Shifting Loyalties

The recent uprising in Libya has highlighted Muammar Qaddafi’s expert ability to manipulate tribal rivalries to maintain his grip on power. In Qaddafi’s early days as leader,  he tried his best to build a unified national identity that trumped tribal sentiments; however, when Qaddafi’s popularity declined at the national level, he realized that manipulating tribal loyalties was his best hope for remaining in power. Following a coup attempt in 1993 staged by military leaders in the Warfalla tribe (Libya’s largest), Qaddafi started emphasizing tribal loyalty as a major identifying factor for Libyans. He then cemented his hold on power by setting rival tribes against each other, rewarding those loyal to him with political appointments and excluding those that opposed him. As a result, tribes competed for Qaddafi’s favor, and tribal identities began to reassert themselves in the Libyan national consciousness.

With the onset of protests in February, Libya’s tribal loyalties began to shift. The Warfalla were the first to defect to the rebel cause, and many others soon followed. Resentment over the disproportionate influence given to Qaddafi’s own tribe (the Qaddafah) and his allies had simmered under his repressive regime for years. Many tribes were eager for the opportunity to increase their influence over national affairs, especially tribes from eastern Libya who felt marginalized by Qaddafi’s reliance on support from his hometown Sirte in central Libya and Tripoli in the western part of the country. Indeed, the history of the country is one of regional conflict between western Tripolitania, eastern Cyrenaica, and southern Fezzan. More than tribal relations, the regional conflict has significantly fractured Libyan society. Qaddafi has used these regional politics to “divide and conquer” the disparate tribes of Libya in order to remain in power.

 In order to realize its potential as a nation, Libya must have a government that legitimizes its authority by unifying national interests rather than systematically suppressing regional interests.  In the past, tribal rivalries have made this goal seem unattainable; however, Libya, like other modernizing countries, has seen the tribal dynamic gradually fall in importance. With increasing urbanization and education, ties between Libyans and their tribes are not as strong as they have been in the past. Qaddafi’s strategy for maintaining power through political manipulation will ultimately fail, as citizens increasingly recognize the oppressive regime as a common enemy. Instead, the interests of modernization and economic development may unify the majority of Libyans and serve as a foundation for their long-term cooperation.

Indeed, the experience of neighboring countries shows that tribalism and ethnocentrism can be brought under control in less authoritarian ways. North African countries like Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania, for instance, do not face the same level of self-destructive tribalism as Libya, especially among youth—the same group that is leading protests all over the Arab world. States that equitably distribute their resources without patronage are better able to avoid intertribal violence. The opposite can be seen in states throughout sub-Saharan Africa, where corrupt, autocratic governments also face the strongest ethnic tension. Libya has the highest Human Development Index (a measure of quality-of-life compiled by the United Nations and based on per-capita GNP, education, and life expectancy) in Africa, showing that it has the resources and infrastructure to advance as a country, if the government acts responsibly.

In an ideal world, governments would build nationwide loyalty through providing security, stability, and services for their people rather than manipulating a corrupt political system to remain in power. However, when governments fail to satisfy their people, power-hungry individuals, such as Muammar Qaddafi, will use any means necessary to maintain authority, even if it means undermining national identity. After the violent suppression of the rebels, Qaddafi has, in the eyes of many Libyans and the rest of the world, lost any claim to legitimacy. An organic government sprung from the will of the Libyan people will be better able to overcome fragmented tribal identities and solidify a more unified national identity. Few outside of Qaddafi’s circle of supporters will be sad to see this happen.