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January 26, 2009

What The Other Hand is Doing…

Filed under: Latin America — Jason Lakin @ 9:25 pm

Over the weekend, Mexican President Felipe Calderón’s administration officially published new laws to bolster the war on organized crime and drug violence. These laws will make it easier for law enforcement officials to do their jobs. Warrants will be obtainable through an oral request rather than requiring time-consuming formal petitions in writing. Undercover agents will receive greater legal protections. Citizens’ arrests of criminals will be permitted.

The government is also considering a bold new program to rely on so-called “sensors” in cities with high crime rates. The sensors are young men (17-24 year olds) who would work on a volunteer basis to prevent crimes and denounce them publicly when they occurred. A pilot program with 2,500 youths was already launched in four states in 2007: Guanajuato, Aguascalientes, Coahuila and San Luis Potosí. According to the federal Ministry of Public Security, the project is now ready to go national. The program is part of a larger attempt to build community policing and local social norms that can impede the culture of lawlessness, violence and impunity which has seized sectors of the population.

Taken together, the increased agility of law enforcement and the introduction of community policing seem like aspects of a good overall strategy. Reasonable people will agree that public security requires an approach that tackles the problem both from above and from below. Mexico’s government seems to be doing just this. On the one hand, they are improving government efficiency and accountability from above; on the other hand, they are instilling a sense of community and service among ordinary citizens from below.

But in contemporary Mexico, there are too many other hands that are undermining the government’s strategy. Some of these hands belong to the government itself: while the Calderón administration invests in small legal changes and community programs that may support the war on crime, the same government is infested with cartel informants. At least a dozen high-level counter-narcotics officials have been accused of accepting cash from the cartels in exchange for confidential information, and there is some evidence that the government has been taking sides: opting to bolster the Sinaloa cartel, while it cracks down on the Gulf cartel.

At the same time, as Mexican daily El Universal reports today, other hands have taken arms in the name of vigilante justice. The civilian para-military units began in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico’s most violent town. Apparently supported by local business people, a gang calling itself Citizen Commando for Juarez has said that it will kill one criminal per day to compensate for the state’s lack of enforcement. These types of groups have been spreading throughout Mexico, according to the newspaper. That is no surprise, since the violence now touches a vast swath of Mexican society, either directly or indirectly. Many middle class Mexicans know someone personally who has been kidnapped. There are a growing number of reports of private security guards turning on their employers and extorting them. And even where the violence has not touched people directly, its effects have often been dire. Earlier this month, citizens of four cities in Zacatecas were unable to access heating gas because the gas company’s workers had gone on strike. The reason? They were tired of being kidnapped and attacked.

Community policing and an agile legal code are good measures. But in a fight like the current one, they are half-measures. If a new para-military group is launched for every community policing program, then there is little chance of halting the culture of violence. And if you cannot trust the police, the army, or the private security forces, who can you trust besides yourself to protect you from the violence?

Furthermore, do “sensors” really stand a chance of intervening in a fight between para-militaries, the Mexican army, the cartels, and government turn-coats? Are citizens really going to arrest kingpins? And even if the average Mexican was able to lend a hand to honest law enforcement officials trying desperately to contain the violence, for how long would they volunteer to fight the bad guys? The gangs do, after all, promise better pay and at least as much security as that afforded to unarmed citizen police. Just ask the U.S. trained ex-military officials who were supposed to smash the cartels in the 1990s, but who work for the Zetas cartel now.

January 19, 2009

Closing Ranks

Filed under: Democratization, General, Latin America — Jason Lakin @ 9:12 pm

Mexican daily El Universal reports today that the striking fishermen of Oaxaca (see last week’s post) are considering a strategic alliance with the striking teachers of Oaxaca.  Oaxaca’s teachers have blockaded streets in Oaxaca this year (as they do virtually every year) to demand better pay and working conditions.  They are joined by the APPO, a social movement that garnered international media attention in 2006 when it took to the streets with the teachers to call for the ouster of the state’s unpopular governor, Ulises Ruiz. Ruiz famously responded with repression, which deepened his unpopularity. In the short-term, though, the repression worked: Ruiz held on to power, and the protests faded away.

The governor of Oaxaca still elicits deep-seated resentment, however. His term will draw to a close in 2010, and Mexico does not allow re-election, so Ruiz will have to step down in less than two years. His opponents could, therefore, opt to simply wait him out. But Ruiz will undoubtedly try, as authoritarian governors in Oaxaca have for decades, to impose his own successor. If he succeeds, the cycle of authoritarianism could continue in Oaxaca for another six years. So there are good reasons to rebuild and extend the coalition that took on the ruling PRI (which has never lost a gubernatorial election) in 2004, and then in 2006. A broad social coalition will be needed to stop Ruiz from engineering a coup in favor of his anointed successor in 2010. If the fishermen join hands with the teachers and the APPO this week, the seeds of such a coalition will be planted.

Mexicans are itching for change, not only in Oaxaca. And the 2009 congressional elections should provide an opportunity for the public to voice that itch. That is the purpose of mid-term elections in modern democracies. But while Mexicans have taken to the streets to protest insecurity, diesel prices, inflation and education policy in the past year, there seems to be a disconnect—not just in Oaxaca—between what political parties and elites are offering, and what these nascent civil society protesters are demanding.

Last week, most of the major political parties announced that they would be designating their candidates for 2009 from above, rather than through a primary process. Closing ranks in this way is rational for the parties, each of which is currently rent by major divisions. The PRD, for example, clearly is in no position to attempt internal elections again after it recently concluded a grueling nine-month debacle surrounding its leadership succession. The PAN, on the other hand, is torn between presidential insiders and those who are outside of the president’s immediate circle.  Elections could sharpen these divisions within the parties, weakening them at a time when they need to unify.

But while closing ranks may be a rational response to internal division, it risks further isolating the parties from social demands. Primaries and internal elections serve as a mechanism for transmitting public opinion to party leaders. Closing off this pathway leaves few other motivations for parties to adapt their policies to fit the desires of the electorate. This can be dangerous: when citizens cannot make their voices heard through normal democratic means, they are willing to support non-democratic alternatives. Recent reports of vigilante para-military groups dedicated to the assassination of criminals suggest that civil society can turn ugly when citizens feel that the government is ignoring their needs.

America’s 2008 presidential election, to be capped by tomorrow’s inauguration, suggests that democracies have the capacity to renew themselves through elections, allowing citizen demands to percolate up through the system and push elites in a new direction. In Mexico, which is currently confronting both an economic and a security crisis, let us hope that, in spite of politicians’ attempts to close ranks, citizen demands for greater economic and criminal justice also percolate up.

January 12, 2009

It’s the Diesel, Stupid!

Filed under: Economics, Latin America — Jason Lakin @ 10:26 pm

Mexico’s fishermen have been on strike for 11 days. The government initially tried to play down the extent of the Zero Fish protest, which began small in Sinaloa and Oaxaca, but spread quickly to other states. No longer. Last week, the protesters stood up the head of the National Aquiculture and Fishing Commission, and demanded to speak directly to the president of Mexico. They didn’t quite achieve that, but today, at last, they have secured a meeting with the cabinet-level Secretary of Agriculture.

The fishermen want the government to do something to clamp down on the accelerating cost of diesel fuel, which they use to power their fishing vessels. The world price of diesel, long a somewhat cheaper fuel, has been rising relative to gasoline for the past several years. The retail price is currently slightly above that of gasoline. The result of this spike in diesel prices has been a series of protests all over the world by truckers, fishermen and other industries dependent on diesel fuel. In the last couple of years, there have been major protests in countries as varied as the United States, Britain, Malaysia, India and now Mexico. Mexico is confronting a double diesel protest: while fishermen are heading toward the end of a second week on strike, truckers in Veracruz just began their own strike today against rising fuel prices. The truckers claim that their movement will also spread throughout Mexico. In all likelihood, faced with a plunging economy, an increasingly out of control crime situation, and rapidly advancing midterm congressional elections, the Calderón administration will want to find a way to stop both of these protests quickly. That will mean spending precious government resources to keep diesel prices down. In the event, the economic crisis means this can be justified, if it must be, as counter-cyclical demand boosting.

Mexico is an oil-producing country, so in theory, it can keep oil prices low for its own citizens, even if world market prices are exploding. But of course, oil producers want to sell their oil when world prices rise, and they lose out doubly if, instead of doing so, they subsidize local consumption. Mexico in particular relies on oil revenues for around 40 percent of government revenues. So the country keeps fuel prices relatively low (below market prices), but still allows them to track changes in world prices in order to reduce the opportunity costs of the subsidy.

Why are world diesel prices sky-rocketing? The answer appears to be simple: diesel is in demand. Europeans are driving more often, and have increasingly come to rely on fuel-efficient diesel cars. At least until recently, American car-makers were also moving in that direction. Meanwhile, refining capacity for diesel has not kept up with this increase in demand. Like escalating food prices last year which led to protests around the world, the politics of diesel reflect integrated markets in which demand in large (usually richer) countries can drive up prices in poor countries. In the case of foodstuffs, the increased demand for staples like corn to create biofuels in wealthier countries was blamed for increasing food prices around the world.

The Mexican government did not necessarily create the diesel problem, but like other developing countries around the world, it will need to find a local solution. In the short term, unfortunately, that solution will probably involve eco-disastrous fuel subsidies. But all need not be lost. Perhaps the administration can use this opportunity to promise short-term subsidies in exchange for longer-term investments in fuel efficiency that reduce the dependence of the economy on diesel. After all, every crisis is an opportunity in disguise. Right, Detroit?

January 11, 2009

Developing a Coherent National Security Architecture

Filed under: Intelligence — Harvard International Review @ 11:21 am

Gabriel Lajeunesse and Bill Wunderle are associates at Georgetown’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Walsh School of Foreign Service, where they co-teach a class on radical Islam and the war of ideas.

We face a number of significant challenges to US security interests. One of the next administration’s first acts should be to introduce rigor into our national security processes.

Transition provides opportunity; opportunity to rethink, renew, reorganize, opportunity to reinterpret and be reinterpreted. Perhaps never before has any President had so much at stake in getting it right as this—with the US engaged in two wars, both of which will be arguably won or lost during this administration, an economic crisis of global proportions, growing competition from China, the threat of a nuclear Iran, and a resurgent Russia to name just a few pressing issues. In his early days in office, President Obama should take the opportunity to organize an effective National Security Architecture. Interagency failures in the handling of Iraq and Afghanistan provide a window into needed reforms.

The National Security Council Staff

President Obama must continue to make conscientious choices as he fills out his National Security Council staff. It is the NSC staff that manage the interagency process for the President—the day to day working groups (currently Policy Coordination Committees, PCCs or sub-PCCs) that bring together the various departments of the US government to formulate policy options for the President and his National Security Council. The National Security Advisor is the captain of this elite team. General Jim Jones is an excellent choice. While some have advocated for massive national security overhaul, i.e. a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the interagency, much can be accomplished simply through good leadership; in that regard we are off to a good start.

The NSC staffers must also be experienced leaders and not just policy wonks. This is particularly crucial when dealing with our nation’s top priorities. It wasn’t until May 2007 that President Bush placed a senior leader in charge of policy development for Iraq and Afghanistan, Lieutenant General Doug Lute. Prior to that, a rising young star, Meghan O’Sullivan, held that seat, but was unable to overcome an environment of interagency backbiting over Iraq that became notorious. The youthfulness of the Bush NSC team was well known; and the decision to bring in more senior leadership has helped the interagency process immensely. Yet even after the appointment of LTG Lute, one has to wonder if it would not be more effective to have a single senior Presidential advisor for Iraq and another for Afghanistan. Our national security leaders need to have sufficient depth of knowledge, continuity, and focus. It may have been effective to have a single senior National Security Advisor and a couple of other senior assistants when looking at the world through “Cold War tinted lenses”; but this cannot be the case now. We should have senior policy advisors/drivers for all our top priorities—i.e. Iran, the Middle East Peace, China etc. These senior Assistant National Security Advisors could keep the interagency on-track with regularly scheduled work-product flowing through working groups to the Deputies Committee, and Principal’s Committee and NSCs as appropriate, to drive whole of government efforts in achieving US national security objectives.

Agencies also need to be agile in how they assign their senior staff to priority problems. The most senior military officers working Iraq or Afghanistan full time at the Pentagon are Colonels. These are the very best officers the services could find, for sure, but possibly not as senior as needed in wartime. The situation is similar across the interagency. If these really are our most pressing problems, they deserve the attention of our very best, very most experienced people.

The National Security Planning Process

In addition to improvements in personnel, the NSC must make some serious changes to its planning methodology (or lack thereof). The NSC should develop overarching regional plans that articulate the government’s desired end-state and strategic objectives and drive interagency action and link ends, ways and means to operationalize our foreign policy. Such an effort would allow for something that has yet to be done to date—a budget process grounded and linked to clearly articulated foreign policy objectives.

Interagency Structure

The interagency must also dedicate proper resources to supporting counterinsurgency and state-building enterprises. US Agency for International Development, State, US Department of Agriculture and Treasury are key actors and must prepare themselves to fully partner with the DoD in its deployments to contingency environments. Additionally, the international affairs budget must be appropriately funded to allow these agencies to fully lead or partner in hostile environments. Planning will go a long way to help justify these expenditures and help demilitarize what has been termed a militarized foreign policy.

By ensuring good leadership of the NSC process, implementing planning processes in the NSC, and properly resourcing the interagency we will optimize our ability to deal with complex challenges ahead.