Domestic politics shed some light on the failure of US policy toward Iraq. Although Congress and the US public consider Iraq a threat, both remain casualty-averse and timid about initiating a conflict on the ground, even after September 11. Hence US leaders have not brought full force to bear against Iraq. Heated internal debate about foreign policy has also reinforced the difficulties of public diplomacy in the Middle East. Because so many US citizens seem to understand the shortcomings of their country’s policy there, many Gulf states now believe that there must be some unspoken, more nefarious motive for dual containment, and their support for US policy is eroding.

These domestic debates would not be so damaging if the United States had not done such a poor job managing the international politics surrounding Iraq. The United States has not sufficiently maintained the type of high-level dialogue with Gulf allies that could make its intentions clearer. It has done little to rebut Iraq’s propaganda about the humanitarian impact of sanctions and bombings. Nor has it quelled rumors that the US government actually wants Hussein in power so it can profit from arms sales to Iraq’s neighbors or convinced Arabs that they have more to fear from Iraq than from Iran or the United States. This policy of US disengagement has made it harder for Middle Eastern leaders to justify cooperation with a country most Arabs see as culturally hegemonic and unfairly pro-Israel. US negligence is stunning considering that it depends on its Gulf allies for basing rights and for the enforcement of sanctions against Iraq, as well as the fact that no future operation against Iraq will be possible without their help.

Meanwhile, Hussein has shrewdly managed his situation. He has sustained a major propaganda campaign blaming the catastrophic fate of Iraqi civilians entirely on UN sanctions and US bombings. Within the Arab world, he has even managed to align his country’s plight with that of the Palestinians, portraying both as the victims of an anti-Arab crusade. His tactics have enabled other countries to claim the moral high ground in siding with Iraq against the United States, even as Hussein offers them economic inducements for cooperation, usually in the form of oil contracts.

Beyond the complexities of domestic and international politics, the paradox of hegemony also helps explain the stalemate in US policy toward Iraq. As Bruce Conin argued recently in the European Journal of International Relations, US policy toward Iraq initially succeeded because the United States fulfilled its role as a leader by coordinating a coalition, abiding by UN Security Council resolutions, and persuading other countries to follow its set of rules. During the Gulf War and several times between 1991 and 1998, the United States restrained its action against Iraq because it did not want to destroy a fragile coalition. However, eventually the United States perceived this leadership role as too constraining. It gave into the unilateralist temptation, initiating a massive air raid on Iraq in December 1998 without UN approval and before Iraq could even attempt another settlement negotiation. Virtually every nation in the world believed that these air attacks violated the precedent the United States itself had established, that military action against Iraq required multilateral authorization. The United States found itself caught in a series of political contradictions. The world perceived its action as threatening, and the coalition to contain and attack Iraq was irrevocably damaged as countries attempted to balance against the United States.

Nowhere is this damage more clear than in current efforts to oust Hussein. Due to internal divisions, poor public diplomacy, and failure to resolve the paradox of hegemony—not to mention the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian crisis—US policy toward Iraq has been stalemated. The United States’ overwhelming military power has become nearly useless in its effort to eradicate a much weaker but politically smarter adversary.

Looking Forward

No one denies that the United States enjoys an unparalleled preponderance of military and economic power. But as recent decisions on missile defense, Kosovo, and Iraq reveal, exercising such power is politically difficult, especially for a democracy. Public diplomacy—through clear communication with foreign leaders and people, close attention to how the United States pursues its agenda, and picking the country’s battles carefully—is vital if policymakers are to translate the United States’ material resources into sustainable foreign policy successes.