Somewhere deep in the mountains of Tajikistan, several hundred Islamic militants are hiding, eager to continue their campaign against the secular governments of Central Asia. Although they believe they are fighting for an Islamic state, their efforts are having an unintended side effect: Russia has seized upon the wave of terror in Central Asia to re-establish its presence in the region. During the past decade, Islam has enjoyed a revival in Central Asia, partly in reaction to repression during the Soviet era. The Soviet leadership targeted the faithful with both propaganda and policy, closing 80 percent of all mosques throughout the empire. Despite efforts to stamp out Islam, Central Asia remained the most religious region of the Soviet Union, and religious fervor has only increased with the Soviet Union's dissolution. At the same time, the secular Central Asian governments have worked to exclude Islam from mainstream politics.

Since 1998, however, the threat of Islamic militancy in Central Asia has decidedly strengthened diplomatic and military relations between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan. Due to their location, economic situations, and historical legacies, these Central Asian republics (CARs) cannot and should not avoid close ties with Russia. However, they should be wary of entering into a relationship with Russia in which they are the dependent party. The Islamic insurgency in Central Asia is an opportunity for Russia to intervene and further its own interests in the region. But by being too eager to accept the forthcoming aid, the CARs risk developing an over-reliance on Russia that will compromise their long-term autonomy.

Instead, the republics should address the internal problems that keep them vulnerable to Russian influence. Any relationship they cultivate with Russia must be a mutually beneficial one that allows for the economic and political growth of the republics. A relationship built solely upon mutual fear of a common enemy, such as Islamic fundamentalism, runs the risk of relegating Central Asia to the status of a security buffer zone for Russia.

The Motive for Intervention

At a time when Russia is struggling to fend off isolation from its former European allies, it has more reason than ever to secure close relations with Central Asia. Russian President Vladimir Putin has acted on these interests in drawing the CARs ever closer to Russia. Against a backdrop of an expanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and increasing independence of the Baltic states, the influence Russia exerts in Central Asia is the last remnant of a lost empire.

Russia's participation in Central Asian affairs is also encouraged by the presence of Russians in Central Asia. In order to increase its hold on the region, the Soviet Union had encouraged the emigration of ethnic Russians to Central Asia. After independence, Russians made up approximately 10 percent of the population in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 22 percent in Kyrgyzstan, and nearly 40 percent in Kazakhstan. These Russians were never assimilated into the population, and most have not learned the local language. Instead, they continue to think of themselves as Russians, a notion encouraged by Moscow. As long as a sizable Russian population remains in Central Asia, the Russian government will consider its welfare an extension of domestic policy.

Most importantly, however, Russia wishes to prevent the arrival of a hostile power on its southern border. Radical Islam is considered especially dangerous because of its perceived ability to spread uncontrollably from one region to another. Russia fears the ignition of extremist sentiments among its own substantial domestic Muslim population. Events in Chechnya have convinced the Russian leadership of the dangers of fundamentalism, as well as demonstrated to the world the lengths to which Russia will go in order to contain the threat.

Fundamental Problems

As Russia hovers nearby, Islamic terrorism threatens the Central Asian nations from within. The frequency and severity of terrorist incidents have accelerated dramatically since 1998. Most of the high-profile examples of terrorism have been linked to two groups, both of which seek to topple the Uzbek government in favor of an Islamic state. One group, called Hizb e-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party), has been blamed for a series of 1999 bomb attacks in Uzbekistan's capital, Tashkent. The other, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), formed in 1998, is considered to be the most dangerous terrorist group in Central Asia. Its leader, Takhir Yoldashev, maintains an office in Afghanistan. A militant named Juma Namangani, who also has links to the Taliban of Afghanistan, heads the paramilitary arm of the IMU.

Namangani is believed to be behind the recent spate of incursions into Kyrgyzstan. In August 1999, 21 Islamic militants entered Kyrgyzstan's Batken region from a hiding place in Tajikistan, taking four hostages. Just two weeks later, a force of 150 militants launched an attack from Tajikistan that succeeded in capturing two villages and seven hostages. Kyrgyzstan declared a state of emergency as a result of this crisis, which featured clashes between the militants and Kyrgyz troops, reinforced by units from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. In the end, the rebels succeeded in extorting a reported US$3 million to US$5 million for the release of the hostages. In August 2000 the violence continued: 36 soldiers and more than 70 militants were killed in fighting in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In both cases, the IMU is presumed to have orchestrated the attacks from bases in Tajikistan. The events of the last two years may be mere preparation for larger-scale extremist activities in the future.

Despite the widespread fear of fundamentalism in Central Asia and abroad, the extremist groups have little chance of achieving complete success since Islamic fundamentalism does not have sufficient popular support. Most Central Asians are Sunni Muslims of either the Hanafi or Sufi sects, both of which discourage extremism. The Hanafi school, which considers faith more important than form or practice, has a tradition of accepting differences of opinion, placing the sect in opposition to the brand of Islam espoused by such groups as the Taliban. The most populous Sufi sect, the Naqshbandi, forbids fanaticism. Both groups have in common a decentralized structure, which is another barrier to the establishment of a central Islamic authority.