Since 1947 the Kashmir dispute has bedeviled relations between Pakistan and India. It has led to three separate wars, in 1947, 1965, and 1971, and a serious armed conflict in Kargil in 1999. In addition, because both countries are declared nuclear weapons states, Indo-Pak hostilities may have serious repercussions for South Asian relations in the future. Although attempts at regional cooperation—such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and the South Asia Free Trade Agreement—have been made in the past, almost all of them have floundered without making any meaningful progress.

The roots of the Kashmir conflict lie beyond the controversial accession of Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir to India; the core tension between the two countries is the confrontation between their two nationalisms. Pakistani nationalism and the “two-nation theory” are founded upon the belief that Muslims would be oppressed under Hindu-majority rule; hence the need for a Muslim state that is separate from Hindu-majority India. And since Kashmir (shorthand for Jammu and Kashmir) is a Muslim-majority state and is part of the unfinished agenda of the 1947 Partition, it should therefore belong to Pakistan. On the other hand, Indian nationalism is secular and initially opposed the idea of Pakistan. It believes that Muslims, Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis, and Jews can live together under one unified nation as they have done for centuries. Kashmir is critical to Indian nationalism because ceding Kashmir would represent a defeat of Indian secularism in a Muslim-majority state. As a result, Kashmir has become hostage to these bitterly contending nationalisms.

Nationalist Struggles and Problems of Governance

India has always recognized the unique nature of Kashmir and, in 1949, incorporated it as such into the Indian Constitution. The special Article 370 granted most governing powers to the Kashmiris, except for some critical powers such as defense, foreign affairs, currency, and communications, which remained vested with the federal government. Kashmiris received their own constitution and flag, and the Kashmir Assembly was to decide which Indian laws, if any, would be permitted to apply to Kashmir. These concessions were quite remarkable for a constitution that was otherwise centralized and never once mentioned the word “federal.”

The powers of the Kashmir Constitution, however, did not last long. By 1953 Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru could no longer stomach the popular Kashmiri Prime Minister Sheikh Abdullah’s assertions of Kashmir’s autonomy or even independence from India. Sheikh Abdullah was summarily removed and placed under house arrest. Soon afterwards, Article 370 was systematically whittled down at the behest of the central government by pliant assemblies produced by rigged elections.

The growing Kashmiri tension did not become militarized until the 1987 elections, wherein opposition Muslim United Front candidates were robbed of a significant number of seats while counting agents and candidates were beaten and thrown out of counting centers. In response, large numbers of Kashmiri youth crossed over the border to Pakistan and were trained and armed. This led to the Kashmir insurgency, which by 1989 was backed by a wave of popular support within Kashmir and Pakistan.

Though Pakistan trained and armed the young Kashmiris who had crossed over to garner support for their “freedom struggle,” the provocation arose primarily from India, not Pakistan. Henceforth, Pakistani-trained militants, most of whom were non-Kashmiri, have fought against the Indian security forces in Kashmir, marking a new stage in the dispute. The violence spread, and terrorist attacks were launched against innocent civilians throughout the rest of India, causing thousands of civilian deaths. In retaliation, sectarian Hindu parties have invoked the Kashmir struggle to identify Indian Muslims with Pakistan. This has led to pogroms against Muslims—most notably in Mumbai from December 1992 to January 1993 and Gujarat from February to March of 2002—killing more than 4,000 innocent civilians. In the entire Kashmir conflict, some 50,000 to 80,000 innocent individuals have been killed, primarily Kashmiris. If other Pakistani-backed secessionist movements in Punjab and the Northeast are added, the death toll approaches 100,000. Nor have the attacks ceased; on July 11, 2006, almost 200 civilians were killed in bomb blasts on suburban trains in Mumbai.

Continuing Political Implications of the Struggle

Civil societies in both countries have paid and are still paying a terrible price for these sanguinary struggles. In Pakistan the fighting over Kashmir has legitimized military dictatorships and draconian anti-terror laws, which are often used against dissidents and to suppress civil society movements. In India it has also led to sweeping anti-terror laws, which are sometimes used against Muslim civil society movements, innocent Muslim civilians, and petty Muslim criminals. The more recent terrorist attacks in Mumbai have led to the postponement of Indo-Pak talks, despite the Left parties’ pressure on the Indian government to proceed as planned. As a result, the Indo-Pak conflict has grave consequences for both countries, and the peace process has often broken down.

If the Kashmir issue is to be solved to the satisfaction of Pakistani leaders, who dub Kashmir the “core issue” in the Indo-Pak conflict, there would first have to be a durable peace. India, while accepting the importance of the Kashmir problem, refuses to separate it from other outstanding issues such as the Siachen glacier, Wullar barrage, and above all the cessation of cross-border terrorism. India argues that to create the atmosphere for a comprehensive settlement, Pakistani-backed terrorism must be stopped first.

Meanwhile, Indo-Pak talks on Kashmir remain fruitless. Pakistan insists that it is not training, arming, or providing logistical support to militants in Kashmir. The rise of militant attacks in Kashmir and the rest of India, however, belies this assertion. While it is clear that some of the groups, such as the much-feared Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Hizbul Mujahiddin, occasionally function autonomously, these militant attacks and low-intensity conflicts are nonetheless designed to force India to accept a solution palatable to Pakistan. It is now widely accepted that Pakistani support and guidance of the Kashmiri militancy keeps the armed struggle going, and until such support is halted, India will almost certainly be unwilling to negotiate a permanent peace settlement.

Critical Problems Still Unresolved

One major obstacle to the creation of a lasting peace solution is the lack of Kashmiri representation in Indo-Pak negotiations. The Indians insist on speaking to the Kashmiris in India and oppose trilateral dialogue. In Pakistan-administered Kashmir (PaK), parties that support accession to Pakistan, such as the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front, are not allowed to contest the Assembly elections, including the recent July elections. This is understandable because the Pakistani state decides the premier of Pakistani-administered Kashmir through its nominees, regardless of the wishes of any party or coalition that has a majority in the Assembly, and the Northern Areas of Gilgit and Baltistan have scarcely any representation at all. Kashmiri opinion on both sides of the Line of Control (LoC) should be fully represented in the talks, even if Indian objections prevent trilateral talks. If India simultaneously discusses with Pakistanis and Kashmiris, it would provide concrete assurance to the Kashmiris that their interests on both sides of the LoC are being represented and duly considered. But the Indians remain wary. Their constant refrain is that the Kashmir problem is a bilateral issue that merits no third-party intervention.