Production of sugar, Cuba’s mainstay export, has dropped to levels comparable to those of the Depression era, and prices of other Cuban commodities, with the exception of nickel, continue their downward trend in international markets.

Legal Problems

In addition to these vexing economic realities, there will be also a maze of legal problems. Obviously, Cuban nationals, Cuban Americans, and foreigners whose properties were confiscated during the early years of the revolution will want to reclaim them or will ask for fair compensation as soon as this becomes feasible. Cubans living abroad await the opportunity to exercise their legal claims before Cuban courts. But this will have to wait until the government is willing to respect the rule of law and to compensate exiles for their losses, which will not likely happen under Raul’s regime. Few would want the return of their homes. Most would want compensation, especially of commercial properties confiscated without payment by the Castro regime. The Eastern European and Nicaraguan examples are good indications of the complexities, delays, and uncertainties accompanying the reclamation process.

Cuba’s severely damaged infrastructure is also in need of major rebuilding. The outdated electrical grid cannot supply the meager needs of consumers and industry, transportation services are woefully insufficient; communication facilities are obsolete. Sanitary and medical facilities have deteriorated so badly that contagious diseases of epidemic proportions constitute a real menace to the population. Cuba’s health system, once the showcase of the regime, has deteriorated significantly, especially after the end of Soviet subsidies. In addition, environmental concerns, such as pollution of bays and rivers, are in need of immediate attention.

The Military and Social Issues

Economic and legal problems are not, however, the only challenges in the nation’s future. Another critical problem that a post-Castro Cuba will have to deal with is the continuous power of the military. In the past, Cuba had a strong tradition of militarism. During recent years, the military, as an institution, has acquired unprecedented power. Under any conceivable scenario, the military will continue to be a key, decisive player.

Any immediate significant reduction of the military may be difficult, if not impossible. A powerful and proud institution, the armed forces would see an attempt to undermine their authority as an unacceptable intrusion into military affairs and a threat to their existence. Their control of key economic sectors under the Castro regime will make it more difficult in the future to dislodge them from these activities and limit their role to a strictly military one. Removing the military from the economy and returning them to the barracks will be a major challenge. Reducing the size of the armed forces will be problematic, too. The economy may not be able to absorb the unemployed members of the military, or the government may not be able to retrain them fast enough to occupy civilian positions.

The military role will also be affected by social conflicts that may emerge in a post-Castro period. For the first half-century of the Cuban republic, political violence was an important factor in society. A belief developed in the legitimacy of violence to effect political changes. This violence will probably reemerge with a vengeance in the future. Castro’s communist rule has engendered profound hatred and resentments. Political vendettas will be rampant, differences over how to restructure society profound, and factionalism in society and the political process common.

Labor Woes, Racism and the Rule of Law and Migration

A free and restless labor movement will complicate matters for any future government. During the Castro era, the labor movement has remained docile and under continuous government control. Only one unified, Castro-controlled labor organization has been allowed. In a democratic Cuba, labor will not be a passive instrument of any government. Rival labor organizations will develop programs for labor vindication and demand better salaries and welfare for their members. A militant, vociferous, and difficult-to-manage labor movement will surely characterize post-Castro Cuba.

The apparently harmonious race relations of the Castro era may collapse in a free society. There has been a gradual Africanization of the Cuban population over the past several decades. In part because of greater intermarriage, and in part because of the out-migration of more than a million mostly white Cubans, there is greater proportion of blacks and mulattoes in Cuba than ever before. This demographic shift has led to some fear and resentment among whites in the island. On the other hand, blacks feel that they have been left out of the political process, as whites still dominate the higher echelons of the Castro power structure. The dollarization of the economy has accentuated these differences, with blacks receiving fewer dollars from abroad. The potential exists for significant racial tension and even conflict, as these feelings and frustrations are aired in a future democratic and free environment, well beyond the Fidel/Raul era.

One difficult problem for a post-Castro Cuba is acceptance of the law. Every day, Cubans steal from state enterprises, participate in the black market, and engage in all types of illegal activities, including widespread graft and corruption. They do this to survive. Eradication of such necessary vices of today will not be easy in the future, especially since many of these practices predate the Castro era. Developing a value system compatible with a democratic, free-market society will be a complicated and lengthy process.

The unwillingness of Cubans to obey laws will be matched by their unwillingness to sacrifice and endure the difficult years that will follow the end of communism. A whole generation has grown up under the constant exhortations and pressures of the communist leadership to work hard and sacrifice more for society. The young are alienated from the political process and are eager for a better life. Many want to migrate to the United States. If the present rate of request for visas at the US consular office in Havana is any indication, more than two million Cubans want to move permanently to the United States.

Under a US-Cuban normalization of relations, Cubans will be free to visit the United States. As soon as the travel ban is lifted, as many as 500,000 Cubans will come as tourists and stay as illegal immigrants. Others will be claimed as legal immigrants by their relatives who are already naturalized citizens of the United States. Still others will travel to third countries in the hope of eventually entering the United States A significant emigration from Cuba is certain, posing an added major problem for US immigration authorities in particular and for US policy in general at a time of increasing anti-immigration feelings and legislation and security concerns in the United States.