In July 1999, King Mohamed VI succeeded to the throne of Morocco following the death of his father, King Hassan II. Hopes were high that the young king would be able to achieve his stated development objectives, such as modernizing the country and fighting poverty.

Three years later, Mohamed remains committed, but he has been ineffective in progressing toward the goals he set at the start of his reign. Morocco needs assistance in three specific areas in order to effect development: mediation of the dispute over Western Sahara, eradication of hashish cultivation and export, and cessation of illegal emigration to Spain. The history of failed unilateral attempts to deal with these issues demonstrates the need for international support, especially from Spain, France, and other European nations that would directly benefit from a more stable Morocco, and also from the United States, which needs to build support for its foreign policy in the Muslim world. The international community should seize the opportunity provided by a forward-looking, relatively popular monarch to move Morocco further along the path to modernization and further integration into the world community.

Morocco desperately needs money to promote development, and that money should come from legitimate economic activities. The lack of economic progress is due in large part to the residual effects of Spanish colonial rule. The most virulent legacy is the continuing conflict over the sovereignty of Western Sahara, which is currently held by Morocco but has been claimed by the Algerian-supported Polisario Front since Spain’s departure in 1975. With the aid of the United Nations, a cease-fire was declared in 1991, and the last dialogues between the two sides occurred in 1996. Because of multiple delays in a referendum on the future of Western Sahara, no decision has been made regarding the wish of the territory’s inhabitants to have their own state. Mohamed has attempted reconciliation by freeing political prisoners, promising the construction of houses and roads, and visiting Western Sahara, the first royal journey to the region in over 20 years.

Despite these efforts, however, the dispute worsened in late 2001 after Morocco issued oil exploration licenses for the waters off Western Sahara to two oil companies, TotalFinaElf, based in France, and Kerr McGee, based in the United States. The licenses were granted without the consent of the people of Western Sahara, and the United Nations has declared that, while the issuance of the licenses themselves was not illegal, any action taken in furtherance of the exploration process would be illegal unless approved by the people of Western Sahara. Resolution of the partition dispute would allow exploration and oil drilling that could provide an influx of revenue to create the infrastructure missing in Western Sahara during its quarter century of conflict. A decision about the territory could also pave the way for rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco and perhaps to economic cooperation between both parties.

Western Sahara is not the only region in great need of development; the northern provinces in the Rif mountains have coped with their lack of opportunity by turning to the illegal export of hashish to Europe. According to the US State Department’s 2001 International Control Strategy Report, Morocco is the world’s largest exporter of hashish, supplying around 70 percent of the European market. The majority of Morocco’s 2,000 metric tons per year of hashish are shipped by boat to Spain where they are then distributed to markets across Europe. The illegal export of hashish brings in US$3 billion per year to Morocco and serves as the country’s primary source of hard currency. In the past few years, a severe drought has wiped out many crops, but hashish has continued to flourish. The drought has been devastating to a country that already faces 23 percent unemployment and has 19 percent of its population living below the poverty line; as a result, many more Moroccans have turned to the drug trade to survive.

The European Union has repeatedly called on Morocco to halt production of hashish, but the flow of drugs continues despite promises from the Moroccan government. In 1996 Hassan established a coordinated unit to fight drug trafficking, and in March 2001 the government predicted that production could be entirely phased out within seven years. However, the failure of coordination among law enforcement agencies, corruption of government officials, and lack of resources (despite the US$2-3 million per day that the Moroccan ambassador to Spain, Abdeslam Baraka, claims is spent on trafficking prevention) have doomed eradication projects to failure. Alternatives such as government-subsidized crop substitution programs, job-creating construction projects, and other development endeavors are needed to turn the people away from the drug trade, but these options are currently unavailable. Presently, the government of Morocco possesses neither the funds nor the institutional structure to put such programs into effect, but international investment and monitoring could make these alternatives feasible.

The provision of economic alternatives to the drug trade could also significantly stem the tide of illegal migration across the nine-mile-wide Straits of Gibraltar, a perennial cause of tension between Morocco and Spain. Thousands of poor Moroccans have died trying to flee to better economic conditions in Spain, where they hope to find temporary work on farms. Many more are stopped on arrival in Spain and deported back to Morocco. The Spanish government estimates that in the first half of 2001, over 13,000 Moroccans were caught arriving on Spain’s coast.

Lack of jobs, failure of crops, and overall desperation have forced many Moroccans to turn to the drug trade and illegal emigration to survive, but the government cannot institute the crackdowns demanded by the European community without providing the necessary progress toward development. When Hassan attempted to tighten control of hashish cultivation without offering alternatives in 1996, the resulting deterioration in conditions led to riots in Tangiers, where young, unemployed men attacked symbols of the government including banks, the national guard, and tax offices. Mohamed has promised renewal and investment in Tangiers but has yet to fulfill his promises.

Morocco needs more than just verbal support if it is to develop. The country is still grappling with the effects of its colonial history, and it needs tangible support not just from Spain, its former colonial ruler, but also from other European countries and the United States. Investment and assistance in creating greater efficiency and transparency in government can be the impetus for a cycle in which the state creates jobs and undertakes development projects to give citizens alternatives to the current illicit options—emigration and participation in the drug trade. A resolution to the lingering conflict over Western Sahara would provide the stability needed for investment by oil companies and the successful start of construction projects. In addition, an end to the need for Algerian support for the Polisario Front could allow for improved relations between Morocco and Algeria, creating the possibility of an economic alliance that would encourage growth in both countries. Halting the dual flows of drugs and immigrants has obvious direct benefits to Spain, France, and other European countries. The indirect benefits to the United States of an additional Muslim ally are just as important. The government’s newfound ability to ameliorate the conditions of despair and discontent that often lead to extremist regimes will decrease the likelihood of Islamic fundamentalism flourishing in Morocco. All of the countries that will benefit from a more stable and successful Morocco need to be part of the solution to its developmental woes. International assistance will facilitate development, allowing Mohamed to fulfill his promises to his people and lead Morocco into a more prosperous era.