State of Emergency

November 3, 2007 by Kiran Bhat

Things have finally come to a head in Pakistan. The violence and agitation which has poured into Pakistan's streets over the past few months has led President (and de facto dictator) Pervez Musharraf to declare a state of emergency. The consitution has been suspended, and all real power placed in the hands of the military and by extension the army chief, Musharraf himself. Unlike previous measures which Musharraf took to quash enemies over the summer, the declaration of martial law is almost universally unpopular and has neither domestic nor western support.

While Musharraf claimed in an address to the nation that he had taken action because Pakistan was a "dangerous" stage in its history in which militant groups were coalescing and terrorizing the entire nation, the facts belie a blunt alternate reality; Musharraf's star is fading fast, and there is little else he can do to save himself from sure political death. At the forefront of Musharraf's problems is the Chief Justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court, Ifthikar Muhammad Chaudhry. Musharraf's sacking of Chaudhry in March led to organized street protests in Islamabad and Karachi, which quickly turned violent . In an attempt to save face, Musharraf reinstated Chaudhry in July. Chaudhry's return led to a reassertion of authority by Pakistan's historically independent judiciary - in fact, Chaudhry and company were set to rule on the legality of last months suspect national elections, in which Musharraf was reelected. The inertia of anti-Musharraf sentiments in Pakistan, coupled with a respected enemy in Chaudhry, made the writings on the wall clear. And so the President acted.

Only a year ago, Musharraf appeared to be the most stable among the plethora of unelected leaders in the Muslim world. By largely preserving freedom of the press, supporting the West's war on terror rhetorically, and masquerading as a democrat by paying lip service to his nation's constitution while defanging it of all legitimate checks on the executive, Musharraf gained general acceptance both at home and from powerful allies abroad. His fall from grace following this outward expression total power could be meteoric, or as is more likely, might not happen at all. Much rides on two major factors.

The first and by far the most important is how Pakistan's people react to martial law. If Musharraf tries to order his military to kill or crack down on civilian protesters, he would lose all international legitimacy and would raise the ire of his own countrymen, likely leading to his demise. The Pakistani people have shown that they are ready and willing to march against Musharraf when he does things that are anathema to the national interest. However, chances are that protesters will have a much harder time organizing under the stringent new rules (including roundups of agitators, curfews and absence of communications) than they did when Chaudhry was sacked. And deprived of their major mouthpiece in Chaudhry himself, who has been under house arrest since the state of emergency was declared, any popular movement would not have the same vehemence or organization as it once may have. Other potential protest leaders seem inert. Former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Bhenazir Bhutto, who are both abroad, urged uprisings. Sharif left the country less than a day after returning last month, and Bhutto was nearly killed in a (possibly Musharraf-engineered?) bombing before she succumbed to apparent fear and fled. Needless to say, both will have a hard time returning to a nation under martial law to lead protests.

The second factor which will determine Musharraf's future is international reaction. Local powers China, Russia and India have kept mum on the issue since Musharraf's declaration. The EU has already condemned the emergency. The Bush Administration, a Pakistani ally since 2001, has strongly hinted that it opposed, and will continue to oppose, martial law. Secretary of State Rice is said to have called Musharraf at two in the morning Pakistan time earlier this week to urge him to reconsider, and has said that any rash action could lead to a break in American funds to the Pakistani military. If Musharraf loses his only real ally in the West over his declaration, he may find it harder to continue the charade of legitimacy both abroad and at home. But realistically, America has a vested interest in keeping Musharraf in power - a stable Pakistan is vital to American interests in Afghanistan and really, across the Muslim world. In addition, chances are that neither the US nor India would be particularly pleased with a potential Islamist alternative to Musharraf. Don't be surprised if Musharraf manages to hold on via Western enablers, even if they don't support him publicly.

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