Peace in the Middle East

You have stated that the “clash of ideas” in negotiation is valuable to diplomacy. But are there boundaries to the value of negotiation? When is a clash of ideas no longer positive, but destructive, and at what point does negotiation cease to be reasonable?

The only time when discussions and negotiations are destructive is if they are a substitute for effective action—when they become a means by which one is prevented from doing what needs to be done to achieve positive goals. In other words, if negotiations are not conducted in good faith but instead are used by one side as a means to avoid or prevent effective action and the pursuit of positive goals by the other side, then they are counterproductive. And it is very hard to judge at times whether the people you are negotiating with are conducting negotiations in good faith or not. Negotiations could also be counterproductive if they create a false hope or expectation that something positive will happen, when in fact some of the parties involved in the negotiation have no intention of making progress. So there are circumstances in which negotiation is not productive. Negotiation is, of course, one of the tools available in the toolbox of diplomacy. Not all tools are the right tools for every situation. So we need to be flexible and make decisions as to what tools—what combination of tools—are appropriate for dealing with particular situations. One very serious clash of ideas relates to the current and past troubles in the Middle East—specifically, the rift within Islam between moderate and extremist groups.

In terms of the toolbox of diplomacy, which tools can the United States and its allies use to ensure that extremist groups in the Middle East are contained?

This is the most important geopolitical challenge that we face—the issue of what is happening in the broader Middle East—because developments in that region impact not only the security of that region, but also the security and the future of the world. When looking at the sources of support for extremism, there are a number of things to consider. One of these is the broader clash or crisis within Islam itself. Muslims for some time have been divided on the issue of what has gone wrong and what needs to be done to fix it. The belief is—and there is truth in it—that at one time Islamic civilization was doing quite well. It was a civilization on the march. It was doing well politically, economically, culturally. And we see the great strides, the great contributions that were made by Islamic civilization, particularly in the sciences.

But there has been a decline, and the question is what has gone wrong and what to do about it. And as a result of engaging on these two questions, different schools and movements have emerged. One of these schools that has acquired a lot of prominence in recent years has been the more extremist interpretation of Islam, which says that the reason why Muslims declined is that they moved away from the “true” Islam. They claim that only their interpretation of Islam, which is an extremist interpretation, is “true” Islam and that only by going back or embracing this version of Islam can Muslims achieve greatness once again and overcome their decline. Others have had other alternative views, one believing that only by doing what those who are successful right now are doing, can one achieve success. That means moving toward separation of church and state, democracy, secularism, and a market-oriented economy. And then there is the middle school—that you can reconcile Islam and modernity. But because of a variety of developments, the two more moderate schools—which had at one time been dominant—have been weakened, and the extremists have gained power. They use terror as a means, and that has given them the prominence they need. Now they are dominant in some places, but not everywhere. And therefore the question is: what feeds these extremists, what strengthens them, and what does it take to weaken the extremist movement?

But at the same time, one needs to work to strengthen the moderates, because it is ultimately the Muslim moderates themselves who have to overcome the problems of this region. Foreigners cannot fix these problems; foreigners can help them. But Muslims need to conquer these challenges themselves. The issues that affect this challenge are several. One is regional conflicts, one of the most important of which is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Second is the dysfunctionality of the internal political systems of many Middle Eastern states. Third are economic issues. And fourth is the level of outside support for moderates versus extremists. So we need to deal with all four of these issues. We must work on resolving regional conflicts and work to promote the development of functional political systems and functional economic systems.

When you think of the economy, for example, many of these countries have young populations. How do you get the young people to be prepared in terms of education for productive and happy lives? What can the world do to help reform the educational systems to produce productive citizens?

If you have a lot of uneducated (or inappropriately educated), young, and unemployed people who cannot take care of themselves and their families, they can end up as recruits to extremist causes. Another challenge is how to assist moderates because extremists can get money from external sources. We believe that Iran provides financial and other support to extremist groups, even political and financial support during elections. Much of the world has a common interest in helping overcome the challenges of extremism in the Middle East by supporting the moderates in the region. This is not only a problem for the United States, but also a problem for Europe. It’s also a problem for Asia. It’s a problem for the entire world. So we have something we can rally the world around and make this issue a defining focus of our alliances and international cooperation. And we should support the moderates in such a way as to ensure that we do not undermine them and that they are not perceived by the people as agents of the United States or as doing America’s bidding. We should support them in a way that they are seen to be working for the empowerment of the people and for a functioning political system that delivers what the people need on economic and other fronts. Those are the key issues. To address them, we will have to apply a broad, bipartisan strategy and develop it into a global coalition-building principle as we go forward.

As you said, foreigners cannot fix these issues, but they can help through a joint effort on the part of the international community. In the context of Iraq, what is the optimal approach to strengthen moderate groups?

In Iraq, there are two key challenges, among others, that are important. One is incentivizing Iraqi moderates, across ethnic and sectarian lines, to come together. That is by facilitating and assisting those moderates to come to agreement on the key issues that divide Iraq, and to achieve a national compact among them. I tried to work on this myself when I was there as ambassador. When I arrived, the Sunni Arabs were not participating in the political process.

Our first task was to bring them into the political process. We made progress on that; they did participate. Nevertheless, there was disagreement on key issues with regard to the constitution, which needs to be the country’s national compact. We managed, through a lot of personal diplomacy running back and forth between the various leaders, to get them to agree to a front-loaded amendment process on the key issues where there were differences with regard to the draft constitution. We thus allowed the constitution to go forward to meet the benchmark that was agreed to but also allowed it to be amended to make it more broadly acceptable. Since coming to the UN, I have been of the view that the UN needs to assist with the process of internal reconciliation. First, the UN is a broadly accepted convener, more so than any other country or entity.

Second, the UN has a lot of experience dealing with these kinds of divisions; it could propose bridging formulas. Finally, it can also talk to some of the players that we could not talk to or would not talk to. So our first major challenge is to get the Iraqis to come together on the big issues where they have been divided along ethnic, sectarian, and political lines—and those are the oil issues, the shape of federalism in Iraq, and so on. The second major challenge is how to undermine the forces that want to polarize the Iraqi people, and that has been the objective of al Qaeda and some extremists. Therefore, we have had to apply military force against al Qaeda because they were attacking innocent Shiite targets in order to get the Shiites to attack the Sunni Arab targets. We have made progress in this sphere. I think the challenge for us now is to move forward at a faster pace, given our own impatience. We have a lot of troops in Iraq and our public is engaged. At the same time, Iraq faces the tasks of state-building and nation-building. What it means to be an Iraqi has not yet been defined and agreed upon. And these are difficult and critical issues, which take time to resolve. The question is how we can accelerate this process and how we can use our presence—the level of our presence, the way we are present—to incentivize Iraqis to come to terms with each other.

Another important consideration is that what happens in Iraq is part of a regional equation. Iraq is a transition country between the Arab Sunni world, the Shiite Persian world, and the Turkish world. Competition among these forces directly affects the situation in Iraq, and some of these actors have not helpful to the stability and success of moderates in Iraq. Here again, the UN can play a positive role with a regional engagement strategy that is focused and that is supported by the Iraqis. The challenge remains how to get the neighbors to behave and how to get Iraqis to come to agreement with each other and to cooperate with each other. The United States needs to provide enough reassurance to the Iraqis in terms of support for their democratic future—meaning one person one vote. It needs to incentivize the Shiite Iraqis to cooperate, because they have suffered from insecurity that the system may not survive without a large American presence. We must also instill confidence in the Sunni Arab population and assure them that their interests will be protected. There are other issues that need to be worked on, including the building up of Iraqi institutions, particularly security and finance institutions, so that Iraqis can do more and more for themselves.

In terms of achieving cooperation from Iraq’s neighbors, what is the United States’ optimal strategy in approaching Iran? What goals can the United States accomplish in Iran to encourage cooperation and to what extent can the UN be involved? Is there a basis for continuing diplomacy, or do you foresee the need for a shift to a military approach?

We want an Iran that is at peace with its neighbors, that does not seek to dominate its neighbors, that does not seek to destabilize its neighbors, but has a reasonable definition of its national interests. And of course we want an Iran that doesn’t possess nuclear weapons, particularly because of concerns about the kind of leadership that Iran has in terms of its policies, its affiliations, its relations, its declarations. For such an Iran to have nuclear weapons would be too dangerous potentially for the world. With regard to Iraq, I think that pressure on the ground is needed to make it difficult for Iran to undermine the situation. Political progress among Iraqis is also important because that too reduces opportunity for mischief making. At the same time, I believe that engagement is necessary among its neighbors and other interested parties, including the United States and other major powers. The future of Iraq is very critical for the future of the Middle East, and the future of the Middle East is the critical issue of our time. The United States does not seek an Iraq that is hostile to Iran. We understand they are neighbors, and they need to get along. But what is not acceptable and what we need to work against is an Iran that seeks to keep Iraq weak, divided, preoccupied internally, and unable to overcome the challenges that it faces, an Iran that adds fuel to the fire in order to gain leverage vis-à-vis the United States.

What potential do you see for future diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran?

It depends on quite a number of factors, but I think this is going to be one of the important issues facing the region and facing us in the coming years. What happens in this region —and therefore Iran’s role—is critical. It impacts not only the situation in Iraq, but also the situation in Afghanistan. It impacts the situation in Lebanon through support of Hezbollah. It impacts the situation of the Palestinians and Israelis because of Iran’s support for Hamas and groups that are not yet ready to make peace with Israel and embrace the two-state concept. We are going to have to be prepared to use the whole range of means available to us—diplomacy, pressure through the UN, pressure from the United States itself, pressure with allies and like-minded nations, as well as appropriate engagement.

Do you think the economic sanctions that have been imposed on Iran will be effective in addressing nuclear security concerns?

Sanctions are one of the instruments available. Will it be effective? We will have to see. So far, it does not look promising. Iran is already under UN sanctions. Although the sanctions have inflicted costs on Iran, contributed to economic difficulties for the government, and added to the country’s isolation, Iran is not yet willing to accept what is asked of it. And what is asked of it is not a lot. What the international community, what the Security Council, asks is that Iran suspend enrichment and enter into discussions about how to deal with the fuel requirements for the power reactors that it wants to build. Now we have said—the international community has said—there is a legitimate concern with regard to security of fuel supplies. The international community has a legitimate concern about proliferation and about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. And if Iran is not interested in nuclear weapons, the way to deal with it is to suspend enrichment, to sit down and find a solution to the problem of security of fuel supplies. So far the Iranians seem to be determined to proceed with enrichment, and we—the international community—would have to look at what needs to be done, both on the positive side and on the negative side, to get the kind of cooperation required to deal with these concerns.