Commander Norman Denny is an analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency and a retired naval intelligence officer with over thirty years experience in the Middle East. He holds Master’s degrees in Public Administration from the University of Tennessee and Military Arts and Science from the Army Command and General Staff College. He is the author of a number of articles dealing with military policy, technology, and history. He is currently on his fourth deployment to Iraq.
The views expressed in this article are CDR Denny’s and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.
A woman mourns as vehicles carrying the remains of Kurdish victims pass by during a ceremony in Kirkuk. Photo courtesy of Reuters.
The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has been quasi-independent since its formation in the northern “no-fly” zone of Iraq following the 1991 Iraq War. Since the 2003 US-led invasion, it has been a relatively peaceful and stable region in a nation torn by sectarian violence. Today, the KRG has all the trappings of a democracy with a functioning governmental structure and Kurds worldwide view the KRG as the best hope for an eventual independent Kurdistan. Kurdish aspirations for an independent homeland are peaking as the KRG enters a decline in power within Iraq and faces potential future Arab domination.
The KRG in Iraq
The Kurds are frequently referred to as the largest ethnic group without a nation-state. Spread across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and a substantial Kurdish diaspora, an estimated 24 to 26 million Kurds reside worldwide. In Iraq the Kurds represent 15 to 20 percent of the population and occupy the mountainous northern regions. Constituting the majority of the northern provinces of Dohuk, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyah, the KRG is defined by the “Green-Line,” drawn between the Kurds and Saddam Hussein in the 1990s. Due to widespread Sunni Arab boycotts of the January 2005 elections, Kurdish minorities in Ninewa and At Ta’mim controlled these provincial governments. In the aftermath of January 2009 provincial elections, the Kurds are faced with Sunni Arab majorities and weakened minority status.
After the fall of Saddam Hussein, the Kurds played a pivotal role in Iraqi politics despite their minority status. Kurdish military forces, the Peshmerga, liberated northern Iraq during the 2003 invasion with minimal US support, and in the chaotic aftermath of Hussein’s fall, the Kurds were the only indigenous force able to effectively police wide areas in the north. When an Iraqi government was re-established, the Kurdish bloc, working with Shia Arab majority parties, exerted great influence. The Kurds, because of this oversized influence, codified the federated KRG in the Iraqi constitution and established a process to resolve disputed internal boundary issues along the Green-Line.
A Kurdish national assembly sits in Irbil, capital of the KRG, where President Masoud Barzani and Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani head a secular, apparently democratic “almost” nation-state. The diverse assembly addresses social, political, economic, and military issues. International recognition of the KRG is widespread, as demonstrated by the dozen foreign delegations in Irbil and the booming level of international investment. Turkey, a traditional opponent of Kurdish aspirations, is the region’s major investor. The KRG appears to be everything the United States hoped to establish in Iraq.
Points of Contention: Baghdad and Irbil
There are only a few unresolved issues between Irbil and Baghdad, but these issues are contentious. The final boundaries of the KRG have yet to be resolved; the disputed areas include Kirkuk and stretch along the KRG’s entire southern border. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution defines the resolution process and was to be completed by July 2008. The Kurds see the process as a means to reverse their forced displacement under the Hussein regime. However, efforts at addressing the disputed areas have been stalled for much of the last year, prompting both Baghdad and Irbil to seek United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) involvement.
Irbil and Baghdad have also disagreed over the rights to exploit oil within the KRG. The Kurdish-controlled areas sit on approximately 10 percent of Iraq’s proven oil reserves and the disputed city of Kirkuk is key to the petroleum infrastructure of northern Iraq. Baghdad and Irbil have been negotiating the Hydrocarbon Law, which determines who controls exploitation of the oil within the KRG, but the negotiations are deadlocked.
Another issue of conflict is the Kurdish military, the Peshmerga. While the right of the KRG to have a “national guard” is enshrined in the constitution, their presence below the Green-Line in the disputed territories is a major source of Arab – Kurd tensions. Funding of the Pershmerga, either from Baghdad or from the KRG budget, is also in dispute.
The KRG is currently the only federated area in Iraq, although several regions in the south are considering adopting federated status as well. The Kurds have attempted to maximize the powers of the federated areas, weakening Baghdad. For the Kurds, who have always suffered under a strong central government, this likely is the defining issue today.
Diminishing Influence
With the KRG enshrined in the Iraqi constitution, the Peshmerga’s strength, the increasing international recognition of the KRG, and its economic prosperity, the outlook for the Kurds should be rosy. But there are indicators that Kurdish power within Iraq may have peaked. While Kurds worldwide may look to the KRG as the harbinger of an independent Kurdistan, those expectations will likely fade as Baghdad reasserts its traditional dominance. Likewise, while the international community recognizes the KRG as federated, none are likely to support its aspirations over those of Baghdad. Though Kurds have traditionally tried to play regional powers Iran and Turkey against Iraq in an effort to further their own goals, Tehran and Ankara are unusually supportive of Baghdad today. Even within the United States, support for Baghdad is strong.
The Kurds in Iraq have every reason to distrust a strong central government and strong leadership in Baghdad. In the late 1950s under Abd-al-Karim Qassim and later in 1970s under the Ba’ath party, the Kurds hoped for a degree of self-rule. In 1970, a weak Ba’ath Party granted the Kurds autonomy. By 1974, Saddam Hussein assumed dominance in Baghdad and withdrew powers granted to the Kurds, using the Iraqi Army to enforce his policy. In 1975, the Algiers Accord between Iran and Iraq ended Iranian support for the Kurds, crushing hope for a Kurdish homeland for nearly a generation.
Several events over the last year give the Kurds reason to pause. After years of inaction and infighting, the Iraqi government launched a series of military operations to control radical Shia militias, including that led by Muqtada al-Sadr. The fact that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki achieved this through much personal control over the military is troubling for the Kurds. With new, concentrated control, the government in Baghdad has taken a hard line stance against the Hydrocarbon Law and Peshmerga funding. In a shocking change, the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) in July 2008 passed a version of the Election Law that the Kurds had vehemently opposed; the Maliki government united a disparate Sunni-Shia coalition to invalidate a Kurdish walkout of the COR. Maliki has also confronted Kurdish control of territory outside the Green Line. Perhaps most troubling, Maliki publicly questioned the adequacy of the constitution, describing it as written “hastily.” The Iraqi constitution, with its recognition of the KRG and Kurdish rights, is the holy grail for the Kurds.
