Humanitarians express concern that militarized charity does not effectively provide assistance to the neediest populations. For example, in Ethiopia’s Somali region ten percent of children die at birth and tuberculosis rages at five times the level that qualifies as an epidemic. USAID warned in July 2006 that more than 7 million people faced famine in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. Although its budget for fiscal year 2007 is US$49 million, the projects financed by the CJTF-HOA do not necessarily serve the most vulnerable populations and are not designed to do so.

A related concern is that the military-backed projects boost troop morale more than they actually help the local residents. In the last fifteen years humanitarian NGOs have intentionally moved away from a ‘feel good’ approach to assistance and focused more on effectiveness. The humanitarian community has come to the realization that good intentions cannot ensure good outcomes – and that in some instances good intentions actually contribute to negative outcomes. NGO hiring guidelines now stress professional qualifications rather than just a sincere desire to help others. The CJTF-HOA does not seem to have drawn on those lessons in developing its programs. For example, Army Sergeant Rebecca Queen commented on her experience painting a school in Djibouti, “I thought it would be fun and something out of the ordinary…But I found it interesting and want to do more projects like this one.” Marine Corps Lance Corporal Manuel Montoya concurred, “It feels good.”

It is extremely difficult to evaluate the success of the hearts and minds programs in terms of either humanitarian or political impact. The impediments to measuring outcomes could encourage a tendency to overstate the positive impact of the CJTF-HOA. For example, in one project, Task Force members spent two days with local residents rehabilitating a soccer field. At the conclusion of the project, Marine Staff Sergeant William E. Potts commented, “It’s a rewarding feeling to know you’re helping someone out.” The project culminated in a soccer match between the Americans and the Djiboutians. In the absence of confirming evidence, however, it certainly seems possible that the Task Force may be overestimating the long-term political effect of a soccer field.

How to "Do No Harm"

In addition to the values of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, many humanitarian organizations have embraced what can be characterized as the “do no harm” philosophy. Advanced by Mary Anderson in the 1990s, this perspective seeks to identify and prevent the potential negative effects of humanitarian aid. Such effects can include: contributing to a war economy, disrupting local markets and prices, legitimizing unsavory leaders, and fostering dependency. In recent years many NGOs have developed evaluation mechanisms and standards of operation to counteract those effects. While one cannot expect a military operation to adhere to the NGOs’ values of neutrality, impartiality, and independence, the “do no harm” philosophy provides a helpful metric for evaluating outcomes from both a humanitarian and political standpoint. Bearing that in mind, the following guidelines suggest ways in which military operations can incorporate the ‘do no harm’ approach in their activities.

Complementarity. This means engaging in projects that complement the activities of other organizations. Many NGOs have developed impressive expertise and specific areas of competence. If an NGO is training local healthcare providers, the CJTF-HOA can organize the construction of a clinic. Similarly, before erecting a school, the Task Force should make sure that it will have teachers and books. Building a health clinic or school in the absence of a sustainable source of supplies and personnel wastes resources and creates resentment among the local population. In large part, providing complementary services for each project extends beyond the competency of the CJTF-HOA. Thus, partnerships with local or international organizations are essential for long-term success.

Planners of the CJTF-HOA do not envision the Task Force as a lone actor in the Horn. The assumption behind the Task Force is that the combination of military action with humanitarian and political effort creates a force multiplier effect to advance US goals. USAID provides the bulk of American civilian assistance to the Horn of Africa countries, committing over US$354 million in 2006. The vast majority of that aid takes the form of donations of surplus US agricultural commodities, known as the Food for Peace Program. Former commander of the CJTF-HOA, Marine Major general Timothy Ghormley, reports having a good relationship with USAID.

The extent to which such cooperative relationships succeed, however, depends on the individual NGO or community organization that the military approaches. For the most part, USAID employees are not in the field building schools and training teachers. The US government contracts with UN agencies and NGOs to carry out such development projects. Some humanitarian organizations refuse to work with the military as a matter of principle. Security fears also discourage NGOs and UN agencies from a visible partnership with military actors. Recognizing those hindrances, the CJTF-HOA should focus on establishing cooperative relationships with those organizations that are most receptive to partnerships. In addition to international NGOs, receptive organizations may include local community groups which value the resources provided by the Task Force.

Another way for the military to complement existing humanitarian operations is to work in areas underserved by the NGOs. Aid workers increasingly worry about their own security in volatile regions. In Afghanistan, for example, militants have killed dozens of aid workers, often claiming that the NGOs are allied with the NATO forces. In situations where soldiers function as aid workers, humanitarian organizations fear that their own personnel could become targets. Currently the CJTF-HOA concentrates its activities in Kenya and Ethiopia along the insecure Somalia border. Because of the region’s remoteness and volatility, fewer NGOs operate there than in other areas in the Horn.

Such geographic separation reduces the security risk to aid workers and diminishes the overlap between civilian and military operations.

Sustainability. Certain projects, such as vaccination campaigns, are easily accomplished in a short time. Other projects, however, require a sustainable commitment to succeed. For example, one Task Force project involved the installation of a pump in a drought afflicted Ethiopian village. The purchase of the 14-horsepower pump created an immediate success, but over the longer-term it is unclear how the villagers will procure spare parts and maintain and repair the pump. Africa is littered with rusted, broken-down equipment donated with the best of intentions, but without long-term planning.