This summer, Mexico will go to the polls for mid-term congressional elections. Eleven states also have concurrent local elections scheduled for July 5. Campaign season is beginning to move into hyper-drive, and Mexico’s major parties and politicians have begun to attack, counter-punch and defend. It seems an appropriate time to take stock of what has changed in Mexico since the 2006 election cycle, and what it means for the main contenders.
The 2006 presidential elections were defined by polarization, with at least a third of voters convinced that the election had been stolen from the leftish candidate for the PRD, Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (AMLO). The Federal Elections Institute (IFE) was completely discredited, leading to a long struggle to reform it. For several months, it looked as though the country’s principal political forces would be unable to come to agreement on a slate of respectable, unbiased candidates to lead IFE. Eventually, they cut a deal that left a compromise candidate, Leonardo Valdés Zurita, in charge. This year’s mid-term elections are the first since the 2006 debacle, and they will test the degree to which the capacity of the institute, widely admired before and immediately after the 2000 election, has been restored.
The election will also take place under a new set of regulations put into place after the 2006 polls. These rules limit the ability of non-partisan interest groups to run advertisements, and privilege the major political parties with free television time on the networks. In spite of foot-dragging by the television industry, these new regulations are slowly being adopted, increasing citizen exposure to subsidized partisan advertisements. The impact of these changes is unclear, though it is intended to reduce the influence of powerful interest groups over election outcomes.
On the issues, Mexico is facing a dramatic double crisis of security and economic decline. This should favor non-incumbents. That means parties other than the PAN at the federal level, and a variety of parties at the state level. Key state elections include that for the capital region, Mexico City, where the PRD has been in control since 1997. A recent survey of capital residents suggests that the importance of the economic crisis has risen relative to insecurity in the last several months. The percentage of residents identifying security as the capital’s biggest problem has fallen by 10 points since November, while there has been an aggregate uptick of about that same amount identifying unemployment, the economic crisis and poverty. Nevertheless, the Mexico City’s PRD governor remains popular, with a 55 percent approval rating, and he still bests the country’s PAN president in a head-to-head match-up (by about 9 points).
In spite of the party’s hold on Mexico City, however, the overall popularity of the PRD has probably taken the biggest hit since 2006. The organization went through a bitter succession struggle for the better part of 2008. Since the AMLO wing of the party was finally declared the loser of internal elections, AMLO and his supporters have slowly shifted their support to other leftish parties who were former coalition partners of the PRD, such as the PT. In February, AMLO appeared in television ads supporting PT and another former coalition member, Convergencia. AMLO’s brother, Pío, is even running as a congressional candidate for Let’s Save Mexico, a PT-Convergencia front. In addition to this high profile defection, the party has also suffered financial difficulties due to fines for illegal activities, and declining membership dues. The PRD has the highest unfavorable rating of the major partisan outfits, about 43 percent in June 2008.
Nine years of PAN rule at the national level and the double crisis have stolen some of that party’s sheen, too. The PAN continues to do well among under-30s and the upper and middle-classes, but levels of support have fallen even within the base. Meanwhile, among the more than one third of voters declaring themselves independents, PAN support has also dropped since the middle of 2008. Although this decline has been relatively modest, neither of the other major parties shows a similar downward trend among independents. The PAN’s electoral maneuverings have also brought into relief some of the party’s weaknesses. For an organization that once prided itself on meticulous adherence to the principles of democracy, the struggle over its gubernatorial candidate in Nuevo Léon has made it clear that principle has been trumped by the quest for power. An internal dispute became very public recently in Nuevo Léon when a fraction of the party protested against the top-down nature of the PAN’s candidate selection process. Worse still, a protracted public period of weighing whether to form an unholy alliance with New Alliance (PANAL), a party closely linked to the authoritarian strongwoman of Mexico’s teacher unions, suggested that the PAN would do anything to hold onto power (both in Nuevo León and Colima).
And so it is that, as I detailed late last year, the PRI looks set for a comeback. If the PAN and the PRD have both lost support in the last year or two, the PRI has been the beneficiary. In 2007, the PRI came out on top in 10 of 14 state elections. By mid-2008, the party was leading among independents, and more voters were identifying with it than any other. It also continued to do well at the state level, winning contests in Guerrero and Coahuila later in the year.
All of which explains why the PAN leadership has recently taken to weekly attacks on the party, reminding voters of the PRI’s 70 years of authoritarian rule, and its prior failures to control corruption or crime. But while those kinds of broadsides may go over well with the true believers, other Mexicans may be harder to convince. Many are not so sure they can put their finger on the benefits of democratic rule nearly a decade out, which, as it happens, has meant nearly a decade of PAN rule (at least at the presidential level). Felipe Calderón may be a savvier politician and a better negotiator than his predecessor, but so far, he hasn’t been able to prove that he is an able manager of the economy or the security situation.
That isn’t entirely his fault, but it probably makes some Mexicans nostalgic for the days of Ernesto Zedillo and PRI rule. A lot can happen in a few months in politics, but right now, the PRI still looks well-placed to benefit handsomely from the decline of its rivals.
