2 Harvard International Review Blog » 2006 » March

March 21, 2006

Why “The Lobby” Really Matters

Filed under: North America, Theory — Doug Lieb @ 3:24 am

Academics will usually accept all the press they can get. But it’s never good to make headlines because David Duke has declared his support for your position.

Last week, Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer – two respected international relations theorists, the former of whom is the dean of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government – released a controversial working paper, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.” The paper’s basic argument is that US financial, political, and military support for Israel is unprecedented and contradicts basic US strategic interests. The authors attribute this unusual policy to the power of the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, focusing particularly upon the influence of the American Israel Political Action Committee (AIPAC) in Congress and the Pentagon. (The paper can be found here by scrolling down to the bottom of the page.)

Readers should evaluate the argument’s merits for themselves. While the distinguished authors may lend their perspective fresh credibility, the notion that a pro-Israel lobby greatly influences US foreign policy is not a novel idea; as such, the paper is unlikely to change many opinions about US policy toward Israel. It is very likely, however, to generate a media frenzy – particularly because Walt and Mearsheimer pointedly call the famously media-savvy Israel defender Alan Dershowitz an “apologist.” The popular debate is sure to be vitriolic, and it may be marked by charges of anti-Semitism even though Mearsheimer and Walt differentiate the pro-Israel lobby from the sort of sinister “Jewish conspiracy” that is the favorite bogeyman of anti-Semites.

What’s already being overlooked in the nascent controversy over the paper is its importance for decades-old debates in the international relations literature. John Mearsheimer is an arch-realist, the dean of the theoretical movement that conceives of states as unitary actors pursuing survival in an anarchic international system. Walt is also a realist, although perhaps a less traditional one. Their argument in “The Israel Lobby” explicitly contravenes one of realism’s central assumptions: that states are unitary, rational actors whose domestic politics are largely irrelevant since basic security concerns dominate international interactions. This paper makes a fundamentally anti-realist argument. In fact, Mearsheimer and Walt seem to object to US policy toward Israel precisely because the policy contradicts realist expectations by, in their view, elevating domestic political considerations above more basic strategic goals.

Mearsheimer and Walt aren’t making a new point about Israel. But they are making a break from a very important set of ideas with which they’ve long been closely identified. Let’s not allow David Duke to distract us from that.

Are you an “Aussie,” mate?

Filed under: Culture, East Asia/Pacific — Huilin Wang @ 2:31 am

Ben Arnoldy noted on last Wednesday’s issue of the Christian Science Monitor that Australian cultural differences are escalating into a much more daunting and imperative public issue in the land down under. Three months ago, attacks on off-duty lifeguards on the beaches in the Conulla area by young men of Lebanese descent had forced the Australian government to look at the reality of the various minority Asian and aboriginal groups that consider themselves citizens of the Commonwealth. The Lebanese gangs had been stirring up problems on beaches for some time by taunting women or instigating fistfights. Many of these men were (and still are) frustrated by the latent racism of Australian public policy and such frustration had ultimately escalated into riots of both Lebanese and ethnic Anglo Australians in December.

Prime Minister John Howard does little to improve the situation. His refusal to accept the fact that racism has been burgeoning in Australia since the end of a “White Australia Policy” in the 1970s prevents Australian federal and local governments from abandoning their static, negligent policies. The view of a self-proclaimed “tolerant and decent” Australian society has slowed down any movement toward shunning racisn and embracing multiculturalism, an –ism that the second in power, Treasurer Peter Costello, calls “confused, mushy, misguided.”

The former policies of “White Australian” are being strained as groups, especially the growing Muslim populations, seek to identify themselves with ethnic and cultural roots that are not those of the Australian tradition more and more. Older arguments advocating homogenization had been instituted to avoid distasteful behavior such as child brides of the aboriginals or the taunting of women in bikinis on the beach by Muslims. But beyond some very specific reasons, it has been hard to justify national identity and conformity to majority values as rationale for the complete suppression of other innocuous values. We know that forced integration and homogenization has never been an effective policy. Take France for example. Their restrictions on the Muslim population, in addition to smaller minority groups, have sparked anger and violence that escalated into weeks of fires and riots this past November. One burning question exists. Can Australian citizens take up a unified Australia identity and encourage nationalism without destroying diversity?

Complements to the advocates of education in multiculturalism call for the education of children and immigrants of Australian national values. Some analysts have used the model of the United States, a country much more ethnically diverse than both France and Australia, to assess this dilemma of national identity. Part of what makes someone “American” comes not from his or her “whiteness” but from the shared values that are “American.” Beyond the national language, one of the most successful factors has been the fact that second-generation citizens are “home-grown Americans” who grow up loving freedom, democracy, and other traditionally emphasized American values. Citizens of the United States cherish the Constitution and the principles of “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness”; thus, most avoid the tense isolation that many minority groups in Australia feel.

The establishment of firm national values and a less wishy-washy multicultural policy have been the recent tasks of Thu Nguyen, a director in the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs in Canberra. Nguyen said, “All of us have to observe our democratic principles, the rule of law, equality of the sexes, English as the national language – the basic democratic values we have to put first. Within that framework, people are free to observe their own cultural practices.”

Perhaps this idealistic proposal is simply that: ideal and unattainable. However, regardless of the results of such an ambitious agenda, many Australians will have trouble ignoring the growing problem of racism in an evermore diverse country.

March 20, 2006

Blaming the ICTY

Filed under: Europe, International Institutions — Meredith Moore @ 10:52 pm

Many are calling Slobodan Milosevic’s death a failure for the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)–another strike against the idea of an international body of justice. They lament the slow pace of the trial that has dragged on since February 2002. But these problems are not the fault of the ICTY.

Milosevic died of natural causes on March 10 in his prison cell of The Hague at the age of 64. His death may not provide the justice that millions of people around the world are craving, but there is nothing the ICTY can do to rectify that. The man charged with 66 counts of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes and held responsible for the deaths of over a quarter of a million people will never be formally convicted or exonerated.

The seriousness of Milosevic’s charges necessitated a lengthy trial. For example, he was allotted 360 hours for his defense, which may seem an inordinate amount of time, but accusations like genocide cannot be addressed in a few weeks in court. Some have argued that he should have been held on lesser counts that would have still called for life in prison, but this was a man spearheading a war to unite Serbs and ethnically cleanse others, and bringing him to justice required a slew of charges. It is clear that few are satisfied with his death, and even fewer would have been satisfied if he were imprisoned for anything less than his 66 counts. In addition, his previous health problems caused multiple long delays in the trial, which was certainly one of the reasons that it lasted so long. The court could do nothing to speed up the process.

One must look at the success of the ICTY before blaming it for circumstances out of its control. It arrested a man still in charge of his country, taking him out of power and holding him accountable to not just his government, but to humanity. This is a huge step for the international community; the court presents a way to punish tyrants and commanders of genocide, and the world is beginning to take note. The International Criminal Court (ICC) began operations in 2002, and it too is taking on leaders charged with responsibility for war crimes, though it has not yet tried a case. This new international court is following the precedent of the ICTY and other ad hoc tribunals. The ICTY is thus not without its problems, but it still has revolutionized the way that the world looks at its leaders.

March 7, 2006

Israeli Elections

Filed under: Middle East, National Politics — Noam Lerer @ 3:56 pm

On March 28, three weeks from now, Israel will hold its first elections since the incapacitation of Ariel Sharon. After Sharon’s second stroke, many analysts predicted that his successor, whoever he would be, would not be able to stand in the shoes of this larger-than-life character. Others thought that simply choosing a leader would be a hard enough feat. Kadima, supposedly a party built by the will of one man and held together strictly by the ambitions of its varied members, was going to fall apart. Once the spike (to 44 seats) caused by Israeli sympathy subsided, the tough questions would remain.

But Kadima held together. A new leader, Ehud Olmert, was chosen, with no competition. Shimon Peres was convinced not to jump ship, and the party continued. Then the critics wondered how Ehud Olmert would perform. Olmert, unlike Sharon, it was wagered, would not be able to have such ambiguity about his future plans and simply say to the people “trust me.” He would have to unveil a real policy, one open to criticism, which might erode his support. And this famously blunt man, who could never be a father figure like Sharon, would not be able to build the same consensus.

But a funny thing happened. Olmert did lay out a platform, a clear one. He has made it clear that the West Bank will get its funding slashed in the next Knesset and that its position is precarious. In a move barely, if at all, reported by the Western media, he did something Sharon never dared to do: evacuated illegal outposts in the West Bank. The move hit closer to home for the settler movement than the evacuation of Gaza, and there was violence. But he persevered.

Since Sharon’s stroke, corruption scandals have plagued Kadima, enveloping a cabinet minister as well as Sharon’s son. Hamas swept to power in the Palestinian Authority, a move that should have drastically increased support for the right and hurt Kadima. Despite all of this, Kadima is still at 37 seats, nearly double that of Labor, its nearest rival; it is almost certain that it will win the election.

What is happening here? And why are trends in Israel so strikingly different from the PA?

It would seem that a new consensus has emerged in Israel, one far more durable than was previously imagined, and, among English-speaking publications, noted only by the Israeli Jerusalem Post. This consensus appears to be that Israel cannot stay in the Palestinian territories, but also that there is no partner to be trusted. The solution has been to disengage from the territories while continuing to take the precautions suitable to the low-scale war that has not yet ended. Israeli unilateralism is not, then, simple a knee-jerk or desperate reaction, but carefully considerd: withdraw from the territories (barring some territory as a bargaining chip), build a fence, and let the PA run itself and prove to the world that it is not yet a responsible government.

This, in my opinion, explains why the election of Hamas has not hurt Kadima. The current status quo is good for Israel: for every day the leaders of the PA refuse to curb terrorism, refuse to recognize Israel, and refuse to impose order on the land they already rule, Israel seems more and more like the responsible side, waiting for a partner capable of achieving peace.

While the PA stews in its own juices, the Israeli economy has gotten out of its recession. While chaos and violence tear the PA proto-state apart, the separation barrier has substantially lowered incidents of terrorism in Israel. While the Palestinians refuse to confront the extremists in their midst (or even elect them), Israel continues to confront its own extremists and exclude them from political consensus.

More important than the fact that the current arrangement has staying power is the fact that it has allowed Israel, for the first time in more than a decade, to focus on itself at least as much as on the Palestinian conflict. Amir Peretz, the Labor leader, has shifted much of the focus of Israeli politics to economics. None of this would have been possible had disengagement not created an atmosphere in which the fate of Palestine became almost wholly the responsibility of the Palestinians.

I believe that Kadima will continue to maintain its lead and form the next coalition after the elections. I also believe that, for all the current fear of a legitimized Hamas continuing a crusade to destroy Israel, that Israel is nevertheless in a better long-term position. Israel is in a position to withdraw to secure borders, turn itself inward, and wait. It is now up to the PA to determine whether it can build a viable state, one capable of achieving prosperity and achieving peace.

March 2, 2006

What Taiwan Should Give Up for Lent (Its President)

Filed under: East Asia/Pacific, National Politics — Linda Li @ 12:16 am

How many more “grave provocations” is Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian willing to risk before China initiates an attack on the island?

The communist government of the People’s Republic has been suspicious of Chen since before he was elected to the executive office. His narrow victory during the 2004 presidential election is still fresh in the minds of Chinese officials and voters. Both groups are still skeptical of the failed assassination attempt and probably hoping to get their hands on some evidence that the event was staged. The PRC firmly believes that Chen will push Taiwan towards independence and, needless to say, holds him in a hostile light. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese public is losing confidence in him as well—his approval ratings have sunk to below 30 percent according to polling data provided by the New York Times. All of this is just to say that Chen should be cautious in his actions.

Chen’s decision to terminate the National Unification Council and Guidelines was incredibly bold in many respects. The obvious repercussions are the reaction it generated with the government of the People’s Republic and the escalation of the already volatile tension between Taiwan and the mainland, which threatens to affect the relationship of each with the US and Japan. The implications for Taiwan’s relationship with the US, however, are more severe than most realize. In 2000, not long after Chen was elected to the presidency for the first term, he was urged by the US to issue “Five No’s” as a gesture to the PRC. Among the five was a previously unmentioned statement promising the non-abolition of the National Unification Guidelines. This recent move by Chen, then, is not only a breach of promise against China, but also breach of good will with the US. As Washington is likely the only government that would be willing to aid Taiwan politically and militarily in the event of an attack (as Taiwan cannot defend against China on its own), Chen needs to take US concerns seriously.

Chen, and the US for that matter, would be mistaken to think that China would not live up to its threat of war against Taiwan. As the governments on either side of the strait open up to increasing economic and social exchanges, they are bound to have more productive discussions on political issues as well. The unification impasse should be approached by both sides in a calmer manner as any provocation may result in conflict on a global scale.