In October 1993, US soldiers landed in Mogadishu with a seemingly straightforward mission: they would abduct the lieutenants of Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid, who had gained power after the fall of Mohammed Siad Barre’s dictatorial regime. The disastrous operation, which resulted in the deaths of 18 US soldiers and hundreds of Somalis, signaled only the beginning to the country’s troubles. Over a decade later, efforts to restore order continue to fail in the war-torn region, demonstrating the difficulties of the international community’s relationship with so-called "failed states."
Intervention in weak or deteriorating states has a mixed record. In the 20th century, the United States and the Soviet Union viewed these states as ideological battlefields, and exerted their influence accordingly. Today, some commentators label Iraq, Afghanistan, and several countries in Africa as failed states, but questions of how to resolve continuing problems in those regions have yet to be answered. To a significant degree, this responsibility to act seems to fall on the Western world. Many academics point to colonialism in Africa, Cold War activity, and current involvement in the Middle East as evidence for the West’s obligation to address the weaknesses of failing countries. A more practical argument is that state failure does not exist in a vacuum, implying that instability in any area has effects on the global system. Alongside these justifications, however, lie the practical issues of how exactly a successful intervention could occur. Even when disregarding questions of national sovereignty, actually implementing lasting change in another region of the world is a daunting challenge for any government.
This symposium takes a closer look at failed states, seeking to define the terms of the debate and determine the extent of other countries’ responsibilities. Our first author, Daniel Thürer, examines the sociology and political theory behind the phenomenon of a failed state. Next, Gabi Hesselbein takes a look at the origins of failed states, arguing that understanding initial causes of failure is necessary for an effective reconstruction policy. Stefan Mair follows, offering a critical perspective: he argues that failing states, not failed states, are in fact more dangerous and thus deserve more attention from the international community. Rachel Stohl and Michael Stohl place failed states back on the agenda, positing that the United States must formulate a coherent and multifaceted agenda in order to effectively address the problem. Justin Logan and Christopher Preble pull the debate in the opposite direction, contending that the threat of failed states is overstated, while our capacity to deal with them is seriously underdeveloped. Finally, we conclude with Gerald Helman, who provides some concrete suggestions—a Conservator model—for dealing with perhaps the most widely discussed failed state of all: Iraq.
In today’s world, countries must increasingly decide when it is justifiable to interfere in another nation’s affairs. Many argue that it is dangerous to allow instability to fester anywhere. However, as the arguments running through this symposium illustrate, it remains extremely difficult to establish a workable policy framework that leads toward successful change.
