Thailand

Siam, the former Thailand, abolished its centuries-old absolute monarchy and adopted a constitutional democracy through a bloodless revolution in 1932. As the only country that had never been officially colonized by Western powers, Siam was proud of its independence. Much of this pride was attributed to, as most conservative Thai historians would argue, the farsightedness and the wisdom of the Siamese kings. In particular, King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), who ruled the kingdom during the high tide of colonialism in Southeast Asia, was extolled for his shrewd strategy in managing his relationships with external powers. But Chulalongkorn’s unsurpassed ability to safeguard his kingdom from the threats of colonialism was not translated into a guarantee of a long-lasting royal institution. 22 years after Chulalongkorn’s death, Thailand witnessed the collapse of the absolute monarchy. The two successive reigns, under King Vajiravudh (1910-1925) and King Prajadhipok (1925-1935), sons of Chulalongkorn, proved incapable of adapting themselves to the changing political environment. Today, almost 80 years since the fall of absolute monarchy, King Bhumibol Adulyadej, the grandson of King Chulalongkorn, who was earlier successful in restoring and strengthening the power and prerogatives of the royal institution, is now facing an emerging anti-monarchy sentiment that has swept across the kingdom following the military coup of 2006. Can the monarchy this time prove its flexibility and, more importantly, relevance in the modernized Thai society, bearing in mind that kings and queens elsewhere in the world have largely fallen into obscurity?

This article seeks to explicate the role of the Thai monarchy in the political context. It aims at untying one major conundrum: What are the legacies of absolute monarchy and how have they shaped the Thai political culture over the years? It argues that despite the fall of the absolute monarchy many decades ago, its impact has continued to overwhelmingly dominate the political body, even to the point of acting as an obstacle to democratization and deepening the ever growing political polarization in the country. This has been one of the root causes behind the rise of political violence in the past few years. The advent of Thaksin Shinawatra in 20o1 was subsequently perceived as a threat to the Bangkok royal elite. One way of eliminating this threat was to accuse Thaksin of being disloyal to the King. In this process, the lèse-majesté law has become an indispensable instrument, discursively employed to curb political dissent and disagreement. Paradoxically, using the monarchy as a political weapon has not only severely weakened the institution itself, but it has also helped propagate the anti-monarchy sentiment among the victims of the law. The study suggests that, for the endurance of the monarchy, the old establishment must be wholeheartedly ready to initiate serious reforms of both the monarchy and the anachronistic lèse-majesté law. The monarchy and its defenders must abandon their unrelenting self-denial of the assumption that all Thais still love their King—this is no longer the case. Failing to do so could result in an inevitable breakdown of the royal institution, and most likely, a new round of violence between the royalists and the anti-monarchy elements.

The Ghosts of Absolute Monarchy

The absolute monarchy, as a political system, might have long come to an end, but its influence has remained immense and authoritative. While the original purpose behind the abolition of the monarchy was to overthrow the supposedly uncivilized form of governance and to embrace the Western concept of democracy, Thai royalists recognized the necessity of maintaining certain aspects of the absolute monarchy in order to shore up their own positions of power. In Thailand today, there are two conflicting views of the monarchy—these views have come to define the relationship between the King and his people. On the one hand, there is a standard and normative view of the monarchy. This view emphasizes that the monarchy has made exceptionally great contributions to the Thai kingdom, mainly to unite all Thais and to preserve Thai territorial integrity. In the study conducted by Søren Ivarsson and Lotte Isager, Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand (2010), this normative view exists: the King is described as a protector of tradition, the nation and democracy; as an egalitarian development king who modernizes as he instructs the government to care for the welfare of its subjects; and as an institution as natural to Thailand’s political and social culture as rice is to the Thai diet. On the other hand, the almost unrestrained power of the King, encapsulated within the protective walls of the lèse-majesté law, has produced a more critical perspective of the monarchy. It reflects the belief that the excessive power of the King has greatly hindered the democratic progress. The royalist elite is viewed as having glorified the King’s power at the expense of dwindling elective institutions. The elite, in collaboration with conservative historians and a powerful media, has consistently painted a somber picture of the political domain as tainted by bad and immoral politicians. To them, the flaws of the Thai political system do not derive from intervention of non-elective institutions like the monarchy, but from irresponsible and unethical politicians. From this point of view, the end of the absolute monarchy does not really mean the end of the monarchy’s power. It instead appears to have given birth to a new political culture in which the monarchy and its defenders have collectively claimed their legitimate right to intervene in politics whenever they feel necessary, even when their actions are in reality no less immoral than that of their political rivals. The ghosts of the absolute monarchy continue to stalk Thai political life in the present day.

It is imperative to reiterate at this initial stage that when discussing the “monarchy,” the term does not refer exclusively to the monarch, but to the entire system of the royal institution. This includes other members of the royal family, the Privy Council (an advisory and implemental body serving the King), and their defenders in other segments of society with vested interests in the monarchy, such as the military, various state agencies, pro-royalty political parties and big businesses. These assorted royalist groups, while sharing the same aspiration of preserving the power of the monarchy, are not however homogenous; they possess differing interests, ideologies, and ways of looking at politics. In his seminal work “Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crisis in Thailand,” published in the Pacific Review in 2005, British scholar Duncan McCargo calls this entire system the “network monarchy.” McCargo argues that the best way to understand Thai politics is to perceive it through different networks that interact, bargain power, and even clash with each other. For him, the most influential network in Thailand in the past few decades has been the network monarchy, with King Bhumibol sitting on top of the highly hierarchical network. The chief operator of this network has been General Prem Tinsulanonda, former army chief and prime minister, who is currently President of the Privy Council. But long before the formation of the network monarchy à la Prem, monarchists of older generations embarked on entrenching the legacies of the absolute monarchy at the same time as they attempted to form a new kind of Thai-styled democracy revolving around the prerogatives of the King. In other words, even with the end of the absolute monarchy, its other characteristics have lived on and are well conserved. In the Thai journal Fah Diew Kan, Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul says in his article “The Legacies of Absolute Monarchy,” that social and political ideology, historical knowledge, cultural intellect, discourses, and the monarchical institution itself have, until now, their roots deeply entrenched in the absolute monarchy. But upholding the role of the monarchy as the epitome of Thai life is like a double-edge sword and contributes negatively to the political development of Thailand.

Because of the incessant, histrionic glorification and sacralization of the monarchy evident throughout the current Bhumibol reign, the intimate attachment of politics and society to the monarchy has served as, metaphorically speaking, a cell that prevents Thais from expressing unconventional thoughts. “Thinking outside of the box” has been forbidden, simply because it threatens the position of the network monarchy. Those who break the convention are often punished with up to a 15-year jail by the strict lèse-majesté law, considered the harshest punishment in the world; ironically, this punishment is only found in the Land of the Free (“Thailand” literally means “Land of the Free”). The convention ranges from the most trivial to the most serious forms of compliance, from having to stand up in the cinema when the song extolling the monarchy is played to having to stand still at 8 am and 6 pm daily when the national anthem is broadcast. Most of all, citizens must remain submissive in the face of outright royal intervention in politics with the backing of the military. The absolute monarchy did collapse, but the royalist and elitist class goes on to survive. As part of the survival tactic, they have proclaimed that the country must select ideas that are suitable for the country, especially those of foreign origin. Foreign ideas, such as democracy, must be adapted to coexist with local beliefs, customs, discourses and traditions. Otherwise, they claim that Thailand will lose its identity, or “Thainess.” It is important to note that the concept of Thainess has revolved around what are perceived to be the three components constituting Thailand—the Nation, Buddhism and the Monarchy. These make up the trilogy first crafted during the reign of King Vajiravudh. Based on this concept, foreign ideas must be compatible with the Thai nation, Buddhism and the monarchy, even when the real function has been to ensure the longevity of the vestiges of the absolute monarchy.

Old Wine in a New Bottle

The new political order in the post-absolute monarchy period has witnessed the rise of democracy, but only on the surface. The actual content has been intrinsically monarchist and thus antithetical to its outer look. This is what many Thais would like to call “royal democracy”; while there is a democratic form of government, the monarchy still plays a central role in politics. Royal democracy has been constructed according to the Bangkok-centric vision of power, royalist-nationalist historiography, and belief in Buddhism as the national religion. In all these cases, the monarchy represents the indispensable factor connecting all the discourses that demand popular submission without conditions. To elaborate, the royalists have successfully created a unitary Thai state with a profound emphasis on the monarchy. For example, the declaration of Buddhism as the national religion was instigated in order to suppress other perceived minority religions, while at the same time, the King has been a patron and protector of Buddhism and the sangha (community of ordained monks). More importantly, a duty of safeguarding Thai sovereignty and independence has been ingrained in the Thai mind. This has a direct link to the monarchy since past Siamese kings were endlessly eulogized for their bravery in defending the kingdom’s territorial rights. Thus, the Thai elite has often stirred up a sense of nationalism by emphasizing the loss of some supposedly Thai territories in the past, even when much of the so-called lost territories have remained just a myth. These discourses have not only stipulated a strong sense of nationalism but also of royalism to the point that the Thais must be prepared to sacrifice their lives for the protection of the country as much as the monarchy. With this philosophy, there is no room left for those who may think otherwise, especially for some who may question the monarchy’s place in politics.

Over the years, the lionization of the monarchy has dangerously intensified. The King has become more than just a Head of State. He is now a semi-god. A highly moral figure, he must not be violated. Meanwhile, there is another persona of King Bhumibol: he is the king of the people and the father of the nation. This was demonstrated in the early years of his reign when he paid countless visits to different parts of Thailand, hoping to create a direct connection with his subordinates. In many ways, the King has been competing with successive governments over the years to win over the public which sees him as the “ultimate fixer” whenever the country encounters crises. But the conflict between the King’s two personas has led to great confusion. As much as the King wishes to build a personal relationship with his people, his other divine image performs as a barrier that separates him from them. Old uncivilized rituals have been restored, such as the use of overly eloquent royal language and the prostration before the King. Ironically, such a practice was abolished in 1873 by King Bhumibol’s grandfather, King Chulalongkorn, who saw it as barbaric. King Bhumibol is arguably no longer Phra Dhammarajadhiraja (king of Dhamma, known as the teaching of Buddha), but more of a Devadhiraja (king of god). The situation has turned more complicated as the King himself has become directly involved in the game of politics. Paul Handley, in his revealing book about King Bhumibol, The King Never Smiles (2006), rightly explains that the King has always been a political player. The notion that the King is above politics is therefore untrue. As the King has entered the public sphere as a political actor, a conflict of interests has emerged. For example, when Thaksin came along and won massive popular support in 2001 and 2005, he immediately became a threat to the old absolute monarchy; this is not to mention that his sister, Yingluck, the present prime minister, could also pose a similar threat to the palace. One way of ridding Thaksin from politics was the military coup in 2006. In the post-coup period, monarchists continued to manipulate state institutions to undermine their enemies, including exploiting the hand of the courts in removing the two pro-Thaksin regimes of Samak Sundaravej and Somchai Wongsawat in 2008 and abusing the law which inevitably led to the rapid rise of lèse-majesté cases. Statistically, in 2005, 33 charges came before the Court of First Instance; they later handed down 18 decisions on these. In 2007, the number of charges increased almost fourfold to 126. This number jumped to 164 in 2009 and then tripled to 478 cases by 2010.The most dramatic increases came under the government of the Democrat Party led by Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011). According to American scholar David Streckfuss, there may have been hundreds jailed for lèse-majesté in this post-coup period.

The attempt to further strengthen the monarchy has been carried out as much by royalists as by the King himself, who has always been an “active monarch.” In his recent study on hyper-royalists, “The Monarchy and Anti-Monarchy: Two Elephants in the Room of Thai Politics,” Thongchai discusses the resumption of royalism as public culture as “some ancient royal rituals and new royal festivities, performances and public appearances [have been] promoted.” Thonghchai further explains an increase in King Bhumibol’s popularity, noting that his “sympathy with the student movement and his intervention to end the widespread unrest in October 1973 eventually made the [monarch] the pinnacle of political and social life.” The regional environment also enabled him to play a crucial role in politics. With the spread of communism inside and outside the Thai border, the King reinvented himself as a chief strategist fighting with communists and in the process denounced them extrinsic to Thai nationhood. Even after the end of the Cold War, while a myriad of governments have crumbled along the way, the King has relentlessly consolidated his place in politics. The royal intervention in 1992, shortly after bloody clashes between the army and pro-democracy groups, won him another trophy as a stabilizer in politics. It is apparent that monarchist ambition cannot be separated from politics. But a question must be asked: Does royal democracy really function in Thailand? As emphasized earlier, many aspects of absolute monarchy, now being merged into a new political order, seem to be irreconcilable with modern values of democracy such as popular mandate and accountability. Thongchai also argues that the term royal democracy is in itself an oxymoron, calling it a contradiction that is “like a black-hole sucking the whole political system into its vortex.”

The “Awakening” Moment

Since the military coup of 2006, the kind of politics based on legacies of absolute monarchy has shown signs of failing. At first glance, as it rallied on Bangkok streets, the royalist yellow-shirt People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) kept on exploiting royal symbols to topple Thaksin. Slogans like “Fight for the King” were used to legitimize the PAD’s dubious political objectives at the expense of the monarchy being disturbingly politicized. But at a deeper level, as I argue, the real challengers to the legacies of the absolute monarchy are not really Thaksin or the so-called anti-monarchy movement, but the hyper-royalists themselves. They have failed to face the new reality in politics. Is history repeating itself? This inability of the monarchy, as an institution, to cope with the change of political circumstance was the very same reason responsible for the downfall of the absolute monarchy in 1932 in the first place. The difference is that the decline of the monarchy today is accelerated by the latest development in politics, known as the “awakening,” or ta sawang. In short, ta sawang is a phenomenon in which many Thais have awakened to realize that after all, Thailand has never been truly free from absolute monarchy and democracy is still chained. The fact that the King has been actively participating in politics does not allow him to be above criticism. The growing criticism against the King, either in public or private, induces a diminishing reverence of the monarchy. More than in any other periods in Thai history, anti-monarchy voices are being heard louder and clearer.

In exploring the role of the monarchy, the issue of succession must be touched upon. Putting aside the question of suitability of the incoming king, the continued re-glorification of King Bhumibol not only unveils the desperation on the part of the monarchists to try to cling onto the glorious past, but also serves to de-legitimize the next king who will find it hard, if not impossible, to fill the big shoes of his father. He has failed even before he will be enthroned. The solution to the crisis within the walls of the palace comes down to the understanding among those in the network monarchy of the real political situation and their willingness to undergo self-reforms by abandoning, once and for all, the obsolete legacies of the absolute monarchy.