Oil fields in Azerbaijan. Courtesy of Vagabondblogger, flickr.com

Within the last decade, several presidents, especially in resource-reliant countries, have attempted to remold their countries' constitutional design for their own benefit by removing presidential term limits. It appears that these attempts have been largely successful in allowing incumbents to stay in power. Just slightly more than a week ago, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez won a referendum that allows him to run for re-election indefinitely after his tenure expires in 2012. Energy-rich Azerbaijan in the southern belt of the former Soviet Union may be next in line to eliminate presidential term limits in the upcoming March referendum.

Although reasons for lifting term limits may vary across states, and although the phenomenon is not unique to resource-abundant states, the logic seems to be the following.

In resource-affluent countries, many of which are in the developing world, access to state resources is also a source of enormous benefits. In governance systems in which the state functions as a "cover" for an extended network of patronage and clientelism, rents obtained from multiple rent-generating opportunities provide the material underpinning for the entire clientelist system, at the apex of which is the president – the patron-in-chief. Over time, as the spoils from commodity exports increase, the quantities of rents available to the president for distribution also increase. The president uses material rewards, drawn from large rents and other forms of rent-seeking, to benefit his coterie, cronies, family, and friends. Other social groups may also benefit from selective dispersal of patronage (e.g. job positions in the government sector, subsidies on public services) and in exchange offer their political acquiescence.

This submission ultimately dampens societal pressures for political participation and retards democratization. The leader's inner circle and cronies who benefit most from windfall gains, associated corruption and rent seeking develop vested interests in sustaining their patron's hold on power. Thanks to the multiple sources of rents that access to state resources provides, the ruler maintains his support base and consolidates his power. Since the system is built on personal relations and depends on the ruler, it is in everyone's interest to support the strongman's uninterrupted stay in office. Nothing less than the survival of patronized now depends on the survival of the patron.

The leader, in turn, uses his incumbency advantage, most importantly the control of state resources and administrative apparatus, to remove previously adopted limitations on presidential powers. Normally, when the second term starts or some years before the term comes to an end, the incumbent ruler and his innermost circle start to think of ways to avoid a succession crisis that would put the system at risk of collapse. Hence the elimination of term limits.

Although the non-reelection rule does not guarantee democracy, ending term limits erodes one of the essential pillars of presidentialism – a fixed period of time in office. It makes it harder for opposition candidates to compete for the presidency, leaving almost no chance for meaningful political change. Deprived of opportunities to participate in government, the opposition might, if possible, resort to violence to compete for political power. Overall, this might endanger political stability with detrimental effects on the prospect for democratic change.

Unrestricted presidencies are especially dangerous if they emerge in states with a rentier economy. Exempted from the obligation to step down, the president would solidify his governing coalition, extend his control of the state and media, and circumscribe political competition. By taking advantage of enormous natural resource revenues, it is easy to manipulate public opinion, gain electoral support, and garner political legitimacy. The injection of populist rhetoric and the introduction of a personality cult around the leader can also help. In fact, the development of the personality cult is especially ironic since these leaders adopt irresponsible, politically motivated policies that lead to unsustainable development and the misallocation of public funds. In institutionally weak environments, limitless presidential power can also translate into policies geared toward weakening civil society and stifling dissenting voices. With extraordinary profits available, the government can also strengthen its repressive capacity to obviate any future attempts to overthrow the regime. With so large a source of wealth, the government strengthens and expands. It can, however, use its strength to curtail the formation of interest groups, insulate itself from social demands, and hold onto power to serve a narrow elite interest (all the while emphasizing that it serves only "the people").

As in similar cases, abolishing term limits is the wrong choice for Azerbaijan, which has so far failed to develop strong institutional restraints like an effective legislature, an independent courts system, a strong civil society, and a free media to avert the negative consequences of such an amendment. If adopted, the constitutional change would finish up the consolidation of a super-presidential system sustained by political clientelism and misappropriation of public resources. In the final analysis this step will undermine the potential of this increasingly authoritarian state to democratize.

Referendum on Abolishing Presidential Term Limits in Azerbaijan

On December 26, 2008 the majority of Azerbaijani parliament members called for a referendum to amend the 1995 Azerbaijan Constitution. Initiated by the governing Yeni Azerbaijan Party, a package of more than 40 constitutional amendments will be put to vote in a referendum that will be held on March 18, 2009. Among other things, the proposed constitutional reform include the removal of presidential term limits, currently limited to two consecutive five-year terms, and the addition of a presidential power to postpone presidential and parliamentary elections in the event of Azerbaijan's engagement in military operations.

According to the proponents of the constitutional reform, the existing clause limiting presidential tenure in office is undemocratic. In an interview given to Reuters at the World Economic Forum in Davos, President Ilham Aliyev justified his party's motion to abolish term limits by referring to European democratic practices. He said, "You will not find any member of the European Union whose leader cannot be elected as many times as the people want him to be in this position. Is it democratic? Yes. So the same should be applied to Azerbaijan." Obviously, Mr. Aliyev's confusion of parliamentary democracy with presidentialism makes his argument untenable. He neglected to mention that a fixed term of office is a defining characteristic of presidential government. Furthermore, he made a misleading comparison between a world of established democracies and one of emerging 'monarchical presidencies,' in which power is highly personalized and centralized around the president. Absent strong vertical and horizontal mechanisms of accountability, the president under this system may remove any obstacles that could inhibit his maintenance of the office, including term restrictions.