The news from Afghanistan these days, for those who've noticed, tends to be largely concerned with reporting the latest suicide bombings. The BBC, for example, reports today that three British soldiers and three civilians have died in an attack in Helmand province–typical of the Taliban, who tend to target foreign militaries but whose bombings inevitably kill civilians as well. The news will hardly shock an American audience, accustomed as we are to the daily reports of suicide bombings in Iraq, which are even more frequent and deadly. But the fact that suicide bombings have become a part of daily life in Afghanistan is troubling–and it sheds a lot of light on the problems that the country now faces.
Some background, perhaps, is needed to explain the significance of this trend. Suicide, which is already regarded as an abomination within Islam, is especially condemned within Afghan culture. And indeed, while suicide bombing has been used in Israel for years, and rather immediately became a tactic in the Iraq insurgency, it remained strikingly absent from the Taliban's arsenal throughout 2001 and 2002. Kabul's Center for Conflict and Peace Studies reports that there was just one suicide bombing in 2002, and just two such attacks in 2003, six in 2004, and 21 in 2005. The situation, of course, is now entirely different. The CCPS noted as early as August 6, 2006 that there had already been more terrorist attacks in 2006 than in the entire previous history of the country. 2007 promises to be even worse, according to an Associated Press article which claims that suicide bombing has roughly tripled, with deaths estimated at 94 coalition troops and 279 civilians.
So why the astronomical increase in suicide bombings? A number of explanations prove useful here. First is the natural shift in Taliban tactics from large-scale rural warfare against coalition forces to more random acts of terrorism. The Taliban, faced with the military superiority of US, international and Afghan army forces, have transitioned from open resistance to the more guerrilla-style tactics favored by Iraqi insurgents. It seems only natural that they should embrace a method of resistance that promises an ideal proportion of insurgent to infidel casualties.
But the real explanation for the increase in suicide bombings is clearly Al Qaeda–both the terrorists still in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and, crucially, the growing Qaeda presence in Iraq. We've seen reports that major Taliban leaders have been training in Iraq, and that Afghans have been sent to Iraq for so-called “on-the-job” training. Al Qaeda's sophisticated propaganda corps, who even have their own video production company, Al-Sahab, have been successfully in arguing for an Islamic legitimization of suicide, on the basis of “martyrdom.” The Taliban have even developed their own video production arm, mirroring Al Qaeda's, which is especially interesting given that under their tyrannical rule, they banned all television as un-Islamic. Only one conclusion is possible: that the Taliban, forced to adapt by American pressure, have essentially merged with Al Qaeda in both ideology and tactics.
Is their strategy working? The US military reports that some 84% of the victims of Taliban attacks are civilians, and for a movement which seeks to win the “hearts and minds” of Afghans, this is a devastating statistic. Apparently the Taliban were initially quite concerned about civilian casualties, occasionally apologizing for attacks in which civilians died. But recent events, including a June 17 attack on a police headquarters that killed 35 Afghans, 22 of them policemen, indicate that this cautiousness may have fallen by the wayside. Considerable resistance also remains to the notion of using suicide attacks within Afghanistan. Hamid Karzai's government has tried to capitalize on this, running ads that show a mullah refusing to say prayers at a suicide bomber's funeral, and saying, “We are Muslims, and Islam does not allow anyone to shed either his own blood or that of his brothers.”
But the Al Qaeda merger is troubling nonetheless. Increased ISAF patrolling can do much to crack down on the lawlessness of the southern regions, where Talibs run amok, and border enforcement can limit weapons trafficking from Iran and Pakistan. But little can be done, militarily, to discourage angry young Afghans from strapping on bombs and blowing themselves up. Afghan clerics need to do more to emphasize the evil of these actions, and NATO forces can be more careful about civilian casualties, which would make it clear that international forces are fighting for the Afghans, not against them. There are no real answers to a terrorist insurgency, though. It will take the combined will of international governments, Afghan forces, and ordinary citizens to defeat what is clearly a growing menace to national stability.
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