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August 19, 2008

The Art of Begging

Filed under: Africa, Human RightsZehra Hirji @ 8:13 am

All over the developing world problems of poverty rage on and the greatest developments seem to not be in a solution, but rather in the strategy of begging. In cities all over places like India and Egypt there exist the “cripple-makers” a modern day beggar’s pimp who literally cripples or handicaps a beggar in some way in order to make him more pitiful towards passersby and thus more likely to receive donations. In sub-Saharan Africa beggars dress in their dirtiest of rags to line up outside churches on Sunday afternoons and outside mosques on Fridays in hopes to catch people when they are feeling their most generous. More and more children are being sent in to beg for money and are often able to cry on command and can be significantly more relentless and persistent than adults when it comes to begging for money. Children and adults even try and sell little things like tissues, prayer pamphlets, and especially gum for some extra change and sympathy.

The greatest moral dilemma an individual most often faces when coming across a beggar is how to help. Westerners are more likely to take on a pretentious approach refusing to donate money thinking that handouts only make the problems worse and remove the incitement for beggars to find their own jobs. While this approach certainly has merit, refusing to spare any extra change, but then forgetting to help out in any other way does nothing but promote the status quo and deny a beggar the opportunity for a lunch or even a mere piece of bread in a day.

With the worldwide food shortage and rampant inflation daily life is becoming more difficult for most people, but the poor are suffering the hardest. When obtaining food has become so difficult that one feels as though the best solution is amputating an arm or a leg it may be time for the international community to revaluate their goals and refocus their attention.

August 18, 2008

Popular Insecurity

Filed under: Development, General, Latin AmericaJason Lakin @ 2:35 pm

Last Friday, the Mexican government released results of a survey that it applies to affiliates of the Popular Insurance program, or Seguro Popular. The people who affiliate to Seguro Popular are those who are not covered by another public insurance program, which in Mexico, is always tied to the kind of employment one has. Government workers are covered by one insurance scheme, some private-sector workers by another, and so on.

The survey results show that 96 percent of SP users are satisfied with the program. Let’s put aside the fact that numbers that high rarely occur in honest surveys. It is worth asking how important high levels of user satisfaction are in the first place. Of course, it is a good thing if citizens like government programs. On the other hand, a government program should surely aspire to more than high approval ratings.

Imagine we create a public program that redistributes one dollar to all affiliates. We then go out and sign poor people up for this program. All they have to do is sign their name, and they receive a dollar. After receiving the dollar, I ask them if they are satisfied with the program. Plausibly, almost everyone will be satisfied with a program that demands nothing of users, and gives out free money. But does such a program actually make any difference? Obviously, it does not. Even someone who lives on a dollar a day, a common international poverty baseline, cannot live for more than one extra day with such a program.

This is, to be sure, an extreme example. But the point is that programs can achieve popularity by being easy and providing little without actually affecting the poverty rate, or the health of citizens. More important than citizen popularity, then, is the abysmal statistic, from the same survey, on how many people are actually getting all the medicines they are supposed to be getting. This number, on average, is 78 percent. It falls to 68 percent in the state of Chiapas. And in the state of Guerrero, one of Mexico’s poorest, only 50 percent of affiliates receive the medicine they have been prescribed. Perhaps more alarming, 34 percent of affiliates in Guerrero do not receive a single medication from the program. Nationally, that number is about 9 percent, less alarming, but hardly encouraging.

When an insurance program doesn’t insure people against medical expenses, we should be concerned. No popularity contest can change that. The program’s high approval ratings may indicate that poor Mexicans had such low expectations from the government before entering the program that anything is better than nothing. For example, maybe affiliates save a couple dollars on a consultation with a doctor. They are satisfied because they expected no help at all, even though they continue to have to pay out of pocket for their medication. Something is always better than nothing.

It is good to know that the Popular Insurance program is better than nothing. It would be nice to know that it was better than that.

August 16, 2008

Farewell Musharraf?

Filed under: GeneralOwen Barron @ 7:00 am

Amid all the hoopla surrounding the Russia-Georgia war, the spectacle of Parvez Musharraf’s impending impeachment or removal has largely gone unnoticed. I’ll direct you to two somewhat contradictory NYTimes articles here and here which cover the unfolding story. The first asserts that Musharraf is likely to resign within the next two days in order to avoid impeachment; the second insinuates that he’s likely to fight it out to the bitter end. I’ll believe the first—that Musharraf will indeed resign—since even the second article contains the following explanation:

Politicians across all parties, however, characterized the public insistence by Mr. Musharraf, a former military man, as a kind of last stand, a bravura performance that could not be maintained under the political reality that almost all of his support had evaporated.
If Mr. Musharraf does not step down voluntarily very soon, the man who succeeded him last year as army chief, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, will quietly make it clear he has to leave, said two senior Pakistani figures who declined to be named because of the sensitivity of the situation.
The army, which remains the most revered institution in Pakistan, does not want impeachment proceedings to begin, fearing it would be tarnished, several politicians said.

So we’re looking at a cornered politician in his last days. The deck is truly stacked against him; as the Times mentions, Musharraf was demolished in voting in the four provincial assemblies. Both sides had been looking at these votes are as a preview of Parliamentary impeachment voting. And the results aren’t good for Musharraf: in Sindh, for example, Musharraf didn’t even get one vote, and the Islamist MQM, who are his main allies, abstained.

Finally, as the above quote indicates, Musharraf has lost his last bastion of support, the army. Which means that the descriptions of Gen. Kiyani—quiet, apolitical—that we read last November must have been fairly accurate. (From Kiyani’s BBC Profile, 27 November 2007: “Some observers had also contended that Gen Kayani was too much “his own man” for Gen Musharraf to place faith in him. But Gen Musharraf chose to ignore these doubters when naming his successor in early October”).

This is not, however, by any means a substantial revision of Pakistan’s long-term status quo. Kiyani’s unwillingness to let Musharraf drag the army down with him simply reaffirms what we’ve seen repeatedly in Pakistan: The military protects itself. Not its individuals per se, but its institutional status and the many privileges that accompany that status. And this is particularly important when you consider how divided the civilian government is likely to be in the event of Musharraf’s departure. Asif Zardari, whose PPP has the majority in the anti-Musharraf coalition, seems to want the post. That’s a change from his apparent plan, as I discussed in March, to eventually become prime minister. Either way, he’ll face a challenge from Nawaz Sharif, who commands much of the remainder of the coalition. Sharif is unlikely to contest Zardari’s ascendancy, but the Times reports that he’ll insist on stripping the presidency of much of its power. Ironically, some of that presidential authority is power that Musharraf gave the office in just his final years.

What we may be looking at, then, is a restored civilian government that’s hopelessly divided on a number of key issues, and a military that, having shed Musharraf, once again has a free hand. That harks back to Benazhir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif’s experiences in the 1990’s, being constantly undermined by the army, but even they didn’t have to deal with intra-government challenges to their authority. Expect a lot of disappointment all around in the new government.

Finally, worth mentioning is that the United States, having firmly thrown its lot in with Musharraf, has found that it’s reduced to asking for a “dignified exit” for Musharraf. This doesn’t bode well for the US influence in the next government, who will surely remember how America held onto its puppet Musharraf until the last possible moment. I wrote the following in November, “I think the US has to decide, now, that our long-term chances for a relationship with Pakistan, which will eventually tend toward civilian rule, depends on us backing off from our support for Musharraf.” Forgive me then for reasserting this, and for stating that the US would be in much better standing with Pakistan’s new government had it displayed just a bit of evenhandedness about the situation.

Update: Careless research, or lack thereof, led me state that the MQM is Islamist, when in fact they are firmly secular. Thanks to our readers for catching this.

August 12, 2008

The New Censorship

Filed under: Culture, Economics, EuropeJessica Sequeira @ 11:34 am

Three days ago, the New York Times published a thought-provoking piece entitled “Today’s Kremlin: Too Elusive for a Solzhenitsyn?” Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, who died on August 3, was one of Russia’s greatest intellectuals. His novels criticizing Soviet labor camps got him imprisoned and exiled, as well as won him the Nobel Prize in 1970, and to an entire generation of Russian intellectuals he served as an emblem of what it means to speak truth to power.

His light, however, went out with not a bang but a whimper. Though reported widely in the mainstream Russian and Western presses, there was no national day of mourning, and many people either failed to recognize his name or ignored the coverage. Why should such a seemingly instrumental figure seem unimportant, and is there any space on the world stage for a public intellectual like Solzhenitsyn today?

These are the questions the Times article explores. Solzhenitsyn’s fame was certainly bolstered by his country’s history of an established intellectual class that views literature as a form of rebellion, but his Russia was also drawn in more clearly defined, Manichean lines than today’s. He was faced with an authoritarian government that shut down dissent in brutal ways, and his subject matter, his outspokenness, and his exile all served to make him a martyr to westerners. The crucial thing was that his work was read, both by his supporters and by those he decried. Writers with his kind of views in the Soviet days could count on a reaction of some sort, for the good or for the bad.

The link between literature and current events today, however, can seem more specious. The tendency is to think of books as something to analyze or read for pleasure and international politics as what’s happening in the real world. There are certainly many Russians with profound complaints against the current Putin administration (more will likely be added to their ranks in the wake of Russia’s recent invasion of Georgia), but there are no real leading lights among them, nor is there much public demand for a Solzhenitsyn-like figure.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was plunged into a period of almost undiluted capitalism. This shock therapy resulted in mass privatization, a huge gap between the rich and poor, corruption, and a confusion of values. In this “New Russia”, one would expect that ideas, like goods and services, could for the first time compete in a free market. This, however, has not been the case. The state still has something of a thumbhold on reigning ideas, using soft power to suppress. As the Times puts it:

“Mr. Putin’s system uses — or at least holds in reserve — methods that recall the old days. But it has been careful not to create martyrs. The chess genius Garry Kasparov, a respected intellectual who tried to found an opposition and pro-democracy movement, was not exiled, executed or sent to Siberia. He was simply sidelined by being effectively banned from state television, while being allowed to speak on the radio to like-minded liberals.

Similarly, while authors who explore Russia’s dark side, like Viktor Pelevin, Vladimir Sorokin and Viktor Erofeyev, have been branded “dangerous” by a pro-Putin youth group that flushed Mr. Pelevin’s books down the toilet, their books are still widely available. The journalist Anna Politskaya was assassinated after challenging the government — but by unknown gunmen rather than with the trappings of a show trial.”

The new censorship has nothing to do with banning books or sending rebels off to the gulags. It works instead by condemning dissidents to quiet irrelevancy. Liberals talk to fellow liberals, angry books languish in bookstores, and nothing gets done.

It would be naïve to try to stick it all to Putin, though. His government’s main tactic is to throw dissidents to the market, composed of ordinary citizens. It’s the citizens themselves, and the peculiar nature of the modern Russian economic system, that are responsible for most of the apathy, irony, and emasculation of the Russian opposition. As a frustrated young reader of Solzhenitsyn complains of his money-driven peers to another reporter, “The problem is that now, it’s all about consumption — this spirit that has engulfed everybody… People prefer to consume everything, the simplest things, and the faster, the better. Books are something that force you to think, reading books requires some effort. But they prefer entertainment.”

A Refugee’s Story

Filed under: Africa, Human Rights, ImmigrationKiran Bhat @ 9:09 am

Aside from his seven-foot stature, David Ngaruri Kenney’s life as an immigrant in the United States appears to be quite standard. He seems to be a first-generation pioneer who came to this country to work and is doing so successfully. Yet underneath the surface there is so much more to his story, and that is precisely why it needed to be told.

Over these past few months, I have had the privilege of working with Mr. Kenney during a summer internship. His life story affirms everything that is great about America’s promise, and everything that is broken with America’s immigration system. His memoirs trace back to his days as a simple tea farmer in central Kenya, through his violent persecution for leading a popular protest of fellow tea farmers against price controls and government regulation, and finally into his struggle to remain in his adopted home, the United States. The account of US Immigration Policy in Kenney’s autobiography is top-notch, with real-world context and analysis spelled out in simple language that the untrained can easily understand. Kenney’s account of his struggles alone have opened my eyes to the confusing and often confounding world of immigration law.

What makes Mr. Kenney’s struggle so awe-inspiring, though, is not his time as a heroic martyr in Kenya, his improbable escape to America, or even his courageous stand against myopic immigration officials. What stands out to me is the fact that this man, who barely knew English coming to this country, eventually studied his way to college and law degrees, all while going through his immigration ordeal. Needless to say, reading this book refreshed my resolve to take advantage of all that this country has to offer.

After working next to his office all summer, I now have a real understanding of Mr. Kenney’s life and his struggles, and I’m all the richer for it. Even if you don’t know Mr. Kenney personally, you cannot help but be depressed, inspired, saddened and thrilled all at once by his incredible story.

August 11, 2008

Crime and Punishment

Mexico is getting tougher by the day. It is old news that the military has been called out to bolster the police’s faltering role in the drug wars. More recently, however, the government seems to be falling over itself to make newer and stricter rules to both reduce crime and improve governance.

The impulse is understandable: the first half of 2008 has seen nearly as many kidnappings as all of 2007. Recently, one of the country’s top businessman (owner of a large sporting goods retail chain) was affected when his 14-year old son was kidnapped and a ransom paid. In spite of the payment, Fernando Martí was  still butchered. Citizens are organizing nationwide protests against the increasing insecurity.

Meanwhile, the Mexican government seems generally paralyzed. A major initiative on oil reform is embroiled in controversy in Congress. And oil reform is going relatively well compared to the rest of the governmental agenda: a recent report in Mexican daily REFORMA noted that, of the 37 ordinary working committees in the Mexican Congress, 23 have not yet met even once in 2008.

The president and his party are pushing for tougher penalties (e.g., lifetime imprisonment) for wayward officials that are involved in kidnappings. At the same time, congressional leaders are pushing for rules that will punish legislators who do not convene or attend legislative meetings, or propose sufficient legislation. The rules would make it harder for such legislators to occupy governing positions in the future.

Sticks, sticks and more sticks. In principle, there is nothing wrong with these punishments. Certainly, heinous crimes deserve heinous punishments, and poor performing legislators should be made to suffer in some way. Unfortunately, however, the reliance on these high profile sticks does not get at the underlying causes of either the violence or the governmental paralysis.

Violence in Mexico, like violence everywhere, is the result of complex factors. I do not pretend to explore them all here. Surely, the fact that an honest cop can’t make a decent living or do his job without fearing for his life is one factor. Equally, if not more important, increasing the penalties for certain crimes is laughable if no one is ever found guilty of these crimes in the first place. Mexicans in general, and Mexican criminals in particular, rightly believe their likelihood of being caught is low, so no punishment, however severe, is likely to matter. They believe this in part because of rampant corruption within the forces charged with law enforcement. This is the original problem in search of a solution: cops are corrupt. Punishing them severely only works if there is someone else who is not corrupt to make sure that the punishment is meted out, and fairly.

And punishing individual legislators for failing to be efficient seems bizarre in a system where political parties ultimately control almost everything that legislators do. Mexican legislators cannot be reelected, so they ultimately depend entirely on the party hierarchy for their next job. If the party hierarchy tells them to legislate, they will legislate. If it doesn’t, they probably won’t. Party leaders are the ones who should be forced to legislate, then, not individual legislators who can be made scapegoats for party failures.

More importantly, however, isn’t there something wrong with a democracy where legislators can get elected, do nothing, and keep working in public office? The breakdown is on the demand side of politics, where voters should be able to hold their representatives accountable, not the supply side, as the proposed laws seem to imply. It is the parties and the electoral system that need reform, because voters, not other legislators, should be punishing politicians who do not do their jobs. Silly rules to force people to come to meetings or propose laws do not get at the real problem, are easy to undermine by doing the minimum necessary without actually producing any quality legislation, and are anyway unlikely to be enforced.

The problem with sticks as public policy isn’t that the sticks are unfair. The problem is that a stick is too simple to deal with complex policy problems. Unfortunately, nearly all policy problems are complex. Try again, compañeros.

August 6, 2008

It’s (not) The Enforcement, Stupid…

Filed under: Immigration, Latin AmericaJason Lakin @ 1:42 pm

Last week, the New York Times reported on a new study by the Center for Immigration Studies. The study claims that a recent drop in the size of the immigrant population in the United States is partially due to the success of increased enforcement of existing statutes. This is a politically charged issue, and little serious analysis of it has been conducted. As the study’s authors note, some pro-immigration groups assert, usually without evidence, that no amount of enforcement will ever work. That claim is certainly suspect. Given that there have been moderate increases in enforcement in recent years, and moderate decreases in immigration (as the report demonstrates), it does seem worth asking the question: might enforcement actually be working?

It is an unfortunate time to ask this question, however, because we are in the midst of a weak economy, and immigration is fundamentally linked to the economy. The authors want to separate out the effects of economic decline from the effects of increased enforcement. But this would seem to be nearly impossible: since the economy has deteriorated at the same time as certain enforcement efforts have increased, the authors have little leverage for separating out these different potential causes of the decline in the immigrant population.

The study claims, however, that there is a slight difference in the timing of the economic downturn and the uptick in enforcement.   According to the study’s authors, the immigrant population started to drop before the employment rate fell, but after the increase in enforcement.   The data in the report do show that immigrant levels began to fall in September 2007 (after enforcement efforts were beefed up), but that the immigrant employment rate did not begin to fall until January 2008.

Although they have been criticized, I will accept the authors’ explanations of their estimation techniques as reasonable, and assume that, even if imperfect, they accurately reflect an underlying downward trend in immigration. I will also accept the view that, if immigration drops before employment, this is not simply the result of a lag in economic indicators of recession when compared to workers’ on-the-ground recognition of recession. In short, I will accept the premises of the authors’ arguments and their data.

However, even if we accept everything that the authors say about their own data in the report, we cannot come to the conclusion that enforcement has had any impact on immigration levels. The reasons are explained by the authors themselves. I highlight them below.

According to the data contained in the report’s Figure 2 (page 4), immigrant levels were rising from early 2006 until approximately September 2007. Note, however, that immigrant levels were constant between September 2006 and May 2007. Between July 2007 and September 2007, there is a big jump in the population of about a quarter million. This shock then subsides from September to about December/January 2008. The shock creates a “hump” in the data, with exceptionally high immigrant levels between July 2007 and December 2007. By January 2008, the hump has disappeared.

What is the cause of this hump? The hump is largely explained by the authors themselves as related to the public debate over U.S. immigration legislation which ultimately failed in the summer of 2007. The authors suggest that the hump could have been the result of optimism on the part of immigrants both inside of and outside of the country, which ultimately led to more immigrants both coming and staying.

If this is true, then the relevant decline in the immigrant population should not start from the peak of the hump, since the decline from the peak to the base of the hump is idiosyncratic, related to a specific moment in public policy history. The relevant decline begins only in January 2008, when immigration begins to fall below the steady state level it had reached before the hump began: the level it reached in May 2007. If we start in January 2008 and go up to May 2008, the immigration population does indeed drop substantially below its July 2007 level: by over half a million immigrants. But guess what else happened starting in January 2008? The unemployment rate, stable since May 2007, also began to rise. So the entire drop in immigration that is unrelated to the idiosyncrasies of the hump started at the same time as unemployment began rising. It is therefore impossible to argue that immigration began to fall before unemployment began to rise.

If there is no gap between the rise in unemployment and the fall in immigration, then there is no plausible way to separate out the effects of the economy from enforcement: the entire project falls apart. Given that we already know from previous recessions that economic factors matter, there is no reason to think that any additional explanatory power is gained by considering the effects of enforcement. By the authors’ own data, logic and explanations, then, nothing can be said about whether enforcement matters. The study’s conclusions are not supported by the study itself.

The Center’s report started with a good question. Unfortunately, that question is still waiting for an answer.