Does the African Union have a future? Founded in 2002 to replace the preexisting Organization of African Unity (OAU), the AU originally championed a "United States of Africa" that would work toward collective security and prosperity. Yet as the AU reaches its half-decade mark, many have critiqued its lackluster performance and questioned its future. Despite repeated calls for a supranational organization modeled after the European Union, the challenges of internal political instability, ideological confusion, and funding continue to diminish hopes for a united body. Is there a place for the AU, with or without a pan-African state? The answer, while not a flat-out "no," does suggest that a revolutionary unification of Africa is unlikely. Instead, as exemplified by recent efforts to organize various diasporas and implement anti-corruption measures, the AU's more immediate role seems to be that of a provider of public goods and a catalyst for reform.

The organization's most fundamental problem is its ideological vacuum. The AU has adopted the vague notion of "pan-Africanism" as its guiding principle, but this term can be used to support opposing goals and priorities. During the formation of the AU, support was divided into two camps: the Casablanca group and the Monrovia group. The Casablanca group argued for extensive unification of defense and economic policies, while the Monrovia group championed a "United States of Africa" that would respect individual state sovereignty. The Sirte Summit, during which the AU was founded, ostensibly echoed the ideology of the Monrovia group. However, key AU figures still support the Casablanca doctrine, leading to contradictory policies on the direction of the organization. Pan-Africanism, as a result, has fallen short of being a full- fledged ideology for the AU. Instead, it has become a catch-all phrase for political expediency.

On a more practical level, the AU lacks the political credibility to be an effective source of power on the continent. Currently, the membership of the AU includes all African states but Morocco, so that even the most egregious violators of human rights, such as Zimbabwe, are represented. Although the AU supposedly only extends its membership to "democratic" regimes, the criteria are far from rigorous. Unlike the EU, it does not require extensive protection of rights or the establishment of rule of law. This undermines not only the AU's commitment to the protection of human rights and democratic institutions, but also the legitimacy of the organization itself.

Furthermore, the AU's lack of funding reduces its relevance as a serious political player. The Pan African Parliament (PAP), which serves as a regional body for popular sovereignty, has not been able to convene as frequently as necessary because of financial shortages. This incapacity has diminished its role in the decision making process. Lack of funding has also weakened the AU's role as a collective security agency. From its first peacekeeping operation in Burundi to the ongoing crisis in Darfur, the AU has shown itself to be incapable of delivering an adequate response to regional violence. Burundi, in particular, demonstrated that AU forces could not attain a sustainable peace without the financial and political support of the UN and other wealthier nations. Such failures undermine the AU's effectiveness as a collective security provider, let alone as a pan-African army, as its proponents imagine.

Though the AU has failed to deliver sweeping changes or unification, such lofty goals are not the only way to benefit the continent. Smaller objectives, in the form of "quiet revolutions," can provide more immediate and substantive improvements. One example is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). To address the problem of self-evaluation from within, APRM gathers a rotating, multi-national board of evaluators that examines each member state for corrupt civil servants and illegitimate governing practices. This process has led to a poorly-publicized but unprecedented firing of senior government officials across the African continent. It has also demonstrated the potential for the AU to skirt its legitimacy problems while still enacting meaningful change. Indeed, APRM policy could not have been effectively promoted without the multi-national structure of the AU, but it has been also achieved without the realization of a pan-African state.

A further example of the AU's potential lies in the recent attempt to "encourage the full participation of the African diaspora." This initiative will work to harness the skills of the diaspora and allow overseas professionals to contribute back to their home countries. The AU's model grew out of individual efforts, such as South Africa's Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA), to reverse the trends of brain drain and outward migration by cooperating with diaspora populations. The benefits to individual nations should be greater under this system: by combining these efforts under a pan-African organization, each country will be able to benefit from a far larger pool of expatriates.

These policies are undoubtedly tools for promoting the collective good, though they are much more limited in scale than original proponents of the AU might have hoped. Taken as a whole, these smaller efforts seem to suggest that cooperation without the creation of a powerful governing body can have meaningful benefits to all nations involved. Perhaps herein lies the raison d'etre of the AU. Beyond the lofty goals of a "United States of Africa," the AU might be able to find success in more realistic, mundane, but nonetheless essential policies.