A Saudi man uses his mobile phone to send an SMS message in a bank in Riyadh, showcasing the expanding reach of Western technology into Saudi Arabia.

During the Cold War, the United States and Saudi Arabia found additional common ground. The United States perceived the Saudis as a rampart against the Soviet Union and Communism. The Saudis felt comfortable developing with high-quality US technology. The Saudis also saw the United States as a defender of last resort against the Soviet proxies in the region, primarily Egypt, Syria, and South Yemen. The United States as the main opponent of the “evil empire,” could provide security against the spread of “godless” anti-Saudi socialist ideology and Arab nationalism.

When the Soviets got bogged down in their support of a socialist regime in Afghanistan, the Saudis were content to become the proxy of the United States. The Saudis, in particular the Saudi intelligence directorate, led by Prince Turki al-Faysal, encouraged, armed, and financed the resistance and, to a certain extent, “created” the Taliban, with full US support.

The US policy of dual containment assured the Saudis that post-Khomeini Iran and Iraq would be kept in check. In 1982, when Iraq attacked Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United States aligned to support Iraq, providing them with funds, safe harbor for their Soviet-made aircrafts, and oil to make up for their loss of production due to Iranian attacks. The Saudis also allowed Iraq to build a pipeline for the Iraqi southern fields to the Saudi harbor of Yanbu on the Red Sea. This was done with the full support of the United States.

Again in 1990, the Saudis and the United States allied, but this time against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The Saudi state provided the bases necessary for the US military, obtained permission from religious institutions and religious segments of the Saudi population to allow the presence of US troops in the land of the holy mosques, and also increased oil production to make up for the loss of Kuwaiti and Iraqi production during the conflict.

Consequently for 56 years after World War II, the two countries have had an extensive and intimate relationship that would seemingly remain resilient to minor adversity. However, the relations are now at their lowest point and appear irreparable. The relations that should have been made strong from 40 years of extensive interaction have also contributed to their destruction.

Societal Contacts and Relations

Saudi Arabia has used a large part of the US$1.3 trillion it earned from oil to develop its economy amd infrastructure. The goal of the various Saudi five-year plans has been to provide citizens with modern infrastructure and to diversify the economy beyond oil production. It needs to import technology, protect its borders, and create jobs for Saudis. In essence, the Saudi state wanted to bring a highly conservative society into the 21st century. However, Saudi internal politics meant that the state could strive for these goals only by getting the assent of its most conservative supporters—the Salafis (the US press commonly refers to them as Wahhabis).

The story of the first Saudi Kingdom being founded as an alliance between the Islamic reformer Abdel Wahab and Mohamed alSaud in 1744 is still relevant today. The Salafis do not oppose Saudi Arabia becoming a major economic power in the world; indeed, oil wealth gives them the means to promote their worldview of Islam. However, the Salafis do not wish to see Saudi modernity create a morally corrupt, Westernized society that could turn people away from the worship of God.

It seems that the Saudi state and the Salafis established a suitable agreement. In the 1960s, King Faysal was able to bring television and radio into Saudi Arabia and managed to gain the Salafis’ approval by granting them a share of the broadcast, enabling nearly constant promotion of piety over the airwaves. As the Saudi state pushed society to bring Saudi Arabia into the 20th century, it embraced modern technology, but sought to avoid the inflow of foreigners and the corrupting influence of modern living that often accompany modernization.

After King Faysal’s death, King Khaled increasingly co-opted the Salafis. This arrangement with the Salafis tipped further in their favor after the 1979 take-over of the Holy Mosque in Mecca. King Khaled and King Fahd gave the Salafis free rein to control society. Most notably, they controlled women’s rights and education. The state allowed the Salafis to develop a heavily religious curriculum inculcated from kindergarten. Additionally, they had constant access to the local mass media. They drastically limited the role of women in public life and the types of jobs they could take. Furthermore, they enforced a severe segregation of men and women.

The state influenced the Salafis by providing them with money to build mosques, Islamic centers, and universities and to promote their causes worldwide. The state also allowed the Salafi self-appointed, extra-judicial police, the Mutawa’in, to enforce public morality much more stringently than before. As the Saudi economy expanded, shopping centers grew up and satellite television brought the world to everyone’s home, the Salafis became more strident to counter these influences. Foreigners were ghettoized in compounds and allowed minimal social contacts with Saudis. The United States was criticized in the Saudi media and mosques for its moral decay.

Efforts were made to limit the education of Saudis, especially of women. Any effort by the United States to advance the social standing of Saudi women was portrayed by the Salafis as an effort to destroy Islamic society and a contemptible divergence from God’s purpose. The Mutawa’in became more active in maintaining puritan standards, such as enforcing store closing at prayer time, the veiling of women, and even the regulating of private behavior at home. After 1970, despite the huge growth of US brands and technology in Saudi Arabia and the modern additions to life such as traffic jams, cell phones, personal computers, and satellite TVs, Saudi society evolved in a manner that had very little in common with US culture. As a result, the staggering Saudi industrial and commercial development, based on US management and technology, did not evolve into a more open, Westernized, liberal society. Instead the Salafis hijacked US technology to establish hundreds of Internet sites and used computer disks, videos, and audio cassettes to promote their puritan ideology and virulent opposition to US politics and values