Impasse in Indo-Bangladesh Relations

On July 24, the Indian and Bangladeshi media reported that after four decades both countries would re-establish their first border haat or market. Located between Kalaichar and Baliamari along the shared 4,096 kilometer border, it is intended to stimulate cross-border rural trade and interaction. The event has been touted as a symbolic milestone in actively improving bilateral relations, which since 2008 have showed increasing signs of progress.

Although Bangladesh and India have formally maintained diplomatic connections since 1972, relations between the two countries have remained weak and strained due to a range of issues ranging from national party politics (the currently ruling Awani League tends to be more pro-India, while the opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party is more Islamist and nationalist), to more intractable disputes over territory, water sharing rights, illegal immigrants, cross-border insurgency and terrorism. 

However, over the last decade, particularly since 2008, both countries have demonstrated growing interest in developing and strengthening ties. For instance, India appears to have allocated priority attention to contesting China’s growing influence in Bangladesh, while Bangladesh, for its part, is looking to enhance its trading relationship with India, Bhutan and Nepal to foster much needed economic and infrastructure development.

According to one Indian defense analyst, Anand Kumar, who spoke to the Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses in April 2010: “A Chinese role in the development of Chittagong is particularly worrisome to India.” He believes that with its Myanmar naval bases north of India, “ China is trying to fulfill two objectives – encircle India as part of its ‘string of pearls’, and gain other openings to sea,” he said. For the time being, however, this strategic viewpoint is still debated within India’s defense and foreign policy bureaucratic circles. 

Yet, concerns over China’s rising influence has not been the only incentive for a more aggressive Indian foreign policy. There are also strong indications that India is beset by water disputes exacerbated by climate change, which has the potential to seriously affect food production and political stability.

Similarly, there is a growing understanding that in order to control India’s restive and underdeveloped northeastern states, economic integration and enhanced connectivity with countries such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Myanmar and Nepal are needed. Hence, in addition to multilateral forums like Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), bilateral mechanisms between Bangladesh and India, such as the Joint Rivers Commission and the Joint Working Group on Security and the Joint Working Group on Trade, which have taken on far greater importance. This is because, although Bangladesh and India signed the Ganga Waters Treaty in 1996, practically all of Bangladesh’s 54 rivers pass through India, which has occasionally restricted rightful water allocation during dry or monsoon seasons.

Border tensions with India also continue at sea, compelling Bangladesh to appeal to the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. In addition, Bangladesh and India are in a protracted dispute over 162 enclaves astride the land divide. Annually, hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi illegal immigrants cross the border to India, leading to numerous security and police confrontations. 

Still, while certain problems persist, Bangladesh and India have pressed ahead on ameliorating relations. In 2007, both countries pledged to cooperate in counterterrorism. There has been a notable improvement in relations between the two countries since the senior leaders of the proscribed United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), an armed separatist group, were arrested and subsequently extradited to India in 2009.