Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University and author of Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy and From Empire to Community. He taught at Harvard University, Columbia University, and University of California-Berkeley and served as a senior adviser to the White House.
An Iraqi girl peeks out of a broken classroom window to watch as U.S. Army Soldiers from Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division deliver new desks to her school in Nawaful, Iraq, March 25, 2008. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Samuel Bendet) (www.army.mil)/flickr.com
An old idea, that the US military should play an active and extensive role in the “reconstruction” of conflict zones in which it is involved, is gaining renewed popularity among US authorities. There is strong sociological evidence that this tilt is a strategic mistake. I first briefly report on the new calls for increased dedication of military assets and training to this mission, then lay out the reasons this course cannot be followed.
An important indication that reconstruction is moving up on the list of strategic goals and means of dealing with conflicts in unstable states is that the highly regarded Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has endorsed this change in direction. He stated, during a speech referring to the June 2008 National Defense Strategy at the National Defense University on September 29, 2008, that, “The US military’s ability to kick down the door must be matched by our ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward.” This sentiment was echoed in the October 2008 US Army Manual on Stability Operations, which stated that, “Achieving victory will assume new dimensions as we strengthen our ability to generate ‘soft’ power to promote participation in government, spur economic development, and address the root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised of the world. At the heart of this effort is a comprehensive approach to stability operations that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector.”
The Pentagon has long vied with the Department of State to ensure that reconstruction would be the Defense Department’s mission. Indeed, only relatively late in the Bush Administration was part of this mission returned to the State Department. Even after the Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act--which returned some of this mission to the State Department-- was passed in 2005, after much additional delay, it was funded only in the modest amount of US$100 million.
In short, the signals are loud and clear: The US military experienced great difficulties in securing Iraq and Afghanistan by the use of force. It is hoping to draw much more on “reconstruction” as a major strategic tool.
What Does Reconstruction Entail?
“Reconstruction” is an unfortunate term in this context, because it implies—as Defense Secretary Gates states—restoring conditions to those that existed before the war. If this were to be the limit of the military’s nation-building efforts, such rebuilding could be achieved; for instance, the 2003 invasion of Iraq by itself caused very little damage. However, there is a distinction between restoration and further development. If Iraq were to be further developed instead of just restored to its pre-war conditions, much more effort would be required--especially given that Saddam had allowed the infrastructure to deteriorate, focused his largesse on the Sunnis (some 20 percent of the population), and denied resources to much of the nation. Moreover, Iraq was run for a decade like a communist state with centralized government agencies making most decisions, ensconcing a passive, bureaucratic, inefficient, and corrupt culture. Also, political development that entails dealing with internal ethnic or religious strife is a tall task, particularly if the goal is to supplant the use of force with political institutions. Thus, further development poses much more of a challenge than restoration.
It is clear from official documentation that the United States and its allies hope to engage in massive political, economic, and social development—that is, not in reconstruction but in the construction of a new society. This development involves improving practically all the facets of the nations involved in “reconstruction.” In Iraq, the attempt to construct a new society included the legal, education, and healthcare systems; welfare; financial institutions, currency, and the stock exchange; sewer, electricity, and water services; and many other elements of the developers’ economic and political systems. The same is true for Afghanistan.
Development vs. Reconstruction
The difference between such multi-faceted development and reconstruction is far from academic hairsplitting. Reconstruction has a clear end-state and can be accomplished with a reasonable dedication of resources, although often much greater amounts than is initially suggested; Iraq presents a case in point. Shortly after the US invasion, the head of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Andrew S. Natsios, stated “The American part of this [reconstruction] will be US$1.7 billion;” just five months later the administration asked for US$20 billion more, followed subsequently by additional supplementary funding each year.
In contrast, development has no clear end-state other than the very ambitious implied precept that the nation being developed will end up like American society—a “shining, prosperous democracy.” Such nation-building is very rarely accomplished, especially in nations that are ill-prepared for it. This is the case in Afghanistan (one of the poorest and most illiterate nations in the world), Iraq, and Pakistan, which can be contrasted with Germany and Japan, the two success stories of multi-faceted development. In the nations currently being “rebuilt,” corruption and waste consume a great part of the resources that the developers provide; infrastructure is nonexistent or in very poor condition; and the labor force lacks education and skills.
The argument that the United States military should develop nations has considerable “public diplomacy” appeal: it is a vision speech writers find hard to resist. It backfires, however, when the United States and its allies cannot deliver on the promises implied in nation-building speeches. Civilian international development efforts have also been highly problematic. A 2006 review of the total aid efforts of the World Bank concluded that the “achievement of sustained increases in per capita income, essential for poverty reduction, continues to elude a considerable number of countries.” The highest rates of development have occurred in nations that received very little or no aid—China, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan—and the least in nations that received large amounts of aid--especially in Africa.
“Reconstruction,” especially as part of a military strategy, has a third meaning that is well worth separating from the preceding two (restoring status quo ante and multi-faceted development): gaining good will. Many of the specific development projects listed as desirable are aimed at “winning the hearts and minds” of the people, encouraging cooperation with US military forces, especially in sharing information and not supporting the insurgency. Examples include digging wells, opening clinics, paving roads, and—on the lighter side—handing out soccer balls and candy to children. In the short run, this can work. However, when the villagers have strong linkages to insurgents--ethnic or family ties, ideological (including religious) reasons to support them, or fear of being terrorized by them--such limited gestures cannot negate these forces.
