In Japan, the first days of May are ripe with national holidays. Most take advantage of this “Golden Week” to travel, spend time with relatives, or enjoy a much-deserved break from the tasking day-to-day of the salaryman. This year, 30,000 citizens chose to spend their time contributing to an undertaking considerably more daunting than the Japanese workweek: protecting Article 9, the war-renouncing clause of Japan’s constitution.
They were drawn together by the Global Article 9 Conference, a three-day event held in the cities of Tokyo, Hiroshima, Osaka, and Sendai. Organized by the Japanese non-profit “Peace Boat”, The Global Article 9 Conference attracted not just Japanese, but participants from all corners of the globe. It coincided with recent moves taken by conservative politicians to amend the constitution and facilitate deployment of the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) abroad. Organizers sought international support for their fight against constitutional revision, insisting that the principles enshrined in Article 9 should be adopted by other states committed to global peace. The Conference’s many guest speakers, including Nobel Peace Laureates Mairead Corrigan Maguire (1976), Wangari Muta Maathai (2004) and Jody Williams (1997), supported this message.
The Global Article 9 Conference was noteworthy not only for its passion and energy, but also as a mirror of current growth of anti-war advocacy in Japan. As the government picks up speed and threats to the Japanese constitution intensify, citizens are organizing en masse against remilitarization. Peace Boat is one of many interest groups formed since the year 2000 to advocate for retention of Article 9. With the cause neglected by opposition parties and courts, such groups assume the burden of blocking the vehement revisionism of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). However, in a nation where advocacy organizations have historically been discouraged, scrutinized and regarded with suspicion, will Peace Boat and its allies be able to meet the challenge?
Article 9 of Japan’s constitution explicitly bars the state from maintaining a military and from the “use of force as means of settling international disputes.” The provision, drafted by U.S. officials after World War II, loses some of its explicitness when translated into Japanese. Shortly after the end of U.S. occupation, General Douglas Macarthur encouraged Japan to develop a defense force of its own, emphasizing that such a body would not conflict with Article 9. Conservatives eager to restore Japan’s military independence agreed. The result was the JSDF, which has grown to be one of the best-funded forces in existence. For many Japanese, and especially those old enough to remember the horrors of World War II, it represents a disturbing move toward remilitarization and a blatant breach of the constitution.
Until the 1990s, the JSDF never operated abroad. With the onset of the First Gulf War, however, international pressure mounted (especially from the United States) for Japan to participate more fully in multilateral security measures and UN peacekeeping operations. In response, legislation was passed in 1992 that empowered Japanese troops to act as peacekeepers given five conditions: a standing ceasefire agreement, consent of the host nation, operational neutrality, the use of force for immediate self-defense only, and the withdrawal of the JSDF if any of the above conditions are violated. Since then, Japan has deployed its military following case-by-case approval of a “special measures law”. One such law was the Special Measures Law on Anti-Terrorism. Passed in 2006, it allowed Japan to provide logistical support to the United States and Coalition forces in the “War on Terror”. The law was repealed after opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won a majority of seats in the upper house of parliament in the July 2007 election.
Pressure for revision rose during the premiership of Abe Shinzo, who resigned last summer amid scandal caused by lost pension records. Before leaving office Abe obtained passage of a law that calls for a national referendum on revision to be held as early as May 2010. Current Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo takes a more reserved stance on the issue, but with a deadline set pressure has mounted on Japanese antimilitarists to organize a united front capable of blocking revision.
Opposition parties are not viable vehicles for doing so. They rarely win. Since its establishment in 1955, the LDP has enjoyed almost uninterrupted majority in both houses of the Diet, as the legislature is known. In moments when majority is untenable, the LDP constructs coalitions with weaker parties to maintain de facto leadership. Despite the LDP’s tendency toward rearmament, its politicians are consistently elected because they have historically proven themselves capable of managing the economy.
Opposition parties also have a reputation for abandoning their pacifism when politically convenient to do so. This happened to the former Japan Socialist Party, a longtime supporter of Article 9, which dropped its absolute stance on the issue to ally with the LDP in the 1990s. Likewise, the New Komeito Party, despite its Buddhist roots, has currently put aside the issue of pacifism to engage in coalition.
Things could be changing. The July 2007 election brought an unprecedented majority for the DPJ in the upper house of the Diet. Although the LDP still retains control of the premiership and the more powerful lower house, the DPJ has used its new position to block a variety of legislation, including the Special Measures Law on Anti-Terrorism. Yet, so far the constitution has not been a driving concern of the party, which seems more interested in advancing its position in Japanese politics.
Courts are similarly ineffectual. In general, the Japanese judiciary resigns itself from political debates. It is not an effective auditor of policy. This is especially true of Japan’s Supreme Court, which ruled years ago that the military issue was “too political” for review, even where the constitution is concerned. The Supreme Court also places tight restrictions on which cases can be considered as constitutional claims. As Craig Martin notes in a special for the Japan Times, “using the courts to review government deployment of troops is all but impossible.” This is ironic, considering that one of the strongest lobbies in support of Article 9 is the Japan Federation of Bar Associations.
Regardless, in recent years there has been an increase in lawsuits filed over the unconstitutionality of the JSDF. Usually these cases are dismissed without much thought. But every rule has its exceptions. Recently the Nagoya High Court chose to overturn its decision to dismiss such a case, ruling that the deployment of the JSDF to Afghanistan and Iraq is, indeed, unconstitutional. The court did not find, however, that any of the 1,100 plaintiffs were warranted compensation. Nor did it mandate that that the government consider withdrawal of troops. Although some peace activists herald the decision as historic, the ruling is unlikely to impact the practice of government.
With opposition parties and courts out of the picture, the burden falls on civil society organizations to pick up the slack. This is not a position for which they have been historically well equipped. Japan’s civic landscape is still very colored by its Confucian roots, which emphasize that individuals should put aside personal concerns to strive for the greater public good. In Japan, disputes are generally dealt with by seeking consensus; it is uncommon for people to wittingly assert their interests over others. As such, advocacy organizations are often regarded with suspicion as they, by definition, involve the declaration of one group’s beliefs against those of other members of society.
Regulatory barriers also exist. In order to register for corporate status, necessary to receive tax-deductible donations and other such benefits, civic groups must adhere to a somewhat arbitrary criterion of “public interest” determined by bureaucrats.
Recently Japan’s public sphere has opened somewhat, creating a space in which groups like Peace Boat can operate. With the puncture of the ‘bubble’ economy, citizens’ faith in their government has been shaken. As a result, fringe political issues such as remilitarization are attracting more attention, as evident in the growth of anti-war advocacy in recent years. The rise of the Internet has been especially significant. Many pro-Article 9 groups rely on websites to coordinate events and spread their message to potential supporters. Recent legal reforms have been influential as well. Inspired by volunteer outpour following the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, in 1998 the Diet passed the NPO Law that notably lowers the bar for corporate status.
Youth are more ambivalent on the issue of Article 9, because they do not harbor the same memories of postwar hardship as their elders. The LDP aims to capitalize on this divide; Abe’s law lowers the voting age from 20 to 18 for the referendum. For the peace movement to succeed, younger generations need to be convinced of the imperative of blocking revision. Organizations such as the Japanese Youth Association recognize this necessity and focus their advocacy on younger citizens.
Although Japan’s peace network is robust, it is fragmented. Anti-war organizations do not always collaborate with each other. The Article 9 Association, which boasts over 5,000 regional branches and the membership of several prominent intellectuals, acts as an umbrella organization for peace groups. Nevertheless, it did not endorse the Global Article 9 Conference because it was not carried out under its auspices.
Peace Boat should be commended for the Global Article 9 Conference. If Article 9 is to be retained, though, more action is needed. Anti-war activists are faced with many obstacles, including ineffective opposition parties, sheepish courts, and a historically restrictive public sphere. If they truly desire to influence government, they must unite and inspire others, especially youth. Otherwise, Article 9 as it stands today could become a thing of the past.
