Kosovo’s Land for Peace Solution

James Ker-Lindsay is Eurobank EFG Senior Research Fellow on the Politics and International Relations of South East Europe at the European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. His main works include EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (I.B. Tauris, 2009), and New Perspectives on Yugoslavia: Key Issues and Controversies (Routledge, 2010, co-edited with Dejan Djokic). He is currently working on a book examining how states attempt to prevent the recognition of secessionist territories, which is due to be published by Oxford University Press.

 Partition is somewhat of a dirty word in international affairs. India-Pakistan, Israel-Palestine and Ireland, to name just some prominent examples, conjure up images of forced displacement, families torn apart, and communities divided. It has therefore come to be seen as a rather unfashionable, if not wholly unacceptable, method by which to approach the resolution of ethnic conflicts. But should territorial division be always viewed in such a negative light? What if it is consensual and does not involve violence or population transfers? (Indeed, in the contemporary era any suggestion of forced migration would violate well established principles of human rights.) Should it be greeted with the opprobrium it currently generates? In many cases, it can represent an eminently logical and peaceful solution to a protracted conflict – a decision of two peoples with little in common and a long history of antagonism, but shoehorned into an uncomfortable and unwanted union, to live apart from one another. The forthcoming independence of South Sudan, following decades of civil war, is a case in point. Likewise, Kosovo is another example where a decision to draw a new boundary may well provide the best means by which to resolve an intractable dispute.

A fine Mess

When Kosovo declared independence in February 2008, it did so under the most controversial of circumstances. The UN sponsored status process overseen by the Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari had been deeply flawed. He did not make the two sides engage in meaningful dialogue over a range of possible constitutional options, such as federalism, autonomy or confederalism,  that would keep the two areas together within a single state; instead, the UN envoy had  opted to pursue independence for Kosovo from the outset. To this end, he sought to formulate the structures of statehood, including the framework for strong minority rights for Kosovo’s various minority communities. As a result, the legitimacy of his mission was undermined in the eyes of Belgrade and its principal supporter, Moscow, which used its veto in the Security Council to block Ahtisaari’s proposal for supervised independence for Kosovo.

A further round of talks, this time held under the auspices of a trio of diplomats from Russia, the United States and the European Union, proved to be fairer in its approach. However, it too was doomed from the start. Although a wide range of possible options was explored, the Kosovo Albanians, armed with a cast iron promise of independence from the United States, and backed by Britain and France, had no reason to compromise.

Although the decision to support Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence required a decision to bypass the UN Security Council, the hope was that with the combined support of Washington and key European Union states the necessary impetus to win over wider international support would be generated. At first the plan seemed promising. Within weeks of having declared independence, Kosovo’s statehood had been recognized by most Western countries – with the notable exception of a few EU members. By the end of the year 53 states had acknowledged the new reality. Kosovo was also admitted to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

However, initial optimism that Kosovo might be able to gain full international acceptance soon began to dissipate. In 2009, just eleven new recognitions were received. In 2010, a mere eight more states followed suit. As things stand, only 75 of the 192 members of the United Nations have chosen to accept Kosovo as a full member of the international community. Moreover, due to strong opposition from Russia and China, Kosovo’s efforts to pursue membership of the UN, as well as of other multilateral bodies and organisations, have amounted to little.

All this has had a profound effect. Citizens of Afghanistan and Haiti have more opportunities for visa free travel than the people of Kosovo. In sports, Kosovo cannot compete in the Olympics or in other sporting competition, including the soccer World Cup. It still does not have a telephone dialling code, relying on numbers provided by Slovenia and Monaco. Nor does it have its own internet country code. Meanwhile, the status issue also dampens foreign investment. Many businesses are wary of investing given the unclear legal situation.

There are several reasons why recognitions have stalled. In part, it is because of intensive lobbying by Serbia. Its rigorous foreign minister, Vuk Jeremic, launched a major campaign to prevent as many countries as possible from recognising Kosovo. His campaign tried to convey the message that Kosovo was not a unique case as many claimed; rather, the principles by which Kosovo had claimed independence could be applied to many other cases. If Kosovo could secede from Serbia, then the principle of the territorial integrity of states – a fundamental building block of modern international relations – would be undermined.

At the same time, the Serbian government secured a UN General Assembly resolution referring the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence to the ICJ, International Court of Justice the UN’s principal legal organ. In its non-binding opinion, issued in July 2010, the Court chose to sidestep the issue of Kosovo’s legality as a state or its right to secede. Instead, it pronounced on the general legality of a declaration of independence as a mere statement, arguing that this was not in fact contrary to international law. In effect, the Court appeared to treat the question as a freedom of speech issue, without becoming enmeshed in the deeper issues. Anyone can say they are independent; however, it is for others to decide whether they actually are.