Hope for a different approach to reconciliation in Cyprus has brought new leadership to the long-divided Mediterranean island nation. Communist president Dimitris Christofias opened historic Ledra Street in the capital, Nicosia, in accordance with his campaign promises. Amid much fanfare, Cypriots crossed the “Green Line,” the north-south barrier that symbolizes the national divide, for the first time in decades. The recent progress has been encouraging but not without stumbles. Ledra Street, for example, closed again on the very day of its opening, when Turkish troops mistakenly entered the UN buffer zone. Cyprus’ fragile advances suggest that even though Cypriots now have the moderate leadership they have long sought, unity is far from guaranteed. Reunification in Cyprus will likely hinge on the most difficult of roadblocks—Turkish compliance.

Voters elected Christofias wanting to change the approach to the reconciliation process in Cyprus, where the Greek-controlled south has been divided from the Turkish-controlled north since 1974. Much of Christofias’ wide-ranging support has hinged on his commitment to reuniting the island. He won the election on a moderate, pro-market platform—a stark contrast to his predecessor’s obstructionism. His pro-unification stance attracted nearly 54 percent of Cypriots in the election, giving Christofias both a wide margin of victory and a mandate to follow through on his diplomatic promises.

The current situation seems to augur well for a political settlement. Most importantly, both governments are now led by moderate presidents. Christofias’ northern counterpart, Mehmet Ali Talat, also defeated an obstructionist predecessor. The leaders have thawed a two-year diplomatic freeze in which little more than hardline rhetoric was exchanged between the two governments. The duo’s resolve has generated several tangible successes that would have been difficult to imagine even a few years ago, including the high-level diplomatic talks that led to a joint opening of Ledra Street. They have acted on promises to convene nearly 100 experts to iron out details of reunification. The leaders have also publicly displayed goodwill measures, such as Talat’s walk through shops in the Greek half of Nicosia’s market. These efforts have been concrete enough to elicit high-level attention from the United Nations, the United States, Britain, and others.

But the current optimism belies the tenuous nature of Cyprus’ progress. After the Turkish troops’ mishap marred the opening of Ledra Street, Christofias sparked further diplomatic controversy by suggesting that his counterpart was unaccountable and not truly in control. However, obstacles larger than rhetoric further obstruct a settlement, however. History shows that Turkey’s opinion—and particularly that of its military—carries the most weight in Cyprus’ politics. In the 2004 UN proposal for reunification, for example, Turkey was able to extract key concessions during the negotiation process in exchange for its assent. The plan was ultimately rejected by Greek voters because of provisions that would have allowed Turkey to keep some troops on the island indefinitely and Turkish settlers to remain on Greek land.

The issue of Turkish troops, 35,000 of which still occupy the island, has been the major obstacle preventing a settlement. Turkey’s military argues that such forces have been critical to Cyprus’ relative peace, implying that any agreement depends on Turkey. Despite Christofias’ otherwise warm diplomatic meetings with Talat, this issue has still generated friction among the populations. Greek Cypriots criticize the military as an ominous reminder of Turkish hostility, while Turkish Cypriots regularly accuse the Greeks of impeding the peace process.

To be sure, Turkey’s military is not the only issue impeding Cyprus’ unity. In 2006, confidence-building measures faltered over substantive issues of unification such as water management, which is a salient political problem in Cyprus. Turkey’s interest in preserving a Turkish government on the island should lead it to play a role in power-sharing discussions, but this support has not been forthcoming. Indeed, Turkey always seems to find an excuse to avoid negotiating; it balked at the suggestion of the EU as acting as an intermediary for multi-party diplomatic talks. Turkey reasoned that after incorporating both Greece and Greek Cyprus, the EU could no longer be impartial. There seems to be little chance that Turkey will budge without being offered either carrots or sticks.

Turkish support will be needed for the withdrawal of troops, solving of logistical issues, and the island’s ultimate reconciliation. Nationalist political pressures make it increasingly difficult for Turkey to compromise its current stance. This pressure cements Turkey’s position of keeping troops in place and retaining guarantorship rights, which grant Turkey responsibility to maintain peace on the island. Turkey will likely reject any settlement that Christofias and Talat create unless this hardline nationalism recedes. If Turkey declared support for reconciliation, both presidents would have more breathing room. Unfortunately, the political landscape in Turkey will not change as easily as Cyprus’ has changed under Christofias and Talat. Ledra Street may open, but 35,000 obstacles still lie in the path.