The European Union or the European Question?
It is widely remembered that at the height of the Roman Empire, it stretched from the edges of Scotland to the sands of the Sahara. Since then the goal of a united Europe has always been in comparison to Rome, though the Romans themselves looked to the kingdom of Alexander the Great as their model. For most of history, the dream of uniting Europe was only conceivable through conquest. But it was a dream shared by Charlemagne, Napoleon, and Hitler alike. Now that dream has been realized in a purely political institution—that of the European Union. Yet, that raises the very question at hand. How has it come about that the unification of Europe should have happened without conquest and with a peaceful revolution of sorts, sans revolution?
The history of the European Union is complex in that it owes its strict origins to the post-bellum European Coal and Steel Community and its development to the intricate political machinations of Europe in the intervening half a century between the end of World War II and its formal creation in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty. Even disregarding its state of being between 1951 and 1993, the last twelve years have seen a quasi-government existing, taxing, and legislating under the mandate of treaties among sovereign nations. Moreover, the issues of political philosophy that are raised by this are not without import. Indeed, the foremost question stands of where does the European Union derive its authority from—it was created through the treaties of politicians, not elected to create a new supranational government, but to uphold the national governments of their lands. As a result, the European Union can, at the most, claim only an indirect legitimacy from the demos; in actuality, it stands as nothing more than the creation of an oligarchy.
Seeing the need to establish its right to rule from the people in order to be fairly called a democratic institution, the European Union worked to write a Constitution. In a sentence, it failed. The proposed European Constitution was defeated in both French and Dutch referenda in 2005. While the Constitution itself is in jeopardy of falling into a political abyss, the situation underscores a more stark reality—some Europeans do not want the European Union. And this “some” happens to be a majority of the populace in a number of countries. It is perhaps the double-edged sword of democracy that when the mob has spoken, the mob has made the law. Unlike in the United States, there are no red-staters to blame this failure on; no appeal to some sort of backwater bigotry to explain why political “progress” was not made. Something is rotten in the state of France. And the Netherlands. And no doubt elsewhere. The reality is that the European Union exists without the will of the European people. It is an interesting place to be politically when one claims to be a democracy.
Perhaps the above analysis is misplaced, however, in that the European Union arose as an economic, rather than political community. Even taking this route, one is led to fundamentally political questions. First, the ability to tax is one of the characteristic features of a government, and it is a measure of whether one is even functional. Through its Value-Added-Tax, the European Union is able to tax and, inasmuch, functions as a government. In that way, one is led to consider the European Union as a government and the consequent political questions that come from it. Nevertheless, to view the European Union as an economic entity primarily, one must ask what characterizes an economic entity and what are the hallmark features of such a conglomeration. Subsequently, the fact that the European Union has an official currency certainly seems to fall within the purview of such an inquiry. From here, it is a straight shot to fundamentally political questions.
Just as it is a simple fact that the European Union has an official currency, it is also a simple fact that not every member state of the European Union uses the Euro. The most prominent and important case, of course, is Great Britain. Historically, Great Britain has been one of the dominant powers of Europe; it remains so today, both economically and militarily. As a result, a very crucial question is raised—what is it for the European Union to exist, to have a currency, to be organized economically and not have one of the foremost of its nations totally within that structure? The most immediate reply is simply that the Euro system is not as strong as it possibly can be. This is the most basic claim. The more interpretive claim, however, is that this division belies a fundamental uncertainty or misgiving or, even, philosophical difference within the European Union. That is, no matter what the reason, there exists not just a worry but a manifested disagreement about how far to go in, a concern about how much a country should be European and how much it should remain itself. And with at least one state on one issue, there is undeniable doubt about how far to jump into the political sea. Altogether and essentially, even when taking an economic, rather than purely political view, there persists an element of disunity within the European Union.
And so long as this disunity exists within the European Union, it will never be fully united not just in the strictly logical sense, but in the practical sense as well. The proverbial question has it, “Which came first—the chicken or the egg?” To it, there is a political parallel, “Which came first—the philosophy or the practicality?” What this means is do political exigencies dictate political philosophy or do political philosophies serve to create political exigencies? Pragmatists argue one way, philosophers the other. Ultimately, it does not matter which came first, but how it will end. In that respect, both are the same. The practical situation of the European Union is that it is fundamentally disunited on both the political and economic fronts; the philosophical situation of the European Union is that its populace does not believe in it.
It has no doubt been said before and it will be said here again. The European Union is not the United States of Europe. Citizens of the United States see themselves as Americans first, foremost, and only. Citizens of the European Union see themselves as German, Italian, Irish, and not as EU citizens. Until that critical point when its populace sees itself as citizens of the European Union and not as citizens of their respective countries, the European Union will always be faced with this psychological disunity. And this psychological disunity will always correlate to the philosophical and practical disunity outlined above. But perhaps this is not a bad thing.
Psychological disunity indeed. Now, in Europe, there is at the least an ethnically homogeneous population, to a degree. Assuming Turkey will change that, I wonder whether Europe has an incentive to let them in. While it would be nice to see an Islamic state in Europe’s core, I can’t say that Europe should be forced to allow it.
Comment by Noah Hertz-Bunzl — December 9, 2005 @ 3:48 pm
The European Union should look to the US constitution when it tries to write its own. America of the late 18th century was very similar to Europe today. As you note, citizens consider themselves members of their own countries rather than Europeans. Before the United States, Americans considered themselves primarily Virginians, Pennsylvanians, Massachusans, and so on. The main concern of the framers was that each state should retain its autonomy. Of course, what became the United States changed in the intervening centuries, as might Europe in the next couple. But Europeans react strongly against a US-style constitution, because they are not attuned to the original meaning and success of the document just as they are unfamiliar with the social climate of the early American state. Tis a shame.
Comment by Patrick McKee — December 13, 2005 @ 2:31 pm
Merely accepting that Europeans will never see themselves as Europeans may doom the EU. For one, national attachments may be less strong than we think – there are very weak attachments, for instance, to the Belgian nation-state, as Belgians identify primarily with their ethnic community instead. Moreover, the question is how to create a European identity. One way is to integrate Europeans into common democratic structures, so that they share a political discourse across national boundaries. Thinking about common problems is one way for people to expand their conception of identity. The failed Constitution referenda shouldn’t be interpreted as a definite “no” to a united, democratic Europe; they should be seen as the (disappointing) rejection of a particular document, in a particular political context.
Comment by Doug Lieb — December 19, 2005 @ 9:32 pm
To build on Patrick’s and Doug’s comments, the fact of Europe’s “psychological disunity” today does not mean Europe will stay that way. Few EU citizens and even fewer European leaders wish, I think, the European Union to acquire fundamental state characteristics (such as defense responsibility and taxation power) and to supersede nation-states in commanding citizens’ identification and loyalty. To the next generations, however, the intentions of the founders are unlikely to triumph over what seems to make sense at the time and for the future.
The history of the origins of European national identities shows to me that such identities can be constructed. Leaders need not wait for an identity to emerge and congeal organically before they undertake state-building projects. That is, the state can precede the nation. Chronologically considered, many nation-states are really state-nations.
US history too illustrates the point. US colonists fought for the freedom of their states, secured by the Articles of Confederation. But the ex-colonists found the Articles gave the federal government too little power, especially in the conduct of foreign affairs. The states ratified the US Constitution after merely seven years of the Articles.
Then again, not until the Civil War did the “United States is” supplant in popular usage the “United States are.” If national identities can be constructed, they can be constructed perhaps only to a point and only so rapidly. The difficult question for Europe’s statesmen is what point Europe has reached now and is likely to reach in the future. I suppose all this has been a fancy way of saying “who knows,” but are not such messages the beauty of academia?
Comment by Stephen Wertheim — December 21, 2005 @ 11:50 pm