I swear by God we are more keen on dying than you are keen on living,” the black-clad Chechen separatist informed the Russian government on videotape. The communication came in October 2002, just days after 40 armed Chechen militants swarmed into a Moscow theater and captured 700 audience members and brought the conflict in Chechnya once more to the attention of the world community. The focus on international terrorist attacks aimed at Western powers has made local conflicts like the one in Chechnya lose their prominence in the international media.

Separatist movements from East Timor to Northern Ireland have plagued both innocent victims and culpable governments with horrific attacks. Even movements with less recent international exposure, like the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka or the Basque separatists in Spain, have brought pain and suffering to thousands. Independence movements such as these have come to characterize world military conflicts, but the nature of political-military interaction has evolved. As the United States pursues its anti-terrorist campaign, recurrent regional conflicts have lost their salience, but not their virulence.

David and Goliath

As diverse as Sri Lanka, the Russian Caucasus, and northern Spain may be geographically, politically, and ethnically, the current status of their respective separatist movements is remarkably similar. All are characterized by asymmetric warfare. The Russian, Spanish, and Sri Lankan military capabilities dwarf those of their foes, yet in all three instances, the states have yet to make significant progress in resolving or even quelling the conflicts through forceful military action.

The Russian military has been embroiled in Chechnya for decades. After Russian forces invaded in 1994, they were forced to leave—humiliatingly defeated—18 months later. Poorly motivated and facing recurrent ambushes from Chechen guerillas, the Russian troops are greatly demoralized, with 30 to 40 Russian soldiers dying per week. The conflict has displaced between 300,000 and 400,000 people and has claimed thousands of lives. Despite the numerical superiority of the Russian forces over the Chechens, Russia has yet to achieve any real progress.

The situation in Sri Lanka has resulted in similarly horrific consequences, claiming the lives of over 65,000 Sri Lankans. In the wake of recent offensive operations, a Sri Lankan army commander justified the stalemate by naпvely commenting, “An attacking force always sustains more casualties.” The effort to capture the town of Pallai provides an instructive example. In an offensive named “Rod of Fire,” the Sri Lankan military attempted to capture this town, strategically located near the important Elephant Pass. Even with the resources of a centralized government, the army suffered hundreds of casualties in comparison to only dozens by the Tamils, who eventually repulsed the attacks. Like Russian soldiers in Chechnya, the Sri Lankan military has had to fight against a well entrenched opposition in domestic territory that has nonetheless proven to be extremely hostile, unfamiliar, and foreign.

The Spanish example provides a similar scenario. Fortunately, the Spanish government has not committed to a serious military involvement in the conflict with the Basque separatists; rather, it has pursued a more covert, intelligence and investigation-based strategy. It is puzzling, however, that the Spanish government must devote even these resources to tackle a separatist movement in a province whose citizens are largely willing to accept Spanish rule. With the power of a well-established central government, Spain has attempted to use the Centro Superior de Informaciуn de la Defense (CESID), the successor to General Franco’s military intelligence service, to fight against the Eusakadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the Basque Homeland and Liberty party. What has resulted is a series of embarrassing losses, like the capture of two CESID agents and the publication of their names in national newspapers. Despite its enormously greater resources and intelligence efforts, Spain has proven unable to make concrete progress in a fight against enemies in its own country.

All three of these examples reveal that insurrections cannot be dealt with by force alone. When rebel movements have the advantage of fighting in their own territory or offer only amorphous targets for attack, they have exhibited a remarkable ability to avoid elimination. Therefore, other solutions to these conflicts must be considered.

Violence For A Voice

Insurrections that devolve into wars of attrition often result in asymmetric combat that forces the separatists to adopt unconventional means of warfare. It is impossible for the rebel movements to directly confront governmental forces on a level field. Accordingly, terrorism results from this unbalanced situation.

Terrorism is perhaps the greatest threat that links the conflicts in Chechnya, Spain, and Sri Lanka. The separatist movements all have enduring legacies of terrorism that have ravaged the civilian populations. In recent years, the Chechens have grabbed the most prominent headlines with several high profile attacks and allegations that Chechen militants have ties to the Al Qaeda network. A series of bombings that destroyed Moscow apartment buildings in September 1999 represented the first recent wave of these attacks, later crowned by the movie theater standoff in October 2002, which claimed the lives of at least 117 hostages. The Russian public and international audiences sat mesmerized as they watched the terrifying drama unfold before their eyes, demonstrating terrorism’s ability to affect the national psyche.

The Tamil Tigers also have employed unconventional tactics. In 1987, they bombed an airplane, killing 16 people. Ten years later, they targeted a ship, killing 32. A truck bombing in October 1997 claimed 18 lives at the 39-story World Trade Center in the capital city of Colombo. Known widely for their suicide campaigns, the Tigers have conducted over 200 bombings of places of religious worship, office buildings, and transportation centers. The Tigers claim that they have been forced to resort to such tactics as the only feasible means of countering the military might of the Sri Lankan army. Despite recent ceasefire agreements and preliminary peace talks, the bombings remain a serious threat.

The Basque separatists have conducted the most notorious terrorist campaign in continental Europe. Since 1973, when ETA operatives assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Francisco Franco’s apparent successor, no Spanish politician has been safe. In 1995, an ETA car bomb nearly killed Josй Marнa Aznar, then leader of the opposition Popular Party. Nevertheless, the government has enjoyed some success in its counter-terrorism efforts, foiling a 1999 plot to bomb Madrid’s Picasso Tower, a skyscraper designed by the architect of the World Trade Center in New York City. Despite such incremental victories by the federal government, the ETA has killed about 800 people since the 1960s.