Jeffrey Harley is a visiting fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a Captain in the United States Navy where he most recently served as a Destroyer Squadron Commander.
The United States’ adherence to the “one China” principle has effectively maintained a stalemate between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the United States has been able to deter a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan by accepting the “one China” principle. In essence, the United States has been opposing Taiwanese independence and dissuading Taiwan from making unilateral declarations while also deterring China from the use of force against Taiwan. Although our policy of dual restraint has, arguably, been fairly consistent from one presidential administration to another, numerous ambiguities remain that allow for multiple interpretations and that embolden the current Taiwanese leadership to push for formal independence. These ambiguities, coupled with other emerging trends, increasingly dilute the effectiveness of our policy toward the PRC and Taiwan.
In view of changing dynamics between Beijing and Taipei, the United States must revisit its policy now in order to alleviate the growing risk of conflict. To establish a more effective policy toward China, the United States must resolve its existing policy ambiguities and develop an integrated policy toward China while at the same time driving a timeline or process for the reintegration of Taiwan and the PRC.
Addressing Ambiguities
Although US acknowledgement of the PRC’s “one China” principle has served our national interests, ambiguities over the definition of sovereignty, the perceived requirement to defend other democracies, and the extent of our military obligations to defend Taiwan may increasingly threaten the stability of cross-strait relations. Domestic politics in Taiwan have also created tensions for the cross-straits situation as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has asserted de facto independence and has pushed various referenda—most recently to join the United Nations under the name of Taiwan—that skirt the edge of de jure constitutional or sovereignty changes.
Statements by the US administration and congressional interpretations of elements of the Taiwan Relations Act add to the ambiguity of what exactly constitutes independence and sovereignty. The most accepted interpretation is that the United States was in the past mainly concerned with the process of cross-strait resolution, not necessarily the outcome. There seems to be a general but evolving consensus among US policymakers, however, that the PRC is the sole government of the “one China” and that the US “opposes” independence for Taiwan.
The idea of “opposing” Taiwanese independence is at the heart of the evolution of US policy toward Taiwan. This idea emphasizes a strive toward peaceful settlement but with a more narrowly defined outcome. Amid this debate, there is divergence on such issues as whether the US policy has shifted too far in support of the PRC, whether Taiwan may join international organizations that require sovereignty, whether Taiwanese leadership may make political visits to the United States, and, finally, whether the United States is obligated to defend Taiwan in a conflict provoked by Taiwanese actions. Each of these points should be clearly and unambiguously addressed to create an integrated policy that would better serve the interests of the United States.
It is fair to suggest that ambiguity has served a valuable role in opening the door to China and in executing the US policy of dual restraint. In the past, a certain amount of “constructive ambiguity” has been helpful in assuaging the various factions that exist in the US Congress as well as in Beijing and Taipei. Additionally, the ambiguities have allowed room for interpretations that have enabled diplomatic flexibility while fledgling relations strengthened over time. However, emerging and continuing trends necessitate the reexamination of the policy, and the time is ripe for the United States to update its policy with China.
Chances of Conflict
Enabling the peaceful development of China should be an obvious and significant priority for the United States, and a number of factors make a conflict between the United States and the PRC unlikely. These factors include a high volume of economic trade between the two nations, blossoming trade relations between the PRC and Taiwan, and a mutual understanding of the danger of military conflict between two nuclear powers. According to a 2007 task force report released by the Council on Foreign Relations, trade between the PRC and Taiwan has grown to US$65 billion per year and is matched by more than US$100 billion in cross-strait Taiwanese business opportunities on the mainland. For the most part, the PRC remains inward-looking to prepare for the 2008 Olympics to showcase China’s development to the world and to maintain efforts to sustain its impressive economic growth, which averages nearly 10 percent a year. The evolving economic partnership between the United States and the PRC as well as Washington’s enthusiasm for the “peaceful rise” of China, is matched by efforts to integrate China into existing world institutions and forums and thereby make the PRC a genuine stakeholder in international affairs.
At the same time, however, the possibility of a conflict between the United States and the PRC may be increasing for multiple reasons. These reasons include: debates arising from within Taiwanese presidential politics, recent demographic shifts in Taiwan, the substantial growth of the PRC’s military spending that seriosuly increases the chance for miscalculation and mistrust, and finally, the continuing lack of a consistent, integrated, and comprehensive US policy toward Beijing.
Risk Factors
The upcoming elections in Taiwan pose a potential risk to the United States as Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian pushes for a referendum that seeks to alter the status quo. President Chen has repeatedly threatened referenda in an attempt to maintain power for the DPP and has pushed Beijing’s redlines, raising fears that some sort of PRC retaliatory response could ensue. The current dialogue about a popular vote in the 2008 elections to join the United Nations as the sovereign nation of Taiwan has produced concern in Beijing in spite of the unlikelihood that the DPP will gather the requisite number of votes to pass such a referendum. For Beijing, the vote is a significant threat in itself as an affront to its vision of territorial integrity. It is difficult to predict whether this move will result in diplomatic backlash.