Why the Red Mosque siege matters

Just as both western and domestic support for his absolute rule waned, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf pulled off a political coup by sending his military into Islamabad’s Red Mosque to crack down on Taliban-linked militias. Mosque leader Maulana Abdul Aziz was arrested yesterday as he attempted to escape, following a raging shootout that left twelve dead. Aziz’s brother Ghazi Abdul Rashid, currently in control of the mosque, has offered to surrender to authorities.

The militants’ apparent capitulation marks a huge victory for Musharraf, who had been weakened by domestic tensions and a perception that he could not eradicate fundamentalists. The siege of the rebel mosque clearly burnishes Musharraf’s anti-terrorist credentials and once more sets him on solid footing in Washington. Less obvious but no less important is the positive impact of the raid on Musharraf’s image at home. While the siege was neither decisive nor timely – Musharraf had withheld the attack for weeks for fear of an Islamist backlash – it proved his authority to a skeptical public and genuinely helped many Islamabad residents. Prior to the raid, fighters following edicts from Aziz had become increasingly audacious in their moral policing of the capital’s streets, vandalizing music stores and kidnapping suspected violators of Islamic Law. Reports even indicated that the militia engaged in the torture and murder of some targets. Much of Islamabad must feel understandably vindicated by the siege, which liberated them from a group that had violently attempted to quash the relative freedom which prevails in one of Pakistan’s largest urban areas. And for this liberation, Musharraf can take credit.

What remains to be seen is whether Musharraf will use his newfound political capital to retain his grip on both the military and political structures in Pakistan. With (largely staged) elections approaching later this year, Musharraf has the option to either retain total control or to soothe an angry populace by giving up his control of the military while staying on as president. He has discussed the option publicly, but the decision remains to be made. After the Red Mosque siege, Musharraf will be tempted to stay on as top general. However, counterintuitive as it may be, it is actually in Musharraf’s best interest that he relinquish military command.

If Musharraf kept command, his subjects, accustomed to a free press and not afraid to protest, would grow increasingly tired of one-man absolute rule. As the street protests earlier in the year demonstrated, lack of domestic confidence in Musharraf leads to American discomfort and unwillingness to lend support. It also leads to increased chances of fundamentalist rule in Pakistan – an unpopular leader coupled with an overwhelmingly devout Muslim population was the formula for the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s. This outcome is unfavorable for both the battle-tested self-preserver and those that preserve him. Giving up military rule does dissolve Musharraf’s absolute power, but it also assuages his harshest critics and buys him and his allies time to plan how they will remain in control of his restless nation.

UPDATE: 7/7/07

The standoff has increased in intensity since Tuesday, as Musharraf has informed the Red Mosque militants that they must surrender or risk death. Meanwhile, cleric Ghazi Abdul Rashid has reversed course and declared that he and his followers will martyr themselves before surrendering. Unless the military succeeds in forcing out the remaining fighters by blocking supplies from entering the mosque, the conflict appears headed towards a violent end. According to the Washington Post, hundreds of women, children and noncombatants remain inside the Red Mosque, held against their will by dozens of radicals. How Musharraf handles the situation will go a long way towards determining whether the Pakistani people retain trust in his ability to command the military effectively – a bloody conclusion to this situation would likely erase the respect he had gained by sending the troops in.