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Spain No More?
The Zapatero Administration and Declining Spanish Identity by Norman Ho
Predicting the Present, Vol. 27 (3) - Fall 2005 Issue

Norman Ho is a senior editor at the Harvard International Review.

In its tumultuous and unpredictable history, Spain has experienced Muslim rule, Christian reconquest and unification, global military and economic superpower status, brutal Napoleonic occupation, civil war, fascist dictatorship, parliamentary democracy, domestic separatist movements, radical Islamist terrorism, and now socialist leadership. Spain’s version of September 11 occurred on March 11, 2004, when Al Qaeda operatives bombed commuter trains in Madrid, killing over 200 and wounding more than 1600 people. Three days later, Spaniards flocked to the polls for their parliamentary elections, voting out José Maria Aznar of the center-right Popular Party (PP) and giving a surprising victory to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE).

Since his dramatic election, Zapatero has sought to establish his vision of a “New Spain” on the Iberian peninsula. He has reversed many of the policies of his predecessor, some in just five short months after election, most notably his decision to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq. He has designed and implemented a radically different foreign policy, favoring the bastions of Old Europe, France and Germany, over the United States. He recently approved arms sales to the authoritarian regime of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, despite opposition from the Popular Party and numerous nations around the world.

These diplomatic changes were followed by a true revolution in domestic policies. Zapatero has introduced broad social and cultural reforms, including a bill that legalizes gay marriage and adoption of children, which passed the Congress of Deputies in June 2005. He has proposed a new “fast-track divorce” system which slashes the time it takes to complete the legal process from two years to just ten days. He has also reduced funding and support for the Catholic Church. And, he has recently opened the door for thousands of illegal immigrants in Spain, granting amnesty to an estimated 800,000 illicit migrants.

There can be no question that Zapatero’s reforms are bold, dynamic, and dramatically new. But whether or not they are ultimately beneficial for Spain’s national interest and world security is another question. For a nation that has been marked by historical disunity and uncertainty, Zapatero’s domestic reforms dangerously strip away the layers of Spanish society. In his attempts to create a “New Spain” and bring Spain quickly in line with other European nations, Zapatero is sacrificing Spanish national identity and showing that he simply does not understand the distinctiveness of Spain’s unique domestic and security needs. Most significantly, Zapatero ultimately fails to grasp the realities of new, global terrorism. His appeasement policy of the removal of Spanish troops from Iraq represented a victory for Al Qaeda and not only weakened Spanish national security, but the security of every democratic nation in the world.

The 43-year old Socialist leader is widely seen by Spaniards as handsome, affable, and sophisticated—but his handling of many issues has hardly been elegant. Zapatero must slow down his dramatic reforms and his construction of a “New Spain” and consider what is best for Spanish national interests and national identity. National identity in any country is strongly based on historical experience—Zapatero, however, seems intent on erasing Spain’s past.

A Retreat from Battle: Spanish Appeasement

At an October 2003 Columbus Day military parade, Zapatero refused to stand as the US flag passed. “It’s not my flag,” Zapatero reportedly declared. It should be no surprise, then, that with Zapatero’s election, the United States lost Madrid’s support in the effort to rebuild Iraq. Zapatero immediately recalled Spain’s 1,300-soldier contribution to the reconstruction effort, despite his earlier expressed plan to withdraw troops around June 30, 2004.

The risks of this decision continue to be immense. While the withdrawal of Spanish military personnel in Iraq probably did not make much of a strategic difference in terms of the actual war effort, the symbolic message such a move sent to Al Qaeda could be disastrous. Zapatero’s appeasement government declared that terrorists could alter not just the election results of rich Western and democratic countries, but also the decisions those countries’ governments would make once they rose to power. Such appeasement almost acts as an invitation for future terrorist attacks on democratic states.

Yet, Zapatero went even further than simply withdrawing Spanish forces. He denounced the Iraq War itself, describing the occupation as “a disaster.” He additionally urged the United States and Great Britain to engage in “self-criticism,” not over their occupation strategy, but their decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power. Zapatero also accused US President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair of lying to the world about the Iraq situation. What is perhaps most shocking about these statements is that they border on being simply anti-American and anti-British rhetoric.

There is evidence, through his own words, that Zapatero does not understand the realities and extreme implications of Islamic radical terrorism and the new global war on terror. Zapatero stated in a TIME Magazine interview in September 2004 that “sexual equality is a lot more effective against terrorism than military strength,” a vague statement that seems contradictory to his decision to keep Spanish troops in Afghanistan.

Zapatero also does not seem to grasp the difference between terrorism inflicted on Spaniards by Basque separatists and the violence from Islamic radicals in Madrid. In countering US claims of appeasement, Zapatero said that Spain had lived with attacks by the militant Basque organization, the ETA, well before the Twin-Tower attacks in the United States, and furthermore, that “we [Spain] did not discover the ruthless face of terror three years ago.”

However, the Basques and Al Qaeda are simply incomparable. What Zapatero does not seem to comprehend is that Al Qaeda and other similar Islamic radicals are at war with not just Spain or individual states, but the very ideals and peoples of Western society. Islamic extremists, for example, still consider southern Spain to be Muslim land that must be liberated from the Spanish “crusaders” that drove out the Moors in the 1492 Reconquista.

Indeed, Osama bin Laden’s chief lieutenant, Ayman al Zawahiri, specifically referred to this loss of “Andalusia” in the first Al Qaeda videotape released after September 11, 2001. Al Qaeda’s terrorism is much more organized and fanatical in its objectives and aims than the ETA. Zapatero must realize that Basque terrorism and Al Qaeda terrorism are two different faces that require two different weapons. On the front against Al Qaeda and other Islamic radicals, Zapatero must understand Spain is fighting a war over five centuries old.


 




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