Controversy swirls around each of these four cases, but in each instance, a robust argument can be made that the military action was morally justifiable. They salvaged the idea of humanitarian intervention. Can we then take the next logical step and derive a doctrine of humanitarian intervention and codify it? This is precisely what the “responsibility to protect” seeks to do – while decrying the language of “humanitarian intervention.” Adopted at the UN General Assembly in 2005, the R2P seems to promise a new world order in which international military forces are used to protect civilians at risk (at least in small countries as interventions in Chechnya and Tibet are improbable).

Trial and Error in Darfur

Darfur has been seen as the test case for the R2P. Indisputably, the international community has failed to provide protection for Darfur’s civilians. The small over-stretched and under-mandated African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission cannot contain the violence. Most activists and many diplomats draw the inference that the problem is lack of international political will. If greater pressure were piled on Khartoum (and if China were persuaded or bullied into line), they assume, then the Sudanese government would permit the AU mission to be replaced by a much tougher UN force authorized to take robust action, which would actually halt the killing. Though this analysis is attractive, it does not hold up.

Both supporters and critics of a UN force in Sudan argue on the false premise that UN troops will have the mandate and capability to protect millions of civilians at risk by using force. Despite the tough language of UN Security Council resolution 1706 of August 31, 2006, that is not true. The 20,000 troops envisioned would be enough only to police the ceasefire agreement drawn up by the African Union at the Darfur peace talks and to shoot their way out of trouble if things went wrong. Policing Darfur – or more ambitiously, disarming the Janjaweed militia – would require a far bigger and tougher force. Doubtless, the UN could overcome some of the logistical and financial problems the AU has faced, but a handover to the UN would be only an incremental advance.

By contrast, the Kosovo-style military action called for by Susan Rice, Anthony Lake, and Donald Payne, including attacks on Sudanese airfields, asks the United States to declare war on Sudan. Rice, Lake, and Payne make the heroic, and reckless, assumption that Sudan’s government will capitulate and the war will go according to plan. Should it succeed, this might be considered a just war. But this plan has no specifics about who will actually protect the civilians. It does not propose a ground invasion with the troop levels needed to protect Darfurian civilians and fight the militia at the same time.

However attractive it might be from a distance, actually providing physical protection for Darfurians with international troops is not feasible. And unfortunately, the clamor for UN troops has consumed most of the diplomatic energies of the United States and its allies over the last 18 months, diverting efforts from achieving a peace agreement that was within grasp a year ago but has now slipped away. And as a direct result, the existing AU troops have been left without funds, and sometimes without food or fuel, and above all without any effort to upgrade their numbers and capability.

Meanwhile, the focus on numbers, armor, and mandate obscured the fundamental question of the concept of operations. What are the troops there to do? Effective peace support is nine parts political work and community relations to one part force or the threat of force, but the Darfur debate has focused on force alone and not the politics of stability. Making Darfur the test case for the R2P has not helped the search for political solutions in Darfur. It unrealistically raised the hopes of the rebels and intensified the fears of the government. This illustrates the blind alley down which the concept of humanitarian intervention has led many idealistic, principled, and concerned people.

There is no such thing as humanitarian military intervention distinct from war or counterinsurgency. Intervention and occupation should not be confused with classic peacekeeping, which is difficult enough even with a ceasefire agreement and the consent of the parties. If we want an intervention to overthrow a tyranny, protect citizens from their own government, or deliver humanitarian aid during an ongoing conflict, we should be honest with ourselves – we are arguing for a just war. And if we wish to make this case, let us be clear that the war is political (and must be very smartly political to succeed); that military logic will dictate what happens (including probable escalation and various unpredictable factors); and that it will entail bloodshed including the killing of innocent people.

Let us be very wary of developing any doctrine for humanitarian intervention. Any principle of intervention can readily be abused – as by the French in central Africa – or become a charter for imperial occupation. There may be cases in which imperial rule is the lesser of two evils, perhaps to end genocide (a current preoccupation) or to end slavery (a late 19th century one), but philanthropic imperialism is imperial nonetheless. As Harcourt noted, ethics can sometimes override law, and invasion, like revolution, can sometimes bring about a better state of affairs. But chasing the chimera of humanitarian intervention distracts us and impedes the search for real solutions to crises such as Darfur.