In December 2006, Ethiopian troops, with the support of the United States, entered Somalia to oust the Islamic Courts movement that had taken over the government. Somalia is a tragic example of a failed state that has put enormous pressure on the international community and neighboring countries for nearly two decades. After the December 2006 attacks, fleeing Islamic fundamentalists escaped into Kenya, which is now home to over a quarter million documented refugees, the majority of whom are Somali or Sudanese. These refugees in Kenya have put pressure on World Food Program food stocks, and the Kenyan government has blamed the rise of national crime on weapons crossing the border from Somalia. The situation has even affected Kenya’s robust tourism industry, as the US embassy in Nairobi has warned that Westerners in Kenya may be targeted for kidnapping by the Islamic Courts movement.

The continuing case of state failure in Somalia, made infamous by the Black Hawk Down incident and the precipitous withdrawal of American troops in 1993, demonstrates a particular set of challenges to the international community: what can and should be done about fragile, failing, and failed states, and when is the appropriate time to address the problem? In this article, we argue that a preconceived strategy that is capable of handling political, economic, and social needs, in addition to more immediate security requirements, is both necessary and crucial for addressing the problem of failed states.

Placing Failed States on the Agenda

During the 1990s, scholars, policymakers, and military strategists became increasingly concerned with the problem of failed and failing states because they threatened regional security and often created humanitarian crises. The Clinton administration seemed to appreciate the need for interventions by regional and global organizations to mitigate the potential dangers of these states, which if left unaided would further threaten regional and global security. In contrast, the Bush administration entered office with little appreciation of or interest in the problem of failed states.

In a January 2000 Foreign Affairs article, Condoleezza Rice outlined what a new Republican administration’s foreign policy assumptions and goals ought to be. While the Clinton administration argued for a comprehensive approach, which included confronting the root causes of conflict within fragile states, promoting multilateral security regarding responses to needs, and attempting a preventive diplomacy, each part of this approach was anathema to the new administration. During the campaign, Bush echoed Rice’s argument that nation-building was an inappropriate use of US troops and resources. Moreover, during the televised presidential candidate debate with Al Gore, Bush indicated that his administration would not have undertaken “nation-building” in Haiti, become involved in Rwanda to prevent genocide, or intervened in the Balkans. The one exception he noted was the case of Australian intervention in East Timor, which Bush approved of because the United States offered only logistical assistance. Thus, when President Bush took office, failed states disappeared from the national agenda and were replaced by the problem of rogue regimes.

Identifying Weak States

However, weak states—characterized by lack of political and economic substance—continue to challenge the international community. While the designation of the number of failed, failing, fragile, weak, under stress, at risk, and collapsed states ranges from a dozen to five dozen across academic and government studies, there are certain characteristics that are generally agreed upon. The World Bank in its Low Income Countries Under Stress Project argues that these states are characterized by weak policies, weak institutions, and weak governance.

In addition, these states lack a strong sense of nationhood; ethnic identities connected to tribal, religious and similar characteristics continue to dominate. The weak state does not deliver the goods of citizenship, such as legal, political, and social rights, and often cannot maintain civil order in substantial portions of its geographic territory. State or regime legitimacy is questioned, and people turn to ethnic communities for support, thus contributing to a further diminution of central state power and an accrual of competing power in ethnic, tribal, or religious communities.

An Unsuccessful Approach

While many argue that the events of September 11, 2001 changed everything with respect to international affairs, the events initially did little to change the Bush administration’s appreciation of the distinction between failed states and rogue regimes. The lack of appreciation for the importance of failed states and the central problems of nation-building is apparent in the inadequate preparations and resources devoted to rebuilding post-Saddam Iraq and Afghanistan after the victory over the Taliban in 2001. In effect, the administration’s policy has led to the possible emergence of two new failed states despite the many billions of dollars devoted to the military missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, this policy has done nothing to address the festering problems in other weak and failing states around the globe.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) became the core of the Bush administration’s international security framework after September 11, 2001. The parameters established by this new national security orientation of the administration and the announcement of the Bush doctrine of preemption have meant that failed and failing states continue to receive less attention, resources, and strategic consideration than they merit. Unfortunately, many of these states still suffer from insecurity, instability, and the threat of terrorism.

Furthermore, when the new Bush National Security Strategy finally recognized that failed states posed a security threat to the United States, it did so in terms of the GWOT. In other words, the focus on failed states was not in terms of the dangers they pose for the spillover of conflicts and victims to neighboring countries. Instead of focusing on building government capacity, improving economies, managing their borders, or tracking resources, the administration stressed weapons material and threatening regimes.

More recently, the administration has undertaken steps to help confront the failed states problem by establishing the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which acts as the coordinator for joint operations across the national security bureaucracy. Moreover, Condoleezza Rice changed her public statements on failed states following her move from National Security Advisor to Secretary of State. During testimony to the House Foreign Affairs committee in February 2006, Rice indicated that failed states threat to pose a serious threat to US security, saying that the US experiences “a real threat to… our peace and security” when poorly governed countries cannot control borders or satisfy their populations’ needs. While in theory these new steps are laudable, in practice they have only paid lip service to the larger failed states problem and have not made discernable a difference on the ground to date.