2 Harvard International Review Blog » 2007 » November

November 20, 2007

Punk’d by the Great Satan

Filed under: Culture, General, Middle East — Owen Barron @ 1:20 pm

This article on BBC caught my eye. I suppose it’s the part of the US counter-terrorism strategy where it wins the Arabs’ hearts and minds…but really, MTV?

From the article:

The music and youth lifestyle channel MTV has launched an Arabic service it hopes can tap into a booming appetite for Western-influenced culture.

MTV says it hopes to respect local culture without diluting its brand.

The MTV Arabia service will screen Arab music videos, talent shows, and international programmes like Pimp My Ride adapted for Arab audiences.

My first reaction when I saw this was to compare it to the recent launches of Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra TV, which seem to be aimed at the young, socially-liberal demographic in the Arab world. This is a real demographic, to be sure, and we needn’t marginalize the success of something like Radio Sawa, which has apparently achieved 94% penetration within the target audience (I’m skeptical of that figure, but it no doubt reflects the station’s general popularity). My beef with Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra is that instead of complementing a more traditional Arabic public diplomacy effort from the US government, it seems to have replaced it entirely. Voice of America has shut down its Arabic division—which, to be fair, was hardly a stellar news source—in favor of the new stations. The problem is that VOA’s demographic was mostly 40-50 year old professional men with an interest in politics. They’re certainly not going to be tuning in to Christina Aguilera. And so the US loses an audience that is now going exclusively to Al-Jazeera for news. I’m not going to play the “Al-Jazeera is a bunch of America-hating terrorists” card, but we can’t imagine that the US gets a fair shake on the network.

Of course, this isn’t relevant to MTV, which has no responsibility to serve anyone but its target audience. So why does MTV believe that “the channel can act as a cultural unifying force in a region known for political tension”? Thinking that Arabs would unite around Britney Spears, or even indigenous pop stars like Egypt’s Ruby or Lebanon’s Nancy Ajram, is as ridiculous as thinking that Arabs unite around bin Laden and burning effigies of Bush. There’s definitely a cultural diversity that’s completely ignored when considering countries foreign to us. Does MTV act as a unifying force in the US? Hardly.

Also: How do you adapt “Pimp My Ride” for an Arab audience? Discuss.

November 18, 2007

The Paranoia of Dictatorship

Filed under: General — Owen Barron @ 5:37 pm

Have Robert Mugabe and his administration entered the paranoid and defensive mode of their totalitarian regime? Or do they have legitimate cause for concern? The BBC reports that Mugabe and his government are worried about a possible invasion by Britain, and consider themselves ready to respond to the “sinister threats” of the British. This isn’t completely out of the blue: it comes as a response to comments made by Britain’s former Army Chief, Lord Guthrie. Guthrie mentioned in an interview with the UK Independent that government figures, including Prime Minister Blair, had asked him to consider an invasion of Zimbabwe, as a response to the political violence that enveloped the country in the months before the 2002 election. Guthrie’s advice: “’Hold hard, you’ll make it worse.’”

It’s fairly clear that the UK was not on the verge of invading Zimbabwe in 2002, and even more clear that the military option is not on the table as of now. Britain is bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and its people are war-weary. Even in 2002, the consideration seems to have been merely an internal government dialogue, and would have required in any case a good few months of demagoguery to sell the war to the British public. That doesn’t stop Mugabe and co. from spreading the hysteria, though. From the BBC article:

“The government was aware of the plans and the president made reference to the sinister [British] motives on several occasions,” he was quoted as saying.
“A defence plan had been operationalised and in fact, it is still in operation. We were also aware that short of a fully-fledged invasion, the British were and are still contemplating the elimination of our political leadership through a number of assassinations,” said Mr Charamba.

We know enough about Mugabe to be skeptical about any of his claims, or those of his government. Still, it’s worth noting that Pius Ncube, the top cleric in Zimbabwe, has called on Britain to do exactly what Mugabe fears, and remove him. “We should do it ourselves but there’s too much fear,” Ncube said. “I’m ready to lead the people, guns blazing, but the people are not ready.” Numerous Western critics, most notably James Kirchick in the New Republic, have considered the same idea. I think, along with most of the Western world, that Mugabe’s time is long since over, if indeed his rule was ever legitimate, which Kirchick disputes. Removing Mugabe through the power of the formerly-imperialist British military, which Zimbabwe liberated itself from just 27 years ago, probably isn’t the best approach, though.

Dancing the Dance: US Diplomacy and Pakistan

Filed under: Defense/Military, Democratization, General, Geopolitics, Human Rights, Middle East, National Politics, South Asia, Terrorism — Owen Barron @ 1:43 am

It’s fascinating to watch the US reaction to the events in Pakistan. I’ve been saying it for a while: the Pakistan case is one of the most succinct encapsulations of the dilemmas of US foreign policy in the Middle East. The key elements are: a US-supported autocrat, violent Islamists, moderate Islamists, and secular opposition. We see more or less the same pattern in Egypt, and the trend of an unpopular US-supported dictator is common across the Middle East. In this way, it’s not unlike the Iranian revolution. One thing I thing which I think is crucial to understanding this is how much of a role the non-Islamists are playing. I went this summer to a speech by Tariq Fatemi, the former Pakistani envoy to Washington, who says the big trend here is the galvanization of Pakistan’s civil society. The connection to Iran, then, is that we have a similar storm of opposition to the regime, ranging from die-hard Islamists to the most secular liberals. And if Musharraf persists in his antics, what are the chances that the Islamist voice will be louder? That’s what happened in Iran, though I’m obviously oversimplifying the case. Khomeini wasn’t the only leader, but he was the most visible and charismatic. I think the US has to decide, now, that our long-term chances for a relationship with Pakistan, which will eventually tend toward civilian rule, depends on us backing off from our support for Musharraf. Killing terrorists now is one thing; completely losing the trust of the people for the long term is another one. Can’t you just see the discussions twenty years from now when we’re dealing with a ruthless Islamist regime in Pakistan whose people hate their rulers but hate the US even more, because when we had a chance to support democracy, we paid for Musharraf’s bullets instead? As a realist consideration, we should back off from Musharraf and let him know our support is not unconditional.

November 13, 2007

State of Emergency, Continued

Filed under: General — Julia Choe @ 12:13 am

To see what Benazir Bhutto wrote about the Pakistani military regime in Spring 2002, see http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/963/1/. Enjoy!

November 10, 2007

Georgia Defaults to Autocracy—Again

Filed under: Democratization, Europe, General — Owen Barron @ 7:19 pm

If you’re a big fan of the arbitrary abuses of government power, or you happen to have a penchant for watching state police tear-gas their own civilians, well, 2007 is certainly the year for you. We’ve seen an already-autocratic state in Burma move from merely “oppressive” to “brutal,” witnessed the steady regression of Pakistan back towards de facto military rule, and now in Georgia, we see the sudden imposition of emergency law to counter what has been a week of vehemently anti-government protests. Of course, if you happen to support—for whatever reason—representative government and a fundamental respect for civil liberties, then the recent events in Georgia should give you cause for concern.

I wrote about the relations between Georgia and Russia in the Spring 2007 issue of the HIR, in the context of their diplomatic warfare of the past two years. I acknowledged that each party had legitimate concerns—the status of breakaway republics South Ossetia and Abkhazia, for one, and the future of Georgia-Russia economic relations. But I also argued that the two have much to cooperate over, such as terrorism, organized crime, drugs, and so forth. Russia would have to acknowledge Georgia’s move towards the West, and Georgia would have to eventually allow self-determination for the separatist states, but their relationship need not be fundamentally damaged.

I assumed, perhaps naively, that Georgia was interested in true cooperation. It seems instead that Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili is less interested in dealing with Russia than with leveraging his battle for Russia for external and internal political gain. Externally, he emphasizes to the EU and the US his disagreements with Russia—no great friend of the West—to gather support for his suppression of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And internally, he highlights the threat of Russia to justify his arbitrary suspension of civil government. Apparently he blames the recent unrest within Georgia on Russian spies and interlocutors who want to destabilize his regime.

In reality, the protestors his police eventually tear-gassed were protesting the corruption that remains endemic within Georgian politics and the economy. At first blush, this might be surprising: Georgia has, since the beginning of Saakashvili’s rule, undergone one of the most aggressive anti-corruption campaigns in recent years. Saakashvili, a Western-educated lawyer, is dedicated to promoting free and transparent markets and has been award high marks in his reforms by the World Bank and the OECD. Apparently, however, the stain of corruption is not so easy to wash out, particularly when it accompanies the high unemployment rates that free-market reforms often trigger. It is this combination of corruption and umemployment that led to protests, not the insiduous influence of Moscow (which is admittedly very real).

So while Georgia has been temporarily pacified by Saakashvili’s promise to hold elections in January, a full year earlier than required by the constitution, concerns will remain about the president’s commitment to democracy. Saakashvili initially approved of the protests, saying that free people should have a right to demonstrate peacefully against their government, but he evidently decided that there was only so much free speech he could take. It is unlikely that any opposition leader—save perhaps billionaire tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili, who just announced—will seriously challenge Saakashvili’s bid for reelection. And neither is the continuation of Saakashvili’s presidency—which has limited corruption while producing growth rates above 12%–a necessarily bad thing. But a regime that feels it can call in the troops whenever the people get just a bit too rowdy, is one that serious democrats should regard with extreme caution.

November 3, 2007

State of Emergency

Filed under: General, South Asia — Kiran Bhat @ 3:52 pm

Things have finally come to a head in Pakistan. The violence and agitation which has poured into Pakistan’s streets over the past few months has led President (and de facto dictator) Pervez Musharraf to declare a state of emergency. The consitution has been suspended, and all real power placed in the hands of the military and by extension the army chief, Musharraf himself. Unlike previous measures which Musharraf took to quash enemies over the summer, the declaration of martial law is almost universally unpopular and has neither domestic nor western support.

While Musharraf claimed in an address to the nation that he had taken action because Pakistan was a “dangerous” stage in its history in which militant groups were coalescing and terrorizing the entire nation, the facts belie a blunt alternate reality; Musharraf’s star is fading fast, and there is little else he can do to save himself from sure political death. At the forefront of Musharraf’s problems is the Chief Justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court, Ifthikar Muhammad Chaudhry. Musharraf’s sacking of Chaudhry in March led to organized street protests in Islamabad and Karachi, which quickly turned violent . In an attempt to save face, Musharraf reinstated Chaudhry in July. Chaudhry’s return led to a reassertion of authority by Pakistan’s historically independent judiciary – in fact, Chaudhry and company were set to rule on the legality of last months suspect national elections, in which Musharraf was reelected. The inertia of anti-Musharraf sentiments in Pakistan, coupled with a respected enemy in Chaudhry, made the writings on the wall clear. And so the President acted.

Only a year ago, Musharraf appeared to be the most stable among the plethora of unelected leaders in the Muslim world. By largely preserving freedom of the press, supporting the West’s war on terror rhetorically, and masquerading as a democrat by paying lip service to his nation’s constitution while defanging it of all legitimate checks on the executive, Musharraf gained general acceptance both at home and from powerful allies abroad. His fall from grace following this outward expression total power could be meteoric, or as is more likely, might not happen at all. Much rides on two major factors.

The first and by far the most important is how Pakistan’s people react to martial law. If Musharraf tries to order his military to kill or crack down on civilian protesters, he would lose all international legitimacy and would raise the ire of his own countrymen, likely leading to his demise. The Pakistani people have shown that they are ready and willing to march against Musharraf when he does things that are anathema to the national interest. However, chances are that protesters will have a much harder time organizing under the stringent new rules (including roundups of agitators, curfews and absence of communications) than they did when Chaudhry was sacked. And deprived of their major mouthpiece in Chaudhry himself, who has been under house arrest since the state of emergency was declared, any popular movement would not have the same vehemence or organization as it once may have. Other potential protest leaders seem inert. Former prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Bhenazir Bhutto, who are both abroad, urged uprisings. Sharif left the country less than a day after returning last month, and Bhutto was nearly killed in a (possibly Musharraf-engineered?) bombing before she succumbed to apparent fear and fled. Needless to say, both will have a hard time returning to a nation under martial law to lead protests.

The second factor which will determine Musharraf’s future is international reaction. Local powers China, Russia and India have kept mum on the issue since Musharraf’s declaration. The EU has already condemned the emergency. The Bush Administration, a Pakistani ally since 2001, has strongly hinted that it opposed, and will continue to oppose, martial law. Secretary of State Rice is said to have called Musharraf at two in the morning Pakistan time earlier this week to urge him to reconsider, and has said that any rash action could lead to a break in American funds to the Pakistani military. If Musharraf loses his only real ally in the West over his declaration, he may find it harder to continue the charade of legitimacy both abroad and at home. But realistically, America has a vested interest in keeping Musharraf in power – a stable Pakistan is vital to American interests in Afghanistan and really, across the Muslim world. In addition, chances are that neither the US nor India would be particularly pleased with a potential Islamist alternative to Musharraf. Don’t be surprised if Musharraf manages to hold on via Western enablers, even if they don’t support him publicly.