Pakistan's Overbearing Army

Fifty years ago this October 24, Pakistan’s first Army Commander in Chief overthrew the prime minister, imposed martial law, and abrogated the constitution. That jarring rotation from civilian rule to martial law spawned five decades of overhauled constitutions, three protracted periods of martial law, and the overthrow of four civilian governments. In Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within, renowned Pakistan expert and former New York Times journalist Shuja Nawaz examines the tumultuous history of Pakistan’s overbearing army. Nawaz gives an insider’s analysis of Pakistan’s civil-military relationship, explaining how the country’s most powerful and well-organized institution shapes, reflects, and suffocates this nuclear-armed, Muslim-majority nation.

Crossed Swords begins with a detailed narration of the subcontinent’s pre-modern history, proceeding to its modern history, where the military has ruled Pakistan for 38 of its 61 years. Historically, most Pakistani army officers believed that coups were needed to rescue Pakistan from its incompetent civilian political class. Nawaz notes that prior to the 1958 coup, its leader, “‘[General Ayub Khan] stated that the Pakistan Army will not allow the politicians to get out of hand, and the same is true regarding the people of Pakistan.’ Ayub’s view was that it was ‘the army’s duty to protect the country.”

Over time, Nawaz argues, the army “has penetrated the civilian sector and now controls large segments of civil administration,” exhibiting the ability to act autonomously in foreign affairs, control domestic political activity, and operate independently of elected civilian leaders.

Nawaz writes that the military’s unfettered access to state resources has let it overpower private sector industries. The military’s intrusion into the government has allowed it to allocate more government revenue for its own institutional expansion, including the purchase of sophisticated military equipment, facilities, and training schools. The author argues that over the decades, this bloated bureaucracy diminished government spending on health, education, and basic infrastructure—sectors of civil society essential for internal development.

Crossed Swords candidly appraises the failures of the army leadership. According to Nawaz, despite the professionalism of its lower ranks, the army’s upper echelons are prone to blunder. He cites the genesis of the military’s ineptitude as Ayub Khan’s coup half a century ago and his “role in institutionalizing the appointment of sycophantic and sometimes incompetent officers to the highest ranks who would not buck the trend or question any of his actions.” Nawaz adds that the army’s emphasis on careerism, centralization, and lack of proper delegation of authority has bled into the daily operations of civilian and political institutions.

He shows that during the 1947 First Kashmir War with India, Pakistan’s aim was to internationalize the Kashmir dispute. Pakistani leaders thought that invading Kashmir would precipitate a UN-mandated ceasefire and bring about a plebiscite in Pakistan’s favor. But as Nawaz notes, “In retrospect, Pakistan’s higher planning and leadership failed to clearly see the advantage of intervening in Kashmir and to gauge the Indian reactions in a manner that they could counter effectively. A guerilla operation was launched without trained manpower to direct and control the tribals, and certainly without laying the ground for local support in the valley of Kashmir.”

Army leadership again proved unprepared during Pakistan’s 1965 war with India. Following the clashes and a formal ceasefire, Ayub Khan proceeded to implement Operation Gibraltar, another gamble to seize Kashmir. Like the 1947-48 war, Gibraltar was based on the idea of infiltrating trained guerrillas into Indian-held Kashmir to foment local unrest. But once again, the reaction of the local people was not adequately considered. Though the operation was supposed to be executed in coordination with the army high command, Nawaz argues, “Even senior officers at the army headquarters were kept in the dark, as were the formation commanders. No prior ground work had been done with Kashmiri leaders in Indian-held Kashmir.”

Although Pakistan killed a great number of Indian troops and displayed a valiant defense of Punjab, military planners left their country’s entire frontier of East Pakistan exposed and “yet again, there appeared to be no attempt to draw their air force or the navy into the strategic planning for the impending war.”

Nawaz also offers a variety of insights about contemporary Pakistani politics. For instance, while policymakers in Washington have recently been accusing the largest Pakistani intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of acting independently of Islamabad, Nawaz argues that this is a result of misdirection. Pakistan’s leadership blames its illegal or unpopular policies on “independent” agents of the ISI, he says.

He also notes that beginning this autumn, a conservative element within the army, known as “Zia Bharti,” or “Zia’s Recruits,” is due to take over many senior leadership positions as promotions occur. Encouraged by jihadist General Mohammad Zia ul Haq during the 1980s, many young Islamists are today reaching the pinnacle of their careers. This group may be disinclined to aid Americans: its members were deprived of advanced overseas military training at elite US institutions after Washington instituted sanctions following the discovery of Pakistan’s covert nuclear program.