There has been much academic and public discourse about the question, “Why do they hate us?” Usually, this means: what makes those from the Muslim world resort to acts of violence against ordinary US citizens on the scale of 9/11. There are two broad arguments that seek to answer this question. The “our fault” studies suggest US actions and policy have fueled anti-US sentiments that lead to violence against US citizens and institutions. These critiques highlight US support for oppression and exploitation or how more specific policies affect (or disaffect) people in the Middle East. The “their fault” camp suggests that anti-US sentiments and violence result from radical ideology, incompatible values, psychological malaise, and political exploitation that fuel some elites and groups to hate the United States and its values and policies.
Most studies pertaining to this question, however, homogenize the “they” who hate the United States, losing the distinction between “militants” and the “merely Muslim.” As different, albeit overlapping, populations, wherein the latter is the recruitment pool for the former, everyday Muslims filter US actions through different lenses than the militant Islamist. Understanding these different audiences, partly through international polling, we can grasp how the merely Muslim view the United States in the first place and how they vary from militants in policy and values as a basis for viewing the United States and its actions. Policy must take both audiences into account if it wishes to minimize the number of people who transition from merely Muslim to militant.
Monte and Princess Palmer’s 2003 study, At the Heart of Terror, suggests that an estimated four percent of Muslims in the world are Islamist fundamentalism fanatics, and only about .01 percent (about 120 thousand people) are militant jihadists. The goal of militant jihadists is an Islamic state, and the means employed toward that end include violent behavior, including terrorism. Militant jihadists come from different regions and countries that have differing priorities. They are recruited anywhere from war (such as the Afghan War against the Soviets) to mosques to madrasas to local organizations.
If militant and fanatic Muslims constitute an estimated .01 to four percent of the 1.2 billion Muslims of the world, the rest range from secularized to practicing to politicized, but, ultimately, are non-violent. Stephen Brooks cautions in his 2006 As Others See Us not to use “a shorthand label like the ‘Muslim perspective’, or impart homogeneity of opinion or belief to any collectivity.” Nonetheless, we can assess modal and varied views from random sample polling of countries in the Islamic world. With this distinction between militants and the “merely Muslim,” we can engage in a more nuanced analysis of the questions of whether, and why, “they hate us.”
While polling is not available to militant jihadists, I do not challenge the notion that the United States is a substantial source of antagonism and hostility to militant Islam. But since it is ultimately an empirical question, we should not presume universal hatred of the United States, even within the jihadist world, for, as has been mentioned, jihadist groups are numerous and often homegrown and concerned with local issues. Not all jihadists target the US and thus, it is probable that not all jihadists hate the United States.
However, there is evidence available regarding general Muslim opinion toward the United States. Polling reported by the Pew Center and Terror Free Tomorrow, among other groups, gives a glimpse of just how many and who exactly “hate us.” The Pew polls find that less than half the populations in five Middle Eastern countries have a favorable opinion of the United States (from lows of 21 percent favorable in Jordan to a high of 49 percent in Morocco). According to Andrew Kohut, author of “Arab and Muslim Perception of the United States” and testimony to the US House International Relations Committee, younger people have a higher favorable rating of the United States than those aged 35 and older, with women generally having a more positive opinion.
Such numbers can change, too. The Pew findings show a vast improvement in opinion from research conducted in 2003. Lebanon’s percentage of favorable opinions toward the United States jumped 15 percent from 2003 to 2005 and Jordan’s leapt from one to 21 percent. A Terror Free Tomorrow poll on October 8, 2005, found the Pakistani population to have “a more favorable opinion of the United States than at any time since 9/11.” Favorability toward the United States doubled from 23 percent to more than 46 percent over the course of the year, while the percentage of the Pakistani population with very unfavorable views declined from 48 to 28 percent.
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