Sizing-up Obama in Russia

Prominent Duma Deputy Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a Huey Long of Russian politics, albeit more flamboyant, declared at a political rally back in November 2008 that Barack Obama would become America’s Gorbachev. The outspoken leader of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party shouted that Obama would bring perestroika to America. This promise may have sounded pleasing to some enthusiastic supporters of Obama in the West. Gorbachev, to the West, has always been considered a person of great courage and vision who believed in change and one day dared to tear down the Berlin Wall. But Zhirinovsky's comment was not intended for the West -- and his Russian audience had a very different image of Gorbachev in mind. Perestroika in the 1980s has been a catastrophic event, as many Russians perceived it both twenty years ago and today. Many people believe that the Soviet Union had committed suicide orchestrated by its own leader, who himself was merely a grand demagogue who promised change at the beginning but had no real plan of action. To Russians, promising “perestroika” in the United States today is to promise it to be stricken by a deadly plague. Zhirinovsky did not say this, but he certainly meant it. The crowd cheered. The blogs quoted him relentlessly.

Why did he express such sarcastic negativism against Obama and America? Some may quickly say that Zhirinovsky does not speak on behalf of the Russian people, that he has always been known for his big mouth and, to put it politely, irresponsible statements. This is, of course, true. Zhirinovsky is not the most prominent and respected politician in today’s Russia. Yet, he reflects opinions of millions of people who would gladly accept America’s quick decline and demise. All these people are not merely hard-core militarists or nationalists. They represent all demographic and social groups of today’s Russia. Their irritation toward America has been brewing for many years. Three factors contributed to this passive-aggressive stance. First, it was frustration rooted in the failed experimentations with wild forms of capitalism and deregulation of the 1990s. There is a popular view in Russia today that Washington deliberately provoked Russia to accept American-type capitalism to deliver the final blow to its economy and weaken the country for good. Second, numerous foreign-policy actions of three consecutive US administrations over 20 years were perceived in Russia as arrogant and incompetent. These actions included—among many others—the NATO expansion, the US-led war against Serbia, and support of pro-Western forces in Ukraine, Georgia, and other ex-Soviet countries. Third, and most importantly, it was the rise of Russian state chauvinism. At first surreptitious and then open and overwhelming, state chauvinism is a blend of official policies and favorable social climate rooted in nationalism and a sense of exceptionalism. This is not a kind of anti-Americanism common, for example, in the Middle East. Being positively correlated with the price of oil, this new Russian state chauvinism is not belligerent. It is a form of grandstanding. Russian leaders would never admit this, but in fact, the Kremlin would love to do everything that Washington does globally. Limited interventionism is Russia’s foreign-policy dream. The problem is that Russia does not have enough power to do that. And this is most frustrating. Overall, these and several other factors have been contributing to the overall negative perception of the United States and its policies.

It would be an exaggeration to say, however, that Russians are preoccupied with the United States and pay undivided attention to its new president. In fact, they are not. Russian politicians, like Zhirinovsky and scores of others, commonly use criticism of US presidents and US policies as a rhetorical device to address Russia’s own domestic and foreign-policy issues and receive approval. The difference among these politicians is in the audiences they appeal to and the coded language they use, which requires additional translation and interpretation.

It’s up to you, Mr. Obama

Reactions of top Russian officials to Obama’s victory in November 2008 were generally predictable. Three major recurrent themes have characterized these reactions. First, the US elections were an important event but obviously not the most significant one. President Medvedev, for instance, released his official address to the nation on time, so that his picture would appear in papers above the reports about the US election results. Second, Russia should be cautiously optimistic about whether Washington is going to change its foreign policy. Third, it is too soon to judge about the future of Russian-US relations. Everything will depend on how Washington (and not the Kremlin) will behave in forthcoming months.