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Keeping Promises
Post-Coup Mauritania by Zeina Fayyaz
Rethinking Finance, Vol. 30 (4) - Winter 2009 Issue

Zeina Fayyaz is a staff writer at the Harvard International Review.

On August 6, 2008, Mauritanian troops staged a coup d’état to remove from power and imprison President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi, their country’s first democratically-elected leader. The coup came shortly after Abdallahi’s call for the dismissal of top military generals on corruption charges. General Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz, the head of the presidential guard, spearheaded the movement. Though the August coup was not Mauritania’s first, the overthrow of a freely-elected leader was very troubling to members of the African Union (AU), the European Commission, and the United States, all of whom issued swift condemnations of the military’s actions. While the junta has since released Abdallahi, it refuses to restore constitutional rule. This coup has dashed the hopes of both world leaders and the Mauritanian people that the nation will ever be a stable democracy.

The coup occurred primarily due to long-increasing tensions between Abdallahi and Mauritania’s parliament. Tensions began when Abdallahi replaced technocratic Prime Minister Zeine Ould Zeidane with Yahya Ould Ahmed El-Waghev, the leader of a new pro-presidential party. Under this new leadership, military brass feared losing their economic and political influence. Though a July 2008 no-confidence vote officially disassembled Ould Waghev’s government, President Abdallahi kept him on to form another government. However, while military leaders decried the President’s blatant disregard for constitutional process, they did not act on their concerns until Abdallahi’s fateful attempt to sack Ould Abdelaziz and other anti-presidential figures.

The international community’s initial reactions to the coup in Mauritania were swift and severe. In addition to strong rhetoric denouncing the event, many nations threatened to cut off foreign aid. For example, both France and the European Union have frozen non-humanitarian aid to the country. EU commissioner Louis Michel has also hinted that recent events might compromise the sort of aid package that Mauritania could expect to receive from the EU for the 2008-2013 period. The United States, meanwhile, has promised to withhold US$20 million in non-humanitarian aid to Mauritania, including military aid, until President Abdallahi is reinstated. By September 1, 2008 the World Bank also suspended 120 million euros in aid to Mauritania. These actions critically affect the future of a nation that, with a GDP of just US$1,600 per capita, depends on foreign food and monetary aid to sustain its people and provide economic stability.

Furthermore, in the days following the coup, the AU held an emergency summit meeting, deciding to suspend Mauritania’s membership in the organization. The Permanent Council of the Francophonie took similar actions. Just as Mauritania is dependent upon foreign entities for its food and capital needs, it is also dependent upon them for political legitimacy. It is important that Mauritania retain membership in these coalitions if it is to maintain international credibility.

With the military government seemingly ignoring them, international bodies have stepped up their demands in recent months. In October 2008, the AU issued an ultimatum to the coup leaders demanding that Abdallahi be reinstated. Additionally, the United States began enforcing travel restrictions on coup leaders, their supporters, and certain government officials. Even Al-Qaeda has condemned the coup and rejected the prospect of military rule in Mauritania. The terrorist organization’s operatives have called for a full-scale jihad to unseat coup leaders, an action which is in the group’s own interest given General Abdelaziz’s commitment to rooting out religious extremism in the country.

In Mauritania, some citizens profess guarded optimism about the new government, but many vehemently oppose it. Already, local police have oppressed several anti-coup rallies. As a result of the coup leaders’ actions, Mauritanians are suffering as foreign-funded programs have been cut and civil liberties have been curtailed.

Meanwhile, General Abdelaziz and his men have formed a transitional government and promise new elections in the near future. They convened a political forum which recommended in January 2009 that elections be held in May of this year with a second-round runoff in June if necessary. However, even if these elections occur, Abdallahi has expressed doubt that military rule will ever come to an end. One indication of this possibility is the fact that current members of the military will be allowed to run in the elections, provided that they resign their posts beforehand. Colonel Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, who orchestrated a 2005 coup in the nation, called elections under such rules a “masquerade” and said they will lack credibility.

Both the international community and the Mauritanian people are watching and waiting to see if the colonel’s assessment is correct. Foreign entities will likely continue to withhold aid until the junta can assuage their fears that democracy in Mauritania is not gone forever. Meanwhile, Mauritanians hope for a day not only when foreign aid returns but also when they will be able to exercise democratic freedoms again. While the outlook now is seemingly dim, General Abelaziz still has a chance to surprise his critics and renew the prospects for democracy in Mauritania.


 




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