migration. People went and they returned to their home countries because they wanted to return to their families and now had a regular channel to do so. Far too often, the problem with irregular migration is that we don't create these kinds of channels and pathways. Something the Biden administration did well was to create different channels, and that is something we need to do more of in the future.

You also worked for USAID on the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean. Reflecting on your time at USAID, what were you able to accomplish? What goals and challenges did you come into the job with? What is the status of that work today, now that the Trump administration is taking a different look at USAID?

A lot of my work at USAID was on that Northern Triangle Task Force, and there were just really significant efforts there. Working at times in difficult governance situations in the region, the challenge was finding the right programs to fund. One of the things that I think was impressive, beyond the localization work, was the work that USAID did to target communities that needed assistance. USAID worked with data from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) to identify communities with high levels of out-migration, and then to target programs in sanitation, water, youth programming, and employment toward those communities. That was something that was impressive and scaled up in a significant way.

As to whether this work persists—I think it is tough. USAID was eliminated in a move that I think was very dangerous and long-term damaging. It really reduced U.S. soft power in a way that is not positive, and that opens up space for countries like China to get a further foothold in Latin America. That said, the U.S. Congress did appropriate new funding for foreign assistance, and some of that funding continues through the State Department. Some of the humanitarian assistance we have seen continue in countries hit by hurricanes last year. Some foreign assistance does continue, and I hope there will be space to continue some of the programs from USAID through the State Department. There was obviously huge devastation from the cuts to USAID, but I hope there is an ability to rebuild in the future, and even in the current moment, I hope some of this work will continue.

You did significant work on Cuba as Special Advisor to the Vice President for the Western Hemisphere and as NSC Director for Central America and Cuba. Thinking about the current situation in the nation, what do you see as the necessary steps for the United States to accomplish its goals relating to Cuba? And is the current administration moving the country in the right direction?

Cuba desperately needs change. It would be hard to find many people, both on the island and in the United States, who don't agree. This is an economic model that has failed. No matter who you talk to— unless they are not being surveilled by the government at the moment—they will admit that this is a time that calls for change in a big way.

I think the most important thing that could be done is to support the Cuban private sector. This is a group of individuals who have really worked hard to bring capitalism into Cuba within a failing communist model. One of the things we did toward the end of the Biden administration, in May of 2024, was put in place a series of new regulations to support independent Cuban entrepreneurs by giving them access to open bank accounts in the United States. Now more than ever, the Cuban private sector should be the focus of U.S. efforts.

I certainly think it is important for the U.S. and Cuba to be talking. The discussions that we understand through the press have been taking place are a really positive sign. What I do worry about is any sort of coercive measures. I do not believe the U.S. should invade Cuba. I think that would be a dangerous step. Cuba is not Venezuela; Cuba is not Iran. In a lot of ways, you see the Trump administration looking for their El Tren de Aragua moment in Cuba, and that is just not something that exists there. The best things that can be done are to have negotiations that push Cuba toward economic change, while also supporting the Cuban people who are suffering through a humanitarian crisis.

One of the things that concerned me earlier this year was the oil blockade on Cuba. This is a country with hospitals that are falling apart, schools that are falling apart. It should not be the U.S. role to increase suffering by doing things that make the situation even worse  by hurting hospitals and individuals who are in those hospitals and under treatment. I think that is a really dangerous step to take. We can do things to push the Cuban government along; we can open things up to the Cuban private sector. But we need to be careful not to do anything that will make the humanitarian situation even worse.

You mentioned Venezuela and Iran. Reflecting on what the Trump administration did in Venezuela: do you think those actions were justified? What can we learn from what Trump did in Venezuela? Do you think it should become a precedent for future military action in Latin America?

I do not support U.S. military intervention in the region. I think this is a dangerous path to go down. In terms of Venezuela and where things are today, I think we have seen some positive steps. For example, we have seen the release of some political prisoners. I think we have to give credit where credit is due; those things perhaps might not have happened without the current circumstances.

That said, you still have Delcy Rodriguez in power, so you switched out one dictator for another. It does not seem like there is a path anytime soon for Edmundo González and María Corina Machado, the democratically elected leaders of Venezuela, to take power. That really needs to be the focus right now. Economic reforms are important, reforms to the oil sector are important, and doing whatever can be done to ease the humanitarian suffering of the Venezuelan people is critical. But an important piece of that is ensuring a democratic transition and ensuring that the results of the 2024 elections in Venezuela are respected. We are not seeing that, and we are not seeing the current U.S. administration focus on democracy in a significant way. It seems like María Corina Machado and Edmundo González are not on a path to return to the presidency. You don't see that coming anytime soon. That really needs to be the focus of U.S. policy at this moment: democracy.

I feel that after the Trump administration, regardless of who comes next, we will enter a new era. What role do you think the U.S. should play in the hemisphere in these new times? Should it return to its pre-Trump approach, continue on its current course, or chart something new altogether?

The U.S. can play an important role for good in the hemisphere. It has in the past, and I think it can in the future. A big piece of this is democracy. I am very proud of some of the work we did in the Biden administration in supporting democratic actors in Guatemala and supporting democracy in Brazil. The effort to achieve democratic outcomes has to come internally, but there are important things the U.S. can do to support that. Guatemala is a good example, where we deployed a mix of carrots and sticks: sticks in terms of revoking visas of individuals who were standing in the way of democracy, and carrots in terms of positive incentives toward the country to support the democratic transition in 2023, when Bernardo Arévalo was elected and faced a long transition during which the corrupt attorney general and the previous president tried to block him from entering power. A renewed focus on democracy is important.

But there are a number of other things the U.S. can do economically, in terms of nearshoring and friendshoring, to bring the economies of our countries even closer. Commercial diplomacy needs to be a focus in the future. If we are to compete with China, we need to be more serious about the tools we use. We have things like the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) which are important, but they are small compared to some of the tools that China and others are using. We need to really think seriously about the tools we are using to invest in infrastructure, to invest in the region, and to build commercial relationships between our countries.

The other piece is on immigration. The regional approach that started during the Biden administration on the Los Angeles Declaration was important, and a lot more needs to be done, especially on labor pathways. I believe this is a win-win-win for the U.S., for Latin America, and for other countries in the region. There are labor needs in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico which are unfulfilled. But you have individuals who are seeking to migrate and who could just as easily seek to fill these labor needs and return to their home countries. We need to do a much better job matching those needs and those gaps, and I think that can really help us address the challenges that come from migration better than we have done in the past or the present.

Jacobstein spoke with Wulff on April 28th, 2025. This interview has been lightly edited for length and clarity.

The views expressed in this piece are the interviewee’s own and are not reflective of the views of the HIR.