Studies referenced by the author.

Two decades have passed since the dissolution of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia began destabilizing southeast Europe, but there is still little reason to proclaim that the region has reached the point of no return for ethnic conflicts and wars. Until recently, many pundits blamed the unresolved issue of Kosovo as the main cause for enduring instability. Yet, even after the overwhelmingly Albanian majority in this Serbian province declared independence on 17 February, 2008—a unilateral move sponsored and micro-managed for the most part by the United States—there is no evidence that the political endgame in the region has started. Indeed, there are unambiguous signs that starting positions have been occupied for a new “great game” in the Balkans. Yet, the rules for the next rounds are being changed at the moment: equipped with new possibilities to influence the region through its energy policy, Russia is re-entering the stage with more clout than ever since the Soviet Union collapse.

Since the very beginning of the turmoil in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, the United States, the European Union (EU), Russia (at that moment still the Soviet Union), and some Muslim countries (i.e. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Malaysia, etc.) became progressively involved in the events on the ground. At the outset, the external interest was declared to be of humanitarian nature, yet, unavoidably, external involvement soon shifted to bickering for influence in the successor countries of former Yugoslavia and thus, in southeast Europe as well.

Without doubt, the United States was most successful in the wheeling and dealing in southeast Europe in the last two decades. Washington applied both soft power (economic aid for reconstruction and development, financial assistance to institution building, civil society, the mass media, etc.), and hard power by leading NATO military interventions in the region. On balance, since 1991, the United States determined all outcomes in the series of post-Yugoslav conflicts. Thus, there is solid evidence to justify calling the present situation in the area of former Yugoslavia a Pax Americana. Yet, there is also reason to assume that US influence in southeast Europe has passed its peak. The apogee was reached with the United States decision to unleash the NATO attack on Serbia in the spring of 1999 without approval by the UN Security Council. The downturn commenced in the past winter after Washington signalled to the Kosovo Albanians that the United States would stand behind a declaration of independence. This meant bypassing, the UN Security Council and its resolutions again; ignoring the reservations by a number of EU and other countries, including China; and acting in defiance of Serb and Russian vehement protests. It is unlikely that the United States will be in the position to intervene in the same imperial manner in south eastern Europe any time soon.

The United States: No role-model for Serbia

The last two decades in south eastern Europe were not only years of ethnic conflicts but also a time of political, economic, and social transition. In a parallel transformation, the countries opted for Euro-Atlantic integration to replace the previous membership in the Eastern block, or, in the case of former Yugoslavia, its non-aligned position. By now, most states of the region regularly hold elections that are considered free and fair by the observers from the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OECD). They have achieved some of the highest growth rates in Europe (although serious economic problems persist). Membership in the EU is supported by the vast majority of the voters throughout the region. In various forms, NATO is present in all countries of the regions and has invited Albania and Croatia to join the alliance. The United States has new military bases in the region: in Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Krivolak (Republic of Macedonia) and “Camp Bondsteel” (Kosovo). Apparently, the Pax Americana is working.

Yet, in Serbia, the biggest and arguably the politically most important country in the region, the United States enjoys little popularity among “normal citizens,” as confirmed by recent opinion polls. Serbia is formally part of the NATO Partnership for Peace program, but there is little reason to expect that this country will one day want to join NATO—the wounds from the 1999 war are too deep. Now, after the United States enforced the Kosovo Albanian independence declaration, the relationship between Washington and Belgrade is worse than ever, since the time Serbia toppled the populist leader Slobodan Miloљević eight years ago.

But how do the “normal people” view the future of their country? After all, they have the opportunity to determine Serbia’s orientation in free elections. Should the United States be the role model for Serbia? Merely 3 percent of the respondents in a representative poll carried out in this April by the respected Centre for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID) in Belgrade thought this to be a good idea. Only China and eastern Europe scored equally low in this survey. Western European (17 percent), Scandinavian, and neutral countries (each 16 percent) are still the Serbs’ favorites. However, Russia (17 percent) has become the rising star in the eyes of many Serbs. The obvious reason for this surge in sympathy is the support that Moscow is providing Serbia, while the United States is the staunch protector of Albanians.

Indeed, for most of the time since the disintegration of Yugoslavia began almost two decades ago, the United States ignored Serbia’s concerns, even after the democratic change in Belgrade in the year 2000. On the other hand, Russia’s involvement with Serbia is century-long and usually portrayed in the prevailing political discourse in both countries as based on common Slavic roots and a long history of mutual solidarity. Although this interpretation does not reflect historical facts, because both states were always primarily pursuing their particular interests, the “special relationship” is often romanticized and serves as an efficient tool to mobilize emotions. In any case, it is evident that a politically assertive and financially open-handed Russia is eager to win Belgrade over to its side.

At this point, the public opinion in Serbia still prefers EU membership as confirmed in a recent opinion poll by the Belgrade pollster Politikum, yet the pro-Russian mood is also strong. An overwhelming number of respondents also refuse a trade-off involving Serbia’s faster accession to the EU in exchange for accepting the secession of Kosovo (see charts).