China has received the most criticism for its strong economic, political, and military support of Sudan and Zimbabwe—two countries with very poor records on human rights. Sudan is the greater challenge for China because of the conflict in Darfur, which has been labeled genocide by the United States. China has large investments in the oil industry and receives about seven percent of its imported oil from Sudan. Western countries have long accused China of not putting sufficient pressure on Khartoum to change its policy in Darfur. China has moved from almost unconditional support of Khartoum to quiet pressure for a larger UN peacekeeping role—a message that President Hu Jintao conveyed to Sudan’s President, Omar Al Bashir, at the Beijing summit last November and during his visit to Sudan in February. This signals a slight retreat from China’s policy of non-interference in African internal affairs. Yet at the same time, Hu cancelled some of Sudan’s debt and offered to build a presidential palace. The United States complained that this sent a mixed message, expressing disappointment that China did not apply more diplomatic pressure on Sudan to reform.

Zambia is a second example of a case in which Chinese investment has sparked criticism—this time domestic. China reopened a large copper mine eight years ago that initially engendered considerable goodwill due to high job creation. Then there was a serious mining accident in 2005 followed by allegations of poor safety conditions, slashing of workers’ benefits, and discouragement of union formation. As a result, the leader of the opposition party whipped up anti-Chinese sentiment before last year’s presidential election. And even though he lost, the event created a permanent atmosphere of animosity toward China. President Hu, upon learning that miners planned to protest, canceled his proposed February visit to the mine at the last minute.

China and Africa are, in many respects, rather unlikely partners. Africa has 900 million people; China has 1.3 billion. Africa’s total gross national income is only about one quarter of China’s. The gross national income per capita in China is more than US$1,500, while the average in Africa is well under half that amount. China’s share of world trade is about nine percent, Africa’s is only about two percent. Although most of China is still poorly developed, there is no part of Africa, with the possible exception of South Africa, that is comparable, even on a small scale, to China’s highly developed and industrialized coastal region.

And although trade between China and Africa has generally had positive consequences, it has also generated increasing problems. China has major trade deficits with the five African countries that sell it large quantities of oil and moderate deficits with the half dozen states that sell it significant amounts of minerals and timber. It has large trade surpluses with nearly all the remaining countries, which include many of Africa’s poorest states. Total Chinese-African trade is nearly in balance, although Chinese exports to Africa are growing faster than its imports from Africa. For example, in 2006 China had a surplus of more than US$1.5 billion with South Africa. There is growing pressure to redress this imbalance. This situation led South African President Thabo Mbeki to warn that “China cannot only just come here and dig for raw materials and then go away and sell us manufactured goods.”

The problem has been especially severe for African countries that produce textiles. The end of the World Trade Organization’s Multi-Fibre Agreement in 2005 eliminated any advantage held by the Africans. It permitted more efficient Asian, especially Chinese, producers to undercut African textiles and flood African markets. Chinese textile exports have seriously harmed industries in Lesotho, Swaziland, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Zambia, and Morocco. Many African textile factories have been shut down, resulting in the loss of an estimated 250,000 jobs and 37 percent of Africa’s textile capacity.

A related problem is the growing number of small Chinese traders and business persons residing in Africa. Chinese officials explain that many of these businesses come to Africa from third countries over which China has no control. In South Africa alone, such business persons are estimated to number between 100,000 and 300,000. They often undercut small African traders, forcing them out of the market and generating hostility toward the Chinese. In addition, construction projects financed by China occasionally result in an influx of Chinese laborers, which sometimes sparks complaints from African workers who feel that they are entitled to such jobs. Nor is the Chinese community immune to conflicts in Africa—early this year Nigerian gunmen abducted five Chinese telecommunications workers in the volatile Niger Delta.

Africans are generally quick to criticize the conditionality of Western assistance and praise the Chinese for eschewing it. For example, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi pointed out that one cannot buy good governance in Africa; such developments can only come from inside the country. The Chinese, he added, understand this fact. On the other hand, Western donors, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund worry that unconditional aid from China is harming their efforts to achieve economic and political reform in Africa. World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz expressed concerns last year about the lending practices in Africa of Chinese banks that ignore a code of conduct for meeting social and environmental standards. Environmental groups are especially critical of the environmental implications of the Merowe dam in Sudan, where Chinese companies are the primary contractors.

The lines are now drawn on most of these issues. China realizes it faces challenges and some criticism from both Africans and the West. It has already begun to respond to African trade complaints and Western concerns over its reluctance to put pressure on Sudan concerning Darfur. As its global role grows, China will probably move further away from some of the principles in its 2006 African Policy statement and the Beijing Action Plan. It will not, however, jeopardize relations with African governments in control of critical oil and mineral exports that fuel China’s economy. However, if China hopes to be able to maintain its strong influence on the continent and continue to reap the benefits of the close relationships it has established with African states, it will have to balance its own economic and strategic interests with the complaints and criticisms that continue to be levied against it.