Visions about the "finality" of the European Union, as articulated by German Foreign Minister joschka Fischer at Berlin's Humboldt University in May 2000, could mark a turning point in the path toward a common European political identity.

After the modest December 2000 modifications of voting procedures by the Council of Europe, many questions about the final shape of the European Union remain open. But on the eve of an unprecedented experiment in EU membership expansion, plans for the future of the EU project, though divisive, are necessary.

In his Berlin address, Fischer outlined his idea of the future European Union as a politically integrated federation of states; he was the first member of a European government to address openly the need for a coherent ultimate aim of European integration. According to Fischer, "the transition from a political union to a parliamentary federation" would constitute a practical answer to the immense challenges that lie ahead. Such reforms could also alleviate the lack of transparency and democratic accountability in EU policy-making, two of the greatest shortfalls of the present system.

Fischer's proposals for the future shape of the European Union included a call for a European constitution. He went so far as to suggest the possibility of a directly elected government with limited but clearly defined legislative and executive powers over all EU member states. Fischer suggested that closer cooperation among a smaller core group of EU member states-a subset of EU members that would become more closely integrated in the short term than the union as a whole-could provide the foundation for the long-term EU project of full political integration. At the same time, Fischer emphasized that the core-- group idea should be seen as a step in the integration process rather than a functional end in itself, asserting that "a gravitational core must have an active interest in expansion, and it has to offer an attractive prospect to the other members."

These "thoughts on the finality of the European Union," carefully labeled as the foreign minister's personal views rather than a government position, sparked a lively debate about an issue vital to European citizens and governments alike. The debate has long been avoided by Europe's policy-makers, partly because ambiguity about the ultimate character of the European project has made partial commitment to a European agenda easier for member states. Not surprisingly, then, the definition of a tangible objective for the integration process, has caused worries in some European capitals.

Although he generally welcomed Fischer's ideas, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine considered Fischer's remarks regarding the role of national governments in the envisioned future European polity to be vague. France's Interior Minister Pierre Chevenement expressed concern about the "federal" character of Fischer's proposals, claiming that "the nation-state and democracy are inseparable in Europe."

But much more than a mere expression of European idealism is needed; preserving the momentum of policy cooperation among a core group of nations may turn out to be a basic necessity. With the creation of the European Monetary Union, the countries of the euro zone have already committed themselves to a degree of cooperation that necessitates close coordination of economic policy. The consolidation of the Western European Union, the former European defense organization, under the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is another reason why the European Union can hardly afford to let its expansion slow down the pace of political integration.

Under its current plan, the European Union could have as many as 30 members by the year 2020, including states as vastly different in economic development and political interests as the United Kingdom and Lithuania. The European Union cannot turn its back on nonmembers in Eastern Europe. Integrating these countries into Europe is clearly in the economic and geopolitical long-- term interest of the continent, but the challenges associated are immense.

A larger European Union will require vast resources and coordination of policies. It will have to bridge gaps in economic development while alleviating structural discrepancies by subsidizing infrastructure and agricultural reform. In addition, the eastward expansion creates new security issues that will challenge the new common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Unresolved tensions over Cyprus and a new border with authoritarian Belarus could become sources of prolonged instability. At the same time, the anticipated expansion in membership will be a significant drain on the European Union's economic resources and its ability to design common policies. Thus, even with modifications to the present European institutions, a larger and more diverse European Union is likely to be a weaker union.

Among prospective EU entrants, the idea of a core group has raised genuine concerns. Most Eastern European candidates justifiably fear that, as members, they might become little more than a free-trade periphery of the core group. A common concern is that a stronger inner core could become a means of preventing new members from fully participating in major decisions of EU policy-making bodies. Furthermore, potential EU members are concerned about the extent to which their interests will be accommodated in CFSP and the closely related agenda of ESDP.

How exclusive the proposed inner core of a future European Union would be depends on its founding premises. Fischer and others have suggested that the commitment to a core group should be outlined in a pact within the present structure of EU treaties. This, however, would require a distinct definition of the policy areas reserved for the core group. Countries like the United Kingdom or Denmark, who wish to commit themselves to common European projects only selectively, have been following these propositions with great skepticism.

As a federation of potentially 30 sovereign nation-states with vastly different interests, the European Union would not be able to avoid a radical reform of its institutions. The articulation of a common vision for Europe's further political integration is imperative for the drafting of an EU polity that will be able to cope with the coming tests to European unity. Regardless of the institutional specifics, it is likely that the measures necessary to incorporate new members into a truly united Europe may ironically create new political divides. It remains to be seen how well the European Union will balance its divergent desires of integration, expansion, and unity.