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Not the Populism of Yesteryear
An interview with Professor Steven Levitsky by Steven Levitsky

Steven Levitsky is John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Social Sciences at Harvard University. He specializes in comparative and Latin American politics, with an interest in political parties and political regimes. Recent research interests include the causes and consequences of institutional weakness, informal institutions, and the dynamics of competitive authoritarianism in the post-Cold War era. He is author of Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2003), and co-editor of Argentine Politics: The Politics of Institutional Weakness (Penn State, 2005) and Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from Latin America (Johns Hopkins, 2006).

HIR: Do you think that the current rise in leftist leadership could eventually mean an ideologically or politically unified Latin America, potentially against the United States?

Levitsky: No, this would never happen. National interest always predominates over ideological interest. And there have been talks for a very long time, back in the earliest populist period, and discussions throughout Latin American history of unifying the states and of acting collectively. It’s never come to anything, because national interests always prevail. You see it now; there is very little cohesion within the Latin American left. Now, the one person who can bring some solidity to a coalition is Hugo Chavez, because he can buy it. Hugo Chavez can buy the support of a few relatively small states. He can probably buy the support of Bolivia and he may be able to buy the support of Cuba, Nicaragua, and perhaps Ecuador. But, the larger countries in South America are too big to be bought by Chavez’s oil money. And the rest of the region fights for itself for all kind of reasons that has nothing to do with ideology. So, I think it is extremely unlikely that you will see anything even remotely resembling unity among left-wing governments in Latin America, particularly among the big powers. Sure, Ecuador and Bolivia may go along, but when you look at the serious powers, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, you will not see any kind of concerted action.

HIR: What do you think the United States should do in order to curb the current rise in anti-US sentiment in Latin America?

Levitsky: It should at least begin to pay lip service to Latin American interests. It should take seriously Latin American demands on trade, talk seriously about ending subsidies for sugar producers and other producers in the United States who are advantaged over Brazilian and Argentine exporters. It should talk seriously about immigration. Immigration and trade are two issues important to governments throughout the region and that’s the surest way to better relations. Talking seriously about these issues is a critical first step.

Latin Americans are also fairly sensitive to unilateral US action. Latin America is a region where the United States is historically perceived to have acted in a unilateral manner. Particularly incriminating is the fact that there have been an awful lot of US military invasions, more in the past than the recent years. But, Latin America is a region that has been perceived to have been pulled upon by the United States, and it is relatively sensitive at that. So, when you’ve got a government that behaves, or acts, or talks, maybe more than anything else, in a very unilateralist fashion, it’s likely to rub a lot of Latin Americans in the wrong way. The US has to treat Latin American states like partners again, rather than weaker powers to be imposed upon, particularly regarding middle-income countries like Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and Chile.

HIR: There has been increasing trade and interaction between China and Latin America, as well as India and Latin America. Do you think that Latin America will find an alternative economic and political partner in China, India, the EU, or any other nation aside from the United States?

Levitsky: Well, to some degree it is finding alternative economic partners, no question about that, both as sources of investment and markets. Asia, both China and India, are becoming major sources of demand and to some degree, of investment in Latin America. That seems likely to continue. However, I am not sure that will transfer very quickly, or easily, into political influence for a variety of reasons.

The ties between Latin America and the US, whether via culture, language, travel, or education, are really quite extensive, and it seems very unlikely that anytime in the next generation or so that the US will cease being the model, the reference point, and the dominant influence in the region. But, the availability of Asian markets and Asian investment reduces the economic leverage of the United States, and this reduces the economic leverage of the IMF, and Latin American governments are all for that.

HIR: What are some of the biggest challenges that a populist Latin America could present to the United States?

Levitsky: I don’t think there’s that much of a threat. I think the United States is always worse off if it can’t count on strong allies in South America and certainly in Mexico. But, it is one thing to have relations go from warm to lukewarm and not be able to count on allies as much, and another thing to say they represent a threat. You have left-of-center governments in countries like Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile that are not in any way anti-United States and present no threat at all. That would have been the case had Lopez Obrador won in Mexico too. National interest, again, predominates over ideology.

Venezuela is a partial exception. Venezuela can do some damage because it controls oil and has a lot of money to create problems. It has got the money to build some degree of a counter-alliance, to bring a few states behind it in opposition to the United States. I’m not sure what an axis of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela can do to the United States, I don’t think much. But, if Hugo Chavez sets his mind to it and is serious about working with Iran or maybe Russia, Hugo Chavez has the resources, as long as oil prices remain high, to potentially do some damage. I’m not sure he would do it, but he is a fairly ideological guy. He is a risk taker, but it is one thing to call Bush the devil; it is another to actually cut off the flow of oil and to actually acquire any sort of weaponry that would threaten the United States. That’s the one place where a threat can come from, even a medium sized threat, and it is the only place.

HIR: Do you think that in the short-term, within the next five to ten years, people like Chavez could transform their governments into authoritarian governments? Beyond just Venezuela, to Bolivia and Uruguay, do you think it’s possible for there to be authoritarian governments or dictatorships in Latin America?

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