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A World Without WMDs?
Modern Challenges to Nuclear Non-Proliferation
An interview with Dr. Hans Blix
by, Natasa Kovacevic
Economics of National Security, Vol. 29 (3) - Fall 2007 Issue

Dr. Hans Blix is the chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, a nongovernmental project funded by Sweden. He served as the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1981-1997, and led the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Disarmament Commission in Iraq until 2003.
Natasa Kovacevic is Editor in Chief of the Harvard International Review.

You have voiced your belief that a new arms race is actually occurring in the world today—both on land and in space. What leads you to this conclusion?

It is clear that the United Kingdom has decided it will prolong the Trident Program for nuclear-tipped missiles, which will take them far into this century. The US administration wants to develop a new, standardized nuclear weapon. It may well be that the Russians are developing further modernizations of their nuclear weapons, and we do not know about the Chinese and others. So there are timetables being drawn up for new nuclear weapons, even though Article 6 of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) requires that the nuclear weapon states should move in the opposite direction and negotiate toward disarmament. As of today, the Russians have been testing a new missile for nuclear weapons, which I presume is a response to the missile shield.

There exists another big power competition when it comes to outer space. The United States and Russia have pursued this race for many years, but actions by the Chinese now demonstrate that they would have the capacity for military action in space. So I conclude that activities leading to more weapons are significantly prevailing over negotiations toward disarmament, despite the fact that there are no longer any real conflicts between the big powers. The total expenditure for military purposes in the world last year was about US$1.3 trillion, and yet there are no longer any real conflicts between the great powers. It has been about 17 years since the end of the Cold War. How can these expenses be justified?

You recently suggested that a way to inspire a suspension of Iran’s nuclear enrichment program would be for nuclear countries, with the United States in the lead, to follow through with disarmament. Can you explain your reasoning behind this suggestion?

Let’s consider the case of Iran. The Iranians may get to the point where they can decide whether to move toward nuclear weapons. So far they publicly reject the option. I am sure they feel that the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom are continuing on a nuclear path and prolonging their programs is something that will undermine the authority of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which Iran is a party. If Iranians see that the actions of the United States and the United Kingdom are not conforming to the treaty’s requirements, then why wouldn’t they also feel that the treaty is not much of a barrier to them? The same applies to the North Koreans.

The absence of significant disarmament weakens the authority of the treaty precisely when there is a great need for it to be strong. Maintaining the authority of the treaty is essential to its effectiveness. I do not foresee the NPT having any real influence on the nuclear weapons policies of the United States or the United Kingdom. I note, however, that the United Kingdom did say, when it informed other countries about the continuation of Trident, that it was absolutely committed to an elimination of nuclear weapons around the world through a stepwise agreement on mutual and balanced reductions. Such declarations are nice to hear, especially at the moment when the United Kingdom is expanding and continuing its nuclear program. One would hope they are sincere and will take initiatives accordingly.

Some have said that demanding nuclear disarmament in the United States in the hope that other states will do the same is a dangerous fantasy. Is it possible that potential rogue states would see the loss of US deterrent capabilities as an open path to unfettered nuclear development?

No, I think that is hype. First of all, there is a tendency in the United States to consider almost anybody outside the Washington beltway as potential proliferators. That is a mistake. To develop a nuclear weapon you must have both a technical capability and a political will. If you know something about where countries stand in terms of technical nuclear capability, you will find, for instance, that Japan could, in a very short time, get nuclear weapons. However, Japan is probably the country in the world that is most anti-nuclear. It does not have the will to develop nuclear weapons. South Korea also does not. But what would happen if the North Koreans were to persist? That is another matter. Pressures could arise in Japan.

When you look at the Gulf States in the Middle East and at Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, you will find that all of these states are many years away from any technical nuclear capability. Egypt is a little closer, but still very far away from it. Algeria is probably the most advanced country in the Arab world in terms of nuclear technology. I think much of the scare lies in predictions made without actual knowledge about nuclear capabilities on the ground. Some seem to think you can acquire these capabilities overnight. You cannot. Saudi Arabia, to my knowledge, does not even have a research reactor, and Syria has only a very tiny research reactor.

There are two components involved in developing a nuclear weapon: will and technical capability. In my assessment there is no state in the Middle East that within the next 8 to 10 years would have the capability—except Algeria, which I believe is not inclined to move on the weapons path. Iran, of course, is another matter. It has considerable technical capability. The question is whether it has, or may develop, a will to pursue nuclear weapons.

Against this background I do not foresee nuclear disarmament in the United States inviting proliferation and creating the threat some suggest.

Now that several years have passed since you concluded that the US’ invasion of Iraq was unjustified, what do you believe the international community, and particularly the United States and United Kingdom, can learn from Iraq? What do you see as a desirable next step for the United States?

In my view, the only positive result from the invasion of Iraq is the disappearance of Saddam Hussein. He was a brutal dictator, and it is a relief that he has been removed. For the rest, I cannot see anything but failures. The major political justification advanced was that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. And it did not. So weapons could not be eliminated. Another reason advanced was to establish democracy. That was a beautiful thought. However, what we have seen so far is anarchy. The third reason advocated was that the invasion would send a signal to all terrorists—to Al Qaeda in particular—that they would be dealt with very forcefully. And yet, there were no Al Qaeda in Iraq at the time, but they have since arrived and established a breeding ground there.


 




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