Defying the hegemony of Acciуn Democrбtica (AD) and Copei, the two main political parties in Venezuela whose power had been waning since the late 1980s, Chavez’s election seemed to mark a fundamental change in Venezuelan politics. Here was a president who appeared to represent the greater population—most of which is of mestizo (mixed European and Native American) background and at least 80 percent of which now lives below the poverty line. Venezuela was no longer to be led, in Chavez’s own words, by the “putrid cupules” of a corrupt and self-serving oligarchy, but by a democratic and revolutionary government committed to the needs of the people.

Three years later, the country finds itself mired in a deep recession, plagued by political instability and social divisiveness. Support for Chavez has dwindled from a high of 80 percent to a mere 30 percent. The government faces widespread strikes, and a coup in April 2002 deposed Chavez for 48 hours. Yet the president still clings to power, aided by the illusion of democratic procedure and international support. Governing in the style of Juan Perуn in Argentina, he has attempted to legitimize his reign by citing his own “democratic” election, holding frequent elections, and passing referenda such as the formation of a new constitution and a representative body, the Asamblea Nacional. However, democracy in Venezuela is more theater than substance.

Chavez’s Venezuela is a prime example of illiberal democratic governance, a term elaborated by Fareed Zakaria in a 1997 Foreign Affairs article as a democracy with too much emphasis on representation and too little on liberalism. Chavez’s 1998 electoral bid was steeped in emotional and populist rhetoric. The population responded positively to his lambasting of the business and old political elite and his call for a revolution leading to a “Fifth Republic” to ameliorate the severe income and opportunity inequality in Venezuela. Once president, Chavez lacked a concrete plan to fulfill his promise to cure social inequalities. The “Five Point Plan,” the skeleton of his platform supporting economic, social, political, and cultural stability, is a mere restatement of the social democratic principles of AD and Copei and a clichйd statement of the rights of man. His actual plan was a redistributive agenda in line with the second phase of illiberal, populist democratic governance.

In 2000, Chavez began Plan Bolнvar 2000, a social welfare program that is the essence of populism. By providing social services such as schools, public works, and “popular markets” where the military distributed food at discounted prices, Plan Bolнvar continues to harness support from Chavez’s core constituency—the poor. However, this measure, like all recent populist efforts in Venezuela, failed to address the root of the problem: Venezuela’s dependence on oil, endemic cronyism, and corruption. As such, it was ultimately a fiscally irresponsible and socially unproductive policy. A recent Latin America-wide poll in The Economist demonstrates that while the Venezuelan economy has been weakened during Chavez’s presidency, he has nevertheless maintained popular support through temporary social programs. The poll shows that at a time when Latin America is deep in economic woes and Venezuela in particular faces a 4.5 percent contraction in gross domestic product and inflation of nearly 20 percent, Venezuelans are the only South Americans who rate their economic situation as better than in 1996.

Chavez has further consolidated his hold on the government by violating the separation of powers, silencing the media, and practically encouraging corruption. The new Asamblea Nacional, packed with Chavez supporters, allowed him to pass many of his populist laws. Chavez also began to rule with help from additional powers granted to him by an enabling law, Ley Habilitante 2000. At the same time, censorship of the press, though discontinuous and on a small scale, has occurred during periods of increased political opposition. Shortly before the attempted coup in April 2002, the government interrupted radio and television signals. An even worse problem is Venezuela’s widespread corruption. For example, US$1 billion recently disappeared from the budget; the government claims to have used the money for undisclosed “wages and bonuses.” Plan Bolнvar 2000, often called “Plan Billuyo 2000” (Plan Money 2000) by the opposition, created widespread corruption among army officials coordinating the program. This pervasive corruption, coupled with temporary economic relief and violations of liberal rights, has completely undermined basic democratic principles and removed responsibility and accountability from Venezuelan society.

These realities have rendered Venezuela an illiberal democracy, a conclusion with three far-reaching consequences. First, it demonstrates the need to focus on economic and social progress in the developing world. The real problem is not Chavez, but the underlying socioeconomic ills that create leaders like him. Second, it challenges the world to rethink its unconditional support for Venezuela and other illiberal democratic regimes. European and Latin American countries in particular support Chavez’s government because it is ostensibly democratic, but this approach is politically unviable. Third, Chavez’s increasingly repressive strategy for maintaining power mandates that the Venezuelan opposition and the international community work for change. The world is democratizing today more than ever, and it is time to define what separates an actual democracy from an illusory one.

As Chavez consolidates his power on the Venezuelan social, economic, and political structures, as the opposition is relegated to a secondary and precarious role in the political arena, and as illiberal democracy solidifies in Venezuela, the international community must reassess its attitude toward the Chavez government. The world must react to the evolving Venezuelan regime not simply based on its populist veneer, but on the deeper and more long-term issues of democratic accountability and responsibility.