Sieglinde Rosenberger is Professor of Political Science at the University of Vienna and a Schumpeter Fellow at the Center for European Studies at Harvard University.
In studying the evolution of the European Union (EU), scholars and politicians alike have focused on its institutional side, or what Jürgen Habermas calls the “postnational constellation.” They examine the European Union as a supranational body—its integration, enlargement, and governance. But there is another side to the EU coin: the member states themselves. Recent studies have therefore paid more attention to creating a more “emotional narrative” of the European identity.
Member States in Transition
While the EU integration process has progressed rapidly, individual member states have undergone uncertain internal transitions. Each member remains a distinct nation-state, especially with respect to the identification of its citizens and the conception of legitimate political actors on the national level. Conversely, member states have lost several roles and functions within the framework of national politics. Common decision-making in domestic and legal affairs and the increase in economic ties that accompany integration have led to the weakening of national sovereignty.
In this volatile context, populist parties and their often charismatic leaders have emerged as political actors and entered the realm of competitive politics in Europe. Since the 1990s, relatively new populist parties have achieved double-digit percentages of the vote in general elections. In the last several years, some of these parties have established themselves in government and altered the agenda of center-right parties in Europe as a whole.
Why should such political parties be analyzed within the framework of the European Union? One answer is that they have returned political debates to the national realm and set back core elements of liberal democracy. Beginning with the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, the European project has been depicted as an institution to curb nationalism and avoid the perils of future wars. However, counter-references to nation-based identities are gaining importance despite the wave of economic and political integration. The process of supranationalization in the decision-making process has been accompanied by political actors striving for a re-nationalization of attitudes.
Right-wing Populist Parties
Issues related to national identity are among the top campaign issues for right-wing populist leaders across Europe, such as Jörg Haider of Austria, Jean-Marie Le Pen of France, Pia Kjaersgaard of Denmark, Pim Fortuyn of the Netherlands, Umberto Bossi of Italy, Christoph Blocher of Switzerland, and Filip Dewinter of Belgium. In particular, the topic most closely linked to the construction of national identities is immigration. Populist parties claim to preserve cultural identity (most importantly, national identity) in order to protect their constituents from external cultural threats that are ascribed to “foreigners.” The populist strategy is mainly concerned with addressing fears and resentments by offering scapegoats. They paint a gloomy picture of a multicultural future, and the solutions that are offered to solve different societal problems may be described as a grab bag of policies intended to maintain a pure cultural identity.
The theoretical concept behind national identity frequently rests on the idea of a homogenous group traceable in history, coupled with modern challenges such as immigration. National identities have often been created by the welldocumented use of the contrast between “us” and “them.” In compliance with this model, populist politicians frame politics in the oversimplified formula of an “us versus them” and attempt to draw a sharp line distinguishing cultures.
To build an “us” as a nation-based group, one must first identify which groups are targeted by populist parties as “them.” The use of slogans such as “eigen volk eerst” (own people first), “Österreich zuerst” (Austria first), and “les francais d’abord” (the French first) in populist rhetoric points to national cultural supremacy that tries to crack down on immigrant workers, refugees, and minorities. “The boat is full” is one of the catchphrases used in policies that are hostile to non-citizens, especially asylum seekers and guest workers. Anti-Semitic statements and racist actions against African immigrants are a crucial part of the populist agenda. Several parties have even suggested that the existence of foreigners threatens the Western lifestyle and democratic values. The election campaigns of Dansk Folkeparti (the Danish People’s Party) in 2001 and Pim Fortuyn in 2002 linked “foreigners” with “Muslim” people, framing the issue as “foreign infiltration.” In welfare states like France and Austria, populists accuse immigrants and asylum seekers of abusing welfare benefits.
In this climate, the notion of Western culture is becoming a factor in creating political differences. One finds well-established references to Western values closely connected with Christianity while discovering xenophobic and particularly anti-Islamic prejudices. Even Samuel Huntington’s notion of the “clash of civilizations” has been cited to legitimatize the discursive construction of national and Western-based identities. National identities are no longer founded solely on national references and symbols but on crossnational ideas captured under the notion of a “Western civilization.” An illustration of this expansion is the acceptance of the hanging of the cross in the public sphere (notably schools) as a cultural symbol, versus the identification of women wearing head scarves in public with religious expression.
A problematic feature of this development is what the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt called “identical democracy.” In the 1920s, the concept described a strong leader expressing the interests of the population while attacking political parties and pluralism in society. In the modern day, leaders present themselves as representatives for the population as a whole, using the slogan “we are all in the same boat” to describe the situation. The metaphor mutes differences within the population; the line between those who belong and those who do not is based on cultural identities and often linked with the political notion of “patriotism.”
Patriotism is based on various constructions that create a cleavage between “us” and “them.” “Brussels bureaucrats” (EU officials), opposition politicians, critical journalists, and intellectuals alike have been labeled the “bad others.” The intellectuals, in particular, have been charged with being unpatriotic simply for criticizing decisions made by populist parties and governments. Under the rubric of patriotism, different views and interests have been, and will continue to be, delegitimized. Patriotic stress on national identities not only interferes with the European integration process, but in fact impacts the democratic standards of individual states. Observers of right-wing populism already speak of a transformation from open to closed societies and warn of authoritarian tendencies. “We are all in the same boat” serves right-wing supporters as a metaphor that diminishes the legitimacy of diversity and pluralism by emphasizing one-sided “common” grounds. As the emphasis on the virtues of an “us” (the nation) model becomes stronger, topics that address socioeconomic inequalities and pluralistic conceptions of democracy are more readily suppressed. As the common is stressed over the different, the appeal to “whole peoples” displaces conflicts at hand. Intermediary institutions and procedures of negotiation, in turn, become largely disregarded. Space for deliberation and pluralistic interests decreases and eventually disappears. The two sides of this development are the devaluation of political bodies designated to deliberate conflicts on the one hand, and the increased stress on a plebiscite model in which one rules with the people against the establishment, on the other.
