When Montenegro narrowly voted to break way from its loose union with Serbia in its May referendum, world leaders praised the peaceful election and embraced the re-emergence of the tiny nation. Attention quickly turned away from the Balkan region and back to the continuing trouble in Iraq, the nuclear standoffs in Iran and North Korea, and radical Islamic terrorism. However, the Balkan peninsula remains troubled; it still contains elements that could unravel the tenuous peace. To lay the foundations for peace and stability in southeastern Europe within the next decade, the European Union, the United Nations, and the United States need to reverse their inattentiveness toward the region and redouble their efforts in healing its painful past. Fortunately, the prospect of EU accession provides ample leverage for the trio toward achieving its goals.

Montenegro’s break from Serbia has created difficulties that must be defused. That the close vote for Montenegrin independence broke down along regional and ethnic lines demonstrates that the country’s greatest challenge is dealing with the ethnic tensions among its people. Montenegrin independence already has emboldened talk of Serb separatism in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the northern autonomous province of Vojvodina of Serbia. The ongoing talks between Serbian and Kosovar leaders on the status of Kosovo have produced few results, and Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica continues to insist that Kosovo must remain a part of Serbia despite the general consensus held by European nations that Kosovo should become independent. If ignored by the international community, the former Yugoslavian states face the risk of backsliding into militant nationalism and regional conflict.

With the region threatening to erupt again, the United Nations and European nations should carefully monitor nationalist and separatist feelings within the Balkans. Efforts to clamp down on extremist elements must begin without delay. Aid and capacity building projects by the United States and other allies should continue to be funded and even increased if necessary to bring calm during this volatile transition period. Besides harming the Balkans, constant fighting would ultimately divert more attention and resources from the international community than would a proactive approach.

Many Balkan states, especially Macedonia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, will likely welcome active international participation. These countries crave EU membership and are eager to follow EU advice to seem worthy of admission. Unfortunately, whether from fatigue at the ten-country enlargement two years ago, paralyzed politics due to narrowly divided governments, or ongoing debate over the EU constitution, EU nations have recently been noncommittal about further enlargement. In spite of these problems, the European Union needs to understand quickly it is solely the promise of membership that provides the impetus in these countries for change.

As it re-engages, the European Union should not handle the incorporation of the Balkans as a slow-moving and linear process. Rather, it should engage the Balkan nations on several fronts simultaneously, tackling political and economic reforms as separate but equally important issues. Right now, European leaders have made the arrests of Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, elusive fugitives indicted for crimes against humanity and genocide, a prerequisite for talks on EU accession. As expected, Serbian leaders continue to drag their feet and have not made serious attempts to locate the fugitives because they fear appearing weak before the nationalist right.

European leaders should instead place this important condition at the end of process, making ultimate accession, not the initiation of talks, dependent on the arrests. By making the condition the final hurdle rather than the initial barrier, the European Union can seize the initiative from the Serbian nationalists and start the talks now. Such a shift also means that the European Union can work immediately toward greater economic cooperation, tying Serbia closer to the rest of the continent and hopefully toning down Serbian nationalist politics.

Additionally, to ensure that the “carrot” of economic cooperation is matched with results, the European Union should withhold economic help when nationalist politicians in the Balkans spread fear and encourage ethnic tension among their electorates. Such a tactic would make the nationalists, not the EU countries, appear to be the obstructionists to economic development while bringing the European Union and the pro-EU integrationists in the Serbian population closer together. As economic interaction increases with the EU countries, the Serbian people will begin to see the high cost of continually electing extremist nationalist leaders who, by flirting with extremist politics, are selfishly holding back their people. The right amount of political pressure, mixed with the allure that economic interaction brings, will make clear to Balkan countries that the European Union is here to help heal the wounds of the past, not to make the road toward EU membership more difficult.

The European Union should also show no arbitrary preference for any particular Balkan nation. Joining the European Union should be based on objective achievements of democratic and economic reform. By encouraging all of them to proceed on fair and parallel tracks, the European Union can prevent the marginalizing of any one country and the inflaming of intraregional suspicions.

Only with international leadership can the Balkan nations realize continued successes in rebuilding their shattered economies and weakened civil societies. The region has thus far proven to be a success story of post-war reconciliation. The last thing world leaders want is the region unraveling while they contend with the crises in the Middle East.